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Talmud

זבחים פ״ט א:א׳-צ״ב א:ה׳

Zevachim 89a:1-92a:5

Hebrew

מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַתָּדִיר מֵחֲבֵירוֹ – קוֹדֵם אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ. הַתְּמִידִין קוֹדְמִין לְמוּסָפִין. מוּסְפֵי שַׁבָּת קוֹדְמִין לְמוּסְפֵי רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ. מוּסְפֵי רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ קוֹדְמִין לְמוּסְפֵי רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״מִלְּבַד עֹלַת הַבֹּקֶר אֲשֶׁר לְעֹלַת הַתָּמִיד תַּעֲשׂוּ אֶת אֵלֶּה״.,גְּמָ׳ מְנָא לַן? מְנָא לַן?! כִּדְקָאָמַר טַעְמָא: ״מִלְּבַד עֹלַת הַבֹּקֶר״! דִּילְמָא תְּמִידִין הֵן דְּקָדְמִי לְמוּסָפִין – מִשּׁוּם דִּתְדִירִי; מוּסָפִין לְמוּסָפִין מְנָא לַן?,אָמַר רַבִּי אִילְעָא, דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״כָּאֵלֶּה תַּעֲשׂוּ לַיּוֹם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים״ – אֵלֶּה כָּאֵלֶּה.,וְהַאי מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְגוּפֵיהּ! אִם כֵּן, נִיכְתּוֹב: ״אֵלֶּה תַּעֲשׂוּ לַיּוֹם״.,אִי כְּתַב ״אֵלֶּה תַּעֲשׂוּ לַיּוֹם שִׁבְעַת הַיָּמִים״, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אֵלֶּה לְשִׁבְעַת הַיָּמִים (אִין, מִידֵּי אַחֲרִינָא לָא)! ״לַיּוֹם״ כְּתִיב.,וְאַכַּתִּי אֵימָא: אֵלֶּה לַיּוֹם, אֲבָל שְׁאָר יוֹמֵי לָא יָדַעְנָא כַּמָּה! אָמַר קְרָא ״תַּעֲשׂוּ״ – שֶׁיְּהוּ כׇּל הָעֲשִׂיּוֹת שָׁווֹת.,אַבָּיֵי אָמַר מִגּוּפַהּ דִּקְרָא: אִם כֵּן, לֵימָא קְרָא ״מִלְּבַד עֹלַת הַבֹּקֶר״ וְתִישְׁתּוֹק, ״אֲשֶׁר לְעֹלַת הַתָּמִיד״ לְמָה לִי? לְמֵימַר דְּהָךְ דִּתְדִירָא תִּיקְדּוֹם.,מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַמְקוּדָּשׁ מֵחֲבֵירוֹ – קוֹדֵם אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ. דַּם הַחַטָּאת קוֹדֵם לְדַם הָעוֹלָה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מְרַצֶּה. אֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה קוֹדְמִין לְאֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא כָּלִיל לָאִישִּׁים.,חַטָּאת קוֹדֶמֶת לְאָשָׁם, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדָּמָהּ נִיתָּן לְאַרְבַּע קְרָנוֹת עַל הַיְסוֹד. אָשָׁם קוֹדֵם לְתוֹדָה וְאֵיל נָזִיר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים. תּוֹדָה וְאֵיל נָזִיר קוֹדְמִים לִשְׁלָמִים, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן נֶאֱכָלִין לְיוֹם אֶחָד, וּטְעוּנִין לֶחֶם.,הַשְּׁלָמִים קוֹדְמִין לַבְּכוֹר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן טְעוּנִין מַתַּן אַרְבַּע [וּסְמִיכָה] וּנְסָכִים, וּתְנוּפוֹת חָזֶה וָשׁוֹק. הַבְּכוֹר קוֹדֵם לַמַּעֲשֵׂר, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁקְּדוּשָּׁתוֹ מֵרֶחֶם, וְנֶאֱכָל לַכֹּהֲנִים.,הַמַּעֲשֵׂר קוֹדֵם לָעוֹפוֹת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא זֶבַח, וְיֵשׁ בּוֹ קוֹדֶשׁ קֳדָשִׁים – דָּמוּ וְאֵימוּרָיו. הָעוֹפוֹת קוֹדְמִין לַמְּנָחוֹת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מִינֵי דָמִים. מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִנְחַת נְדָבָה, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא בָּא עַל חֵטְא. חַטַּאת הָעוֹף קוֹדֶמֶת לְעוֹלַת הָעוֹף, וְכֵן בְּהֶקְדֵּישָׁהּ. גְּמָ׳ מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וּפַר שֵׁנִי בֶן בָּקָר תִּקַּח לְחַטָּאת״ –,אִם בָּא לְלַמֵּד שֶׁהֵן שְׁנַיִם, הֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״וַעֲשֵׂה אֶת הָאֶחָד חַטָּאת וְאֶת הָאֶחָד עֹלָה״; מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּפַר שֵׁנִי בֶן בָּקָר תִּקַּח לְחַטָּאת״? שֶׁיָּכוֹל שֶׁיְּהֵא חַטָּאת קוֹדֶמֶת לְכׇל מַעֲשֵׂה עוֹלָה, תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וּפַר שֵׁנִי בֶן בָּקָר תִּקַּח לְחַטָּאת״.,אִי ״פַּר שֵׁנִי״, יָכוֹל תְּהֵא עוֹלָה קוֹדֶמֶת לְחַטָּאת לְכׇל מַעֲשֶׂיהָ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וַעֲשֵׂה אֶת הָאֶחָד חַטָּאת וְאֶת הָאֶחָד עֹלָה״. הָא כֵּיצַד? דַּם חַטָּאת קוֹדֶמֶת לְדַם עוֹלָה – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּרַצָּה; אֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה כּוּ׳.,וְאַמַּאי? מַתָּנָה קַמַּיְיתָא דִּמְכַפְּרָה – תִּיקְדּוֹם, וְהָנָךְ לָא!,אָמַר רָבִינָא: הָכָא בְּחַטַּאת הַלְוִיִּם עָסְקִינַן; וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּכִי עוֹלָה דָּמֵי, קָאָמַר רַחֲמָנָא הִיא תִּיקְדּוֹם. בְּמַעְרְבָא אָמְרִי: הוֹאִיל וְהִתְחִיל בְּמַתָּנוֹת, גּוֹמֵר.,אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: דַּם חַטָּאת וְאֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה, אֵיזֶה מֵהֶן קוֹדֵם? דַּם חַטָּאת קוֹדֵם – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁמְּרַצֶּה, אוֹ דִילְמָא אֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה קוֹדְמִין – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן כָּלִיל לָאִישִּׁים?,תָּא שְׁמַע: דַּם חַטָּאת קוֹדֵם לְדַם עוֹלָה. לְדַם עוֹלָה הוּא דְּקָדֵים, לְאֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה לָא קָדֵים.,אַדְּרַבָּה, מִסֵּיפָא: אֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה קוֹדְמִין לְאֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת. לְאֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת הוּא דְּקָדֵים, לְדַם חַטָּאת לָא קָדֵים! אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.,אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: דַּם עוֹלָה וְאֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת, אֵיזֶה מֵהֶן קוֹדֵם? דַּם עוֹלָה קוֹדֵם – דְּקָאָתֵי מִכֹּחַ כָּלִיל, אוֹ דִילְמָא אֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת קוֹדְמִין – (דְּקָאָתֵי) [דְּקָאָתוּ] מִכֹּחַ מְכַפֵּר?,תָּא שְׁמַע: דַּם חַטָּאת קוֹדֵם לְדַם עוֹלָה. דַּם חַטָּאת הוּא דְּקָדֵים לְדַם עוֹלָה, אֲבָל אֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת לָא.,אַדְּרַבָּה, מִסֵּיפָא: אֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה קוֹדְמִין לְאֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת. אֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה הוּא דְּקָדְמִי לְאֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת, אֲבָל דָּם עוֹלָה לָא! אֶלָּא מֵהָא לֵיכָּא לְמִשְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.,אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: דַּם עוֹלָה וְדַם אָשָׁם, אֵיזֶה מֵהֶן קוֹדֵם? דַּם עוֹלָה קוֹדֵם – דְּקָאָתֵי מִכֹּחַ כָּלִיל; אוֹ דִילְמָא דַּם אָשָׁם קוֹדֵם – (דְּקָאָתֵי מִכֹּחַ) דִּמְכַפֵּר?,תָּא שְׁמַע: דַּם חַטָּאת קוֹדֵם לְדַם עוֹלָה. אֲבָל דַּם אָשָׁם – לָא.,בְּדִין הוּא דְּאִיבְּעִי לְמִיתְנֵי דַּם אָשָׁם; וְאַיְּידֵי דִּבְעָא לְמִיתְנֵי סֵיפָא: אֵיבְרֵי עוֹלָה קוֹדְמִין לְאֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת –,דְּאִי תְּנָא לְאֵימוּרֵי אָשָׁם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: לְאֵימוּרֵי אָשָׁם הוּא דְּקָדְמִי, לְאֵימוּרֵי חַטָּאת לָא קָדְמִי – מִשּׁוּם הָכִי תְּנָא חַטָּאת.,תָּא שְׁמַע: חַטָּאת קוֹדֶם לְאָשָׁם – חַטָּאת הוּא דְּקָדְמָה לֵיהּ לְאָשָׁם, אֲבָל עוֹלָה לָא. מַאי, לָאו דָּם?,לָא; אַאֵימוּרִים. דַּיְקָא נָמֵי, דְּקָתָנֵי ״מִפְּנֵי שֶׁדָּמָהּ נִיתָּן״. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.,חַטָּאת קוֹדֶמֶת כּוּ׳. אַדְּרַבָּה – אָשָׁם קָדֵים, שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ לוֹ קִיצְּבָה! אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, רִיבּוּי דְּמִזְבֵּחַ עֲדִיף.,אָשָׁם קוֹדֵם לְתוֹדָה כּוּ׳. אַדְּרַבָּה – הַתּוֹדָה וְאֵיל נָזִיר קָדְמִי, שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנִין לֶחֶם! אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים עֲדִיפִי.,תּוֹדָה וְאֵיל נָזִיר כּוּ׳. אַדְּרַבָּה – שְׁלָמִים קָדְמִי, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּצִיבּוּר כִּבְיָחִיד! אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, נֶאֱכָלִין לְיוֹם אֶחָד עֲדִיפִי.,אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: תּוֹדָה וְאֵיל נָזִיר – אֵיזֶה מֵהֶן קוֹדֵם? תּוֹדָה קָדְמָה, שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה אַרְבָּעָה מִינֵי לֶחֶם; אוֹ דִילְמָא אֵיל נָזִיר קוֹדֵם, שֶׁכֵּן יֵשׁ עִמּוֹ דָּמִים אֲחֵרִים? תָּא שְׁמַע: זוֹ קוֹדֶמֶת לָזוֹ, שֶׁזּוֹ טְעוּנָה אַרְבָּעָה מִינֵי לֶחֶם, וְזוֹ אֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה אֶלָּא שְׁנֵי מִינֵי לֶחֶם.,וְהַשְּׁלָמִים קוֹדְמִין לִבְכוֹר כּוּ׳. אַדְּרַבָּה – בְּכוֹר קוֹדֵם, שֶׁכֵּן קְדוּשָּׁתוֹ מֵרֶחֶם, וְנֶאֱכָל לַכֹּהֲנִים! אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, מִצְוֹת יְתֵירוֹת עֲדִיפִי.,הַבְּכוֹר קוֹדֵם כּוּ׳. אַדְּרַבָּה – מַעֲשֵׂר קוֹדֵם, שֶׁכֵּן מְקַדֵּשׁ לְפָנָיו וּלְאַחֲרָיו! אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, קְדוּשָּׁה מֵרֶחֶם עֲדִיפָא.,מַעֲשֵׂר קוֹדֵם לָעוֹפוֹת כּוּ׳. אַדְּרַבָּה – עוֹפוֹת קָדְמִי, שֶׁכֵּן קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים! אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, מִין זֶבַח עָדִיף.,אָמַר רָבִינָא בַּר שֵׁילָא: אֵימוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁיָּצְאוּ לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – פְּסוּלִין. וּתְנָא תּוּנָא: מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא זֶבַח, וְיֶשְׁנוֹ קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים – דָּמָיו וְאֵימוּרִין.,בִּשְׁלָמָא אֵימוּרִין – לֵיתַנְהוּ בְּעוֹפוֹת; אֶלָּא דָּם מִיהָא אִיתֵיהּ! אֶלָּא לָאו קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: אֵימוּרִין כִּי דָּמוֹ –,מָה דָּמוֹ לִפְנֵי זְרִיקָה, אַף אֵימוּרִין קוֹדֶם זְרִיקָה – וְקָא קָרֵי לְהוּ קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים; וּמָה דָּמוֹ מִיפְּסֵל בְּיוֹצֵא, אַף אֵימוּרִין מִיפְּסֵל בְּיוֹצֵא.,נֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: בְּשַׂר קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁיָּצָא לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: כָּשֵׁר, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר: פְּסוּל.,רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר כָּשֵׁר – הוֹאִיל וְסוֹפוֹ לָצֵאת, רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ אָמַר פָּסוּל – עֲדַיִין לֹא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנּוֹ לָצֵאת. עַד כָּאן לָא פְּלִיגִי – אֶלָּא בְּבָשָׂר, אֲבָל בְּאֵימוּרִין לָא!,הוּא הַדִּין דִּבְאֵימוּרִין נָמֵי פְּלִיגִי; וְהָא דְּקָא מִיפַּלְגִי בְּבָשָׂר – לְהוֹדִיעֲךָ כֹּחוֹ דְּרֵישׁ לָקִישׁ, דַּאֲפִילּוּ בָּשָׂר דְּסוֹפָהּ לָצֵאת, אֲמַר: עֲדַיִין לֹא הִגִּיעַ זְמַנּוֹ לָצֵאת.,לֵימָא כְּתַנָּאֵי: אֵימוּרֵי קָדָשִׁים קַלִּים שֶׁיָּצְאוּ לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים – רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אֵין מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן, וְאֵין חַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא; רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמֵר: מוֹעֲלִין בָּהֶן, וְחַיָּיבִין עֲלֵיהֶן מִשּׁוּם פִּיגּוּל נוֹתָר וְטָמֵא.,מַאי, לָאו בְּדַהֲדַר עַיְּילִינְהוּ פְּלִיגִי? וּבְהָא פְּלִיגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר מִיפַּסְלִי בְּיוֹצֵא, וּמָר סָבַר לָא מִיפַּסְלִי בְּיוֹצֵא.,אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: בְּדַהֲדַר עַיְּילִינְהוּ – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי; וְהָכָא בִּדְאִיתַנְהוּ אַבָּרַאי פְּלִיגִי, וּבְהָא פְּלִיגִי: דְּמָר סָבַר אֵין זְרִיקָה מוֹעֶלֶת לַיּוֹצֵא, וּמָר סָבַר זְרִיקָה מוֹעֶלֶת לַיּוֹצֵא.,וְהָא רַב פָּפָּא הוּא דְּאָמַר: בִּדְאִיתַנְהוּ אַבָּרַאי – כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי, בִּדְעַיְּילִינְהוּ לְגַוַּואי פְּלִיגִי!,הָנֵי מִילֵּי גַּבֵּי שְׁתֵּי לֶחֶם – דְּלָאו גּוּפֵיהּ דְּזִיבְחָא; אֲבָל אֵימוּרִין, דְּגוּפֵיהּ דְּזִיבְחָא הוּא – בִּדְאִיתַנְהוּ אַבָּרַאי פְּלִיגִי.,עוֹפוֹת קוֹדְמִין כּוּ׳. אַדְּרַבָּה – מְנָחוֹת קוֹדְמוֹת, שֶׁכֵּן יֶשְׁנָן בְּצִבּוּר כְּבַיָּחִיד! אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, מִינֵי דָמִים עֲדִיפִי.,מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא כּוּ׳. אַדְּרַבָּה – מִנְחַת נְדָבָה קוֹדֶמֶת, שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה שֶׁמֶן וּלְבוֹנָה! אֲפִילּוּ הָכִי, מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא הַבָּאָה עַל חֵטְא עֲדִיפָא, דִּמְכַפֶּרֶת.,אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: מִנְחַת סוֹטָה וּמִנְחַת נְדָבָה, אֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן קוֹדֶמֶת? מִנְחַת נְדָבָה קָדְמָה – שֶׁכֵּן טְעוּנָה שֶׁמֶן (אוֹ) וּלְבוֹנָה, אוֹ דִלְמָא מִנְחַת סוֹטָה קָדְמָה – שֶׁכֵּן בָּאָה לְבָרֵר עָוֹן?,תָּא שְׁמַע: מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא קוֹדֶמֶת לְמִנְחַת נְדָבָה. מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא הוּא דְּקָדְמָה לְמִנְחַת נְדָבָה, הָא מִנְחַת סוֹטָה – לָא! מִי קָתָנֵי ״מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא מְכַפֶּרֶת״?! ״מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא״ קָתָנֵי, וְהָא נָמֵי בָּאָה עַל חֵטְא.,תָּא שְׁמַע: זוֹ קוֹדֶמֶת לָזוֹ, שֶׁזּוֹ בָּאָה מִן הַחִיטִּין וְזוֹ בָּאָה מִן הַשְּׂעוֹרִין. מַאי, לָאו מִנְחַת נְדָבָה לְמִנְחַת סוֹטָה? לָא, מִנְחַת חוֹטֵא לְמִנְחַת סוֹטָה.,תִּיפּוֹק לִי דְּהָא מְכַפְּרָא וְהָא לָא מְכַפְּרָא!,וְאֶלָּא מַאי, מִנְחַת נְדָבָה? תִּיפּוֹק לִי דְּזוֹ טְעוּנָה שֶׁמֶן וּלְבוֹנָה, וְזוֹ אֵינָהּ טְעוּנָה שֶׁמֶן וּלְבוֹנָה! אֶלָּא חַד מִתְּרֵי טַעְמֵי [נָקֵיט].,חַטַּאת הָעוֹף קוֹדֶמֶת כּוּ׳. מְנָא הָנֵי מִילֵּי? דְּתָנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״וְהִקְרִיב אֶת אֲשֶׁר לַחַטָּאת רִאשׁוֹנָה״ – מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר? שֶׁאֵין תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר לְלַמֵּד שֶׁתִּקְרַב רִאשׁוֹנָה, הֲרֵי כְּבָר נֶאֱמַר: ״וְאֶת הַשֵּׁנִי יַעֲשֶׂה עֹלָה״.,אֶלָּא זֶה בָּנָה אָב לְכׇל חַטָּאוֹת שֶׁיִּקְדְּמוּ (לְעוֹלָה) [לְעוֹלוֹת] הַבָּאוֹת עִמָּהֶן – בֵּין חַטַּאת הָעוֹף לְעוֹלַת הָעוֹף, בֵּין חַטַּאת בְּהֵמָה לְעוֹלַת בְּהֵמָה, וַאֲפִילּוּ חַטַּאת הָעוֹף לְעוֹלַת בְּהֵמָה.,הִלְכָּךְ, חַטַּאת הָעוֹף לְעוֹלַת הָעוֹף – מִ״וְּאֶת הַשֵּׁנִי״, חַטַּאת בְּהֵמָה לְעוֹלַת בְּהֵמָה – מִדְּרַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא, חַטַּאת הָעוֹף לְעוֹלַת בְּהֵמָה – מִזֶּה בָּנָה אָב.,תָּא שְׁמַע, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנִּתְחַלְּפָה חַטָּאת – חַטָּאת קוֹדֶמֶת, וְכָאן (בְּיוֹלֶדֶת) – עוֹלָה קוֹדֶמֶת.,כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁבָּא עַל חֵטְא – חַטָּאת קוֹדֶמֶת, וְכָאן עוֹלָה קוֹדֶמֶת; וְכׇל מָקוֹם שֶׁשְּׁנַיִם בָּאִים תַּחַת חַטָּאת – חַטָּאת קוֹדֶמֶת, וְכָאן עוֹלָה קוֹדֶמֶת.,אָמַר רָבָא: לְמִקְרָאָהּ הִקְדִּימָהּ הַכָּתוּב.,תָּא שְׁמַע: פָּרִים קוֹדְמִין לְאֵילִים, וְאֵילִים קוֹדְמִין לִכְבָשִׁים, כְּבָשִׂים לִשְׂעִירִים. מַאי, לָאו דְּחַג? לָא, לִנְדָבָה. פָּרִים קוֹדְמִין לְאֵילִים – שֶׁכֵּן נִתְרַבּוּ בִּנְסָכִים. וְכֵן אֵילִים לִכְבָשִׂים. כְּבָשִׂים לִשְׂעִירִים – שֶׁכֵּן נִתְרַבּוּ בְּאַלְיָה.,תָּא שְׁמַע: פַּר כֹּהֵן מָשִׁיחַ קוֹדֵם לְפַר הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר שֶׁל צִבּוּר, פַּר הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר שֶׁל צִבּוּר קוֹדֵם לְפַר עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה,,פַּר עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה קוֹדֵם לִשְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה. דְּאַף עַל גַּב דְּפַר עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה עוֹלָה, וּשְׂעִירֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה חַטָּאת!,וְאֵימָא מֵרֵישָׁא: פַּר הֶעְלֵם דָּבָר שֶׁל צִבּוּר קוֹדֵם לְפַר עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה!,בְּחַד מִינָא מִיהָא לָא קָאָמְרִינַן, דְּחַטָּאת קָדְמָה. כִּי קָאָמְרִינַן בִּתְרֵי מִינֵי – אַשְׁכְּחַן עוֹלָה דְּקָדְמָה לְחַטָּאת!,אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא מִשְּׁמֵיהּ דְּרָבָא בַּר מָרִי: חַטַּאת עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה חָסֵר א׳ – ״לְחַטָּת״ כְּתִיב. רָבִינָא אָמַר: ״כַּמִּשְׁפָּט״ כְּתִיב בְּהוּ.,הַשְׁתָּא דְּאָתֵית לְהָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא פָּרִים דְּחַג נָמֵי – ״כְּמִשְׁפָּטָם״ כְּתִיב בְּהוּ.,אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: חַטַּאת הָעוֹף וְעוֹלַת בְּהֵמָה וּמַעֲשֵׂר, אֵיזוֹ מֵהֶן קוֹדֵם? תִּיקְדּוֹם חַטַּאת הָעוֹף – אִיכָּא מַעֲשֵׂר דְּקָדֵים לַהּ. לִיקְדּוֹם מַעֲשֵׂר – אִיכָּא עוֹלַת בְּהֵמָה דְּקָדְמָה לֵיהּ. תִּיקְדּוֹם עוֹלַת בְּהֵמָה – אִיכָּא חַטַּאת הָעוֹף דְּקָדְמָה לַהּ.,הָכָא תַּרְגִּימוּ: מִין זֶבַח עֲדִיף. בְּמַעְרְבָא אָמְרִי: עָיְילָא בַּהּ עוֹלַת בְּהֵמָה בְּחַטַּאת הָעוֹף, וְאַגְבַּהְתַּהּ מִמַּעֲשֵׂר.,מַתְנִי׳ כׇּל הַחַטָּאוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה קוֹדְמוֹת לָאֲשָׁמוֹת, חוּץ מֵאֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע – מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא בָּא עַל הֶכְשֵׁר.,כָּל הָאֲשָׁמוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה בָּאִין בְּנֵי שְׁתַּיִם וּבָאִין בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים, חוּץ מֵאֲשַׁם נָזִיר וַאֲשַׁם מְצוֹרָע – שֶׁהֵן בָּאִין בְּנֵי שֶׁנָּתָן, וְאֵין בָּאִין בְּכֶסֶף שְׁקָלִים.,כְּשֵׁם שֶׁקּוֹדְמִין בְּהַקְרָבָתָן, קוֹדְמִין בַּאֲכִילָתָן. שְׁלָמִים שֶׁל אֶמֶשׁ וּשְׁלָמִים שֶׁל יוֹם – שֶׁל אֶמֶשׁ קוֹדְמִין לְשֶׁל יוֹם. שְׁלָמִים שֶׁל אֶמֶשׁ, חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם שֶׁל הַיּוֹם – שְׁלָמִים שֶׁל אֶמֶשׁ קוֹדְמִין. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: חַטָּאת קוֹדֶמֶת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא קׇדְשֵׁי קָדָשִׁים.,וְכוּלָּן הַכֹּהֲנִים רַשָּׁאִין לְשַׁנּוֹת בַּאֲכִילָתָן – לְאָכְלָן צְלוּיִן וּשְׁלוּקִין וּמְבוּשָּׁלִין, לָתֵת לְתוֹכוֹ תַּבְלֵי חוּלִּין וְתַבְלֵי תְרוּמָה. דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: לֹא יִתֵּן לְתוֹכוֹ תַּבְלֵי תְרוּמָה, שֶׁלֹּא יָבִיא הַתְּרוּמָה לִידֵי פְסוּל.,גְּמָ׳ אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: תָּדִיר וּמְקוּדָּשׁ, אֵיזֶה מֵהֶם קוֹדֵם? תָּדִיר קוֹדֵם – מִשּׁוּם דִּתְדִיר, אוֹ דִלְמָא מְקוּדָּשׁ קָדֵים – דְּקַדִּישׁ? תָּא שְׁמַע: תְּמִידִין קוֹדְמִין לְמוּסָפִין. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּמוּסָפִין קַדִּישִׁי! אַטּוּ שַׁבָּת לְמוּסָפִין אַהֲנַאי, לִתְמִידִין לָא אַהֲנַאי?!,תָּא שְׁמַע: מוּסְפֵי שַׁבָּת קוֹדְמִין לְמוּסְפֵי רֹאשׁ חוֹדֶשׁ! אַטּוּ רֹאשׁ חוֹדֶשׁ לְמוּסָפִין דִּידֵיהּ אַהֲנִי, לְמוּסְפֵי שַׁבָּת לָא אַהֲנִי?!,תָּא שְׁמַע: מוּסְפֵי רֹאשׁ חוֹדֶשׁ קוֹדְמִין לְמוּסְפֵי רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה. אַף עַל גַּב דְּרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה קַדִּשָׁה! אַטּוּ רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה לְמוּסְפֵי דִּידֵיהּ אַהֲנִי, לְמוּסְפֵי רֹאשׁ חוֹדֶשׁ לָא אַהֲנִי?!,תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּבָר אַחֵר – בִּרְכַּת הַיַּיִן תְּדִירָה וּבִרְכַּת הַיּוֹם אֵינָהּ תְּדִירָה, וְתָדִיר וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ תָּדִיר – תָּדִיר קוֹדֵם. אַף עַל גַּב דְּבִרְכַּת הַיּוֹם קַדִּישָׁה! אַטּוּ שַׁבָּת לְבִרְכַּת הַיּוֹם אַהֲנַאי, לְבִרְכַּת הַיַּיִן לָא אַהֲנַאי?!,תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה – מִתְפַּלֵּל אָדָם שֶׁל מִנְחָה, וְאַחַר כָּךְ שֶׁל מוּסָפִין! אַטּוּ שַׁבָּת לִתְפִלַּת מוּסָפִין אַהֲנַאי, לִתְפִלַּת מִנְחָה לָא אַהֲנַאי?!,תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁלָמִים שֶׁל אֶמֶשׁ, חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם שֶׁל יוֹם – שְׁלָמִים שֶׁל אֶמֶשׁ קוֹדְמִין. הָא אִידֵּי וְאִידֵּי דְּיוֹם – חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם קָדְמִי, וְאַף עַל גַּב דִּשְׁלָמִים תְּדִירִי!,אָמַר רָבָא: מָצוּי קָאָמְרַתְּ?! תָּדִיר קָמִיבַּעְיָא לַן, מָצוּי לָא קָמִיבַּעְיָא לַן.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בַּר יְהוּדָה לְרָבָא: אַטּוּ מָצוּי לָאו תָּדִיר?! וְהָתַנְיָא: אוֹצִיא אֶת הַפֶּסַח שֶׁאֵינוֹ תָּדִיר, וְלֹא אוֹצִיא אֶת הַמִּילָה שֶׁהִיא תְּדִירָה!,מַאי תְּדִירָה – תְּדִירָה בְּמִצְוֹת. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: מִילָה לְגַבֵּי פֶּסַח – כִּי תָדִיר דָּמְיָא.,אִיבַּעְיָא לְהוּ: תָּדִיר וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ תָּדִיר, וּקְדֵים וּשְׁחַט לְשֶׁאֵינוֹ תָּדִיר, מַאי? מִי אָמְרִינַן: כֵּיוָן דְּשַׁחְטֵיהּ – מַקְרֵיב לֵיהּ; אוֹ דִלְמָא, יָהֵיב לְאַחֵר דִּמְמָרֵס בְּדָמוֹ עַד דְּמַקְרֵיב לֵיהּ לְתָדִיר, וַהֲדַר מַקְרֵיב לְשֶׁאֵינוֹ תָּדִיר?,אָמַר רַב הוּנָא מִסּוּרָא, תָּא שְׁמַע: שְׁלָמִים שֶׁל אֶמֶשׁ, חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם שֶׁל יוֹם – שֶׁל אֶמֶשׁ קוֹדֵם לְשֶׁל יוֹם. הָא דְּיוֹם דּוּמְיָא דְּאֶמֶשׁ –,וְהֵיכִי דָּמֵי, דִּקְדֵים שַׁחְטֵיהּ לִשְׁלָמִים – חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם קָדְמִי!,דִּלְמָא שְׁלָמִים דְּאֶמֶשׁ וְחַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם דְּיוֹם הֵיכִי מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ – דְּשַׁחְטִינְהוּ לְתַרְוַיְיהוּ; אֲבָל לָא שַׁחְטִינְהוּ לְתַרְוַיְיהוּ – תִּיבְּעֵי לָךְ.,תָּא שְׁמַע: דָּבָר אַחֵר – בִּרְכַּת הַיַּיִן תְּדִירָה וּבִרְכַּת הַיּוֹם אֵינָהּ תְּדִירָה, וְתָדִיר וְשֶׁאֵינוֹ תָּדִיר – תָּדִיר קוֹדֵם!,הָכָא נָמֵי, דְּכֵיוָן (דְּאָתְיָין) [דַּאֲתָא יַיִן] – כְּמַאן דִּשְׁחִיטִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ דָּמֵי.,תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּאָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: הֲלָכָה, מִתְפַּלֵּל אָדָם שֶׁל מִנְחָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ שֶׁל מוּסָפִין! הָכָא נָמֵי, כֵּיוָן דְּמָטֵי זְמַן תְּפִלַּת מִנְחָה – כְּמַאן דִּשְׁחִיטִי תַּרְוַיְיהוּ דָּמֵי.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אָשֵׁי לְרָבִינָא: שְׁחָטוֹ קוֹדֶם חֲצוֹת – פָּסוּל, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בּוֹ ״בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם״. קוֹדֶם לַתָּמִיד – כָּשֵׁר, וִיהֵא מְמָרֵס בְּדָמוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּזְרוֹק הַדָּם!,הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, כְּגוֹן דִּקְדֵים שַׁחְטֵיהּ לְתָמִיד בְּרֵישָׁא. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב אַחָא סָבָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא – דְּקָתָנֵי ״עַד שֶׁיִּזָּרֵק הַדָּם״ (תָּמִיד), וְלָא קָתָנֵי ״עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁחוֹט וְיִזְרֹק דָּם״. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ.,וּבְכוּלָּן כֹּהֲנִים רַשָּׁאִין כּוּ׳. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא ״לְמׇשְׁחָה״ – לִגְדוּלָּה, כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁהַמְּלָכִים אוֹכְלִין.,מַתְנִי׳ אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אִם רָאִיתָ שֶׁמֶן שֶׁהוּא מִתְחַלֵּק בַּעֲזָרָה – אֵין צָרִיךְ לִשְׁאוֹל מַהוּ; אֶלָּא מוֹתַר רְקִיקֵי מְנָחוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל, וְלוֹג שֶׁמֶן שֶׁל מְצוֹרָע.,אִם רָאִיתָ שֶׁמֶן שֶׁהוּא נִיתָּן עַל גַּבֵּי הָאִישִּׁים – אֵין צָרִיךְ לִשְׁאוֹל מַהוּ; אֶלָּא מוֹתַר רְקִיקֵי מִנְחַת כֹּהֲנִים וּמִנְחַת כֹּהֵן מָשִׁיחַ, שֶׁאֵין מִתְנַדְּבִין שֶׁמֶן. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר: מִתְנַדְּבִין שֶׁמֶן. גְּמָ׳ אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לְדִבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, הַמִּתְנַדֵּב שֶׁמֶן – קוֹמְצוֹ וּשְׁיָרָיו נֶאֱכָלִין. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״קׇרְבַּן מִנְחָה״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁמִּתְנַדְּבִין שֶׁמֶן; וְכִי מִנְחָה – מָה מִנְחָה קוֹמְצָהּ וּשְׁיָרֶיהָ נֶאֱכָלִין, אַף שֶׁמֶן קוֹמְצוֹ וּשְׁיָרָיו נֶאֱכָלִין.,אָמַר רַבִּי זֵירָא: אַף אֲנַן נָמֵי תְּנֵינָא, אָמַר רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן: אִם רָאִיתָ שֶׁמֶן שֶׁמִּתְחַלֵּק בַּעֲזָרָה – אִי אַתָּה צָרִיךְ לִשְׁאוֹל מַהוּ; אֶלָּא מוֹתַר רְקִיקֵי מִנְחוֹת יִשְׂרָאֵל וְלוֹג שֶׁמֶן שֶׁל מְצוֹרָע, שֶׁאֵין מִתְנַדְּבִין. מִכְּלָל דְּמַאן דְּאָמַר מִתְנַדְּבִין – מִתְחַלֵּק.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי, אֵימָא סֵיפָא: אִם רָאִיתָ שֶׁמֶן שֶׁנִּיתָּן עַל גַּבֵּי אִישִּׁים – אִי אַתָּה צָרִיךְ לִשְׁאוֹל מַהוּ; אֶלָּא מוֹתַר רְקִיקֵי מִנְחַת כֹּהֲנִים וּמִנְחַת כֹּהֵן מָשִׁיחַ, שֶׁאֵין מִתְנַדְּבִין שֶׁמֶן. מִכְּלָל דִּלְמַאן דְּאָמַר מִתְנַדֵּב – כּוּלָּן לָאִישִּׁים. לְאַבָּיֵי קַשְׁיָא רֵישָׁא, לְרַבִּי זֵירָא קַשְׁיָא סֵיפָא!,בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי זֵירָא – רֵישָׁא בְּשִׁירַיִם, סֵיפָא בְּקוֹמֶץ. אֶלָּא לְאַבָּיֵי – קַשְׁיָא! תְּנָא רֵישָׁא אַטּוּ סֵיפָא.,בִּשְׁלָמָא סֵיפָא – תָּנֵי מִשּׁוּם רֵישָׁא; אֶלָּא רֵישָׁא מִשּׁוּם סֵיפָא מִי תָּנֵי?! אִין; אָמְרִי בְּמַעְרְבָא: תְּנָא רֵישָׁא מִשּׁוּם סֵיפָא.,תָּא שְׁמַע: יַיִן כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – לַסְּפָלִים, שֶׁמֶן כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן – לָאִישִּׁים. מַאי, לָאו מִדְּיַיִן כּוּלּוֹ לַסְּפָלִים, שֶׁמֶן כּוּלּוֹ לָאִישִּׁים? מִידֵּי אִירְיָא? הָא כִּדְאִיתַהּ וְהָא כִּדְאִיתַהּ.,אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא, כְּתַנָּאֵי: שֶׁמֶן לֹא יִפְחוֹת מִלּוֹג. רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: שְׁלֹשֶׁת לוּגִּין. בְּמַאי קָמִיפַּלְגִי? אַמְרוּהָ רַבָּנַן קַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב פָּפָּא: דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ דּוּן מִינַּהּ וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ. ,דְּרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: מָה מִנְחָה מִתְנַדְּבִין, אַף שֶׁמֶן מִתְנַדְּבִין [וּמִינַּהּ – מָה מִנְחָה לוֹג שֶׁמֶן, אַף כָּאן לוֹג שֶׁמֶן. וּמָה מִנְחָה קוֹמְצָהּ וּשְׁיָרֶיהָ נֶאֱכָלִין, אַף שֶׁמֶן קוֹמְצוֹ וּשְׁיָרָיו נֶאֱכָלִין].,וְאִידַּךְ – מִמִּנְחָה: מָה מִנְחָה מִתְנַדְּבִין, אַף שֶׁמֶן מִתְנַדְּבִין; וְאוֹקֵי בְּאַתְרַהּ – כִּנְסָכִים: מָה נְסָכִים שְׁלֹשֶׁת לוּגִּין [אַף שֶׁמֶן (שלש) [שְׁלֹשָׁה] לוּגִּין, וּמָה נְסָכִים כּוּלָּן לַסְּפָלִין] – אַף שֶׁמֶן (כּוּלָּן) [כּוּלּוֹ] לָאִישִּׁים.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא לְאַבָּיֵי: אִי מִמִּנְחָה מַיְיתֵי לַהּ [רַבִּי], דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא דּוּן מִינַּהּ וּמִינַּהּ! אֶלָּא רַבִּי מֵ״אֶזְרָח״ גָּמַר לַהּ.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב נָתָן לְרַב פָּפָּא: מִי מָצֵית אָמְרַתְּ הָכִי?! וְהָתַנְיָא: ״קׇרְבַּן מִנְחָה״ – מְלַמֵּד שֶׁמִּתְנַדְּבִין שֶׁמֶן. וְכַמָּה? שְׁלֹשָׁה לוּגִּין. וּמַאן שָׁמְעַתְּ לֵיהּ דְּאָמַר שְׁלֹשָׁה לוּגִּין – רַבִּי הִיא; וְקָא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מִ״קׇּרְבָּן״! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: אִי תַּנְיָא תַּנְיָא.,אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: הַמִּתְנַדֵּב יַיִן, מֵבִיא וּמְזַלְּפוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הָאִישִּׁים. מַאי טַעְמָא? אָמַר קְרָא: ״וְיַיִן תַּקְרִיב לַנֶּסֶךְ חֲצִי הַהִין אִשֵּׁה רֵיחַ נִיחֹחַ לַה׳״. וְהָא קָא מְכַבֵּי! כִּיבּוּי בְּמִקְצָת לָא שְׁמֵיהּ כִּיבּוּי.,אִינִי?! וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר רַבָּה בַּר אֲבוּהּ: הַמּוֹרִיד גַּחֶלֶת מֵעַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְכִיבָּהּ – חַיָּיב, דְּלֵיכָּא אֶלָּא הַאי! אִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: כִּיבּוּי דְּמִצְוָה שָׁאנֵי.,תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנָא רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר בֶּן יַעֲקֹב: כְּלַפֵּי שֶׁנִּתְּנָה תּוֹרָה לִתְרוֹם, יָכוֹל יְכַבֶּה וְיִתְרוֹם? אָמְרַתְּ: לֹא יְכַבֶּה! שָׁאנֵי הָתָם, אֶפְשָׁר דְּיָתֵיב וְנָטַר.,תָּא שְׁמַע: יַיִן כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא – לַסְּפָלִים, שֶׁמֶן כְּדִבְרֵי רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן – לָאִישִּׁים! וְעוֹד תַּנְיָא: יַיִן (נסך) – [לְנַסֵּךְ] לַסְּפָלִים. אוֹ אֵינוֹ אֶלָּא לָאִישִּׁים? אָמַרְתָּ: לֹא יְכַבֶּה!,לָא קַשְׁיָא; הָא רַבִּי יְהוּדָה, הָא רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן. לְמֵימְרָא דִּשְׁמוּאֵל כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ?! וְהָאָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מְכַבִּין גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל מַתֶּכֶת בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁלֹּא יִזּוֹקוּ בָּהּ רַבִּים. אֲבָל לֹא גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל עֵץ. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן סְבִירָא לֵיהּ, אֲפִילּוּ גַּחֶלֶת שֶׁל עֵץ נָמֵי!,בְּדָבָר שֶׁאֵין מִתְכַּוֵּין – סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן, בִּמְלָאכָה שֶׁאֵינָהּ צְרִיכָה לְגוּפָהּ – סָבַר לַהּ כְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה.,אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: נְסָכִים שֶׁנִּטְמְאוּ – עוֹשֶׂה לָהֶן מַעֲרָכָה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָן וְשׂוֹרְפָן, מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בַּקֹּדֶשׁ בָּאֵשׁ תִּשָּׂרֵף״. תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: הַדָּם וְהַשֶּׁמֶן וְהַמְּנָחוֹת וְהַנְּסָכִים שֶׁנִּטְמְאוּ – עוֹשֶׂה לָהֶן מַעֲרָכָה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָן וְשׂוֹרְפָן.,אֲמַר לֵיהּ שְׁמוּאֵל לְרַב חָנָא בַּגְדָּתָאָה: אַיְיתִי לִי בֵּי עַשְׂרָה, וְאֵימָא לָךְ קַמַּיְיהוּ: נְסָכִים שֶׁנִּטְמְאוּ, עוֹשֶׂה לָהֶן מַעֲרָכָה בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָן וְשׂוֹרְפָן.,הֲדַרַן עֲלָךְ כׇּל הַתָּדִיר,מַתְנִי׳ דַּם חַטָּאת שֶׁנִּתַּז עַל הַבֶּגֶד – הֲרֵי זֶה טָעוּן כִּיבּוּס, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר אֶלָּא בְּנֶאֱכָלוֹת – שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״בְּמָקוֹם קָדוֹשׁ תֵּאָכֵל״. אֶחָד הַנֶּאֱכָלוֹת וְאֶחָד הַפְּנִימִיּוֹת טְעוּנוֹת כִּיבּוּס, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״תּוֹרַת הַחַטָּאת״ – תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל הַחַטָּאוֹת.,חַטָּאת פְּסוּלָה – אֵין דָּמָהּ טָעוּן כִּיבּוּס, בֵּין שֶׁהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר וּבֵין שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר. אֵיזוֹ הִיא שֶׁהָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר? שֶׁלָּנָה, וְשֶׁנִּטְמְאָה, וְשֶׁיָּצָאת. וְאֵיזוֹ הִיא שֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה לָהּ שְׁעַת הַכּוֹשֶׁר? שֶׁנִּשְׁחֲטָה חוּץ לִזְמַנָּהּ וְחוּץ לִמְקוֹמָהּ, וְשֶׁקִּיבְּלוּ פְּסוּלִין (וְזָרְקוּ) אֶת דָּמָהּ.,גְּמָ׳ דַּם חַטָּאת (שֶׁמֵּתָה) [שֶׁנִּתַּז] כּוּ׳. וְאִי תּוֹרָה אַחַת לְכׇל חַטָּאוֹת, אֲפִילּוּ חַטַּאת הָעוֹף נָמֵי! אַלְּמָה תַּנְיָא: יָכוֹל תְּהֵא דַּם חַטַּאת הָעוֹף טָעוּן כִּיבּוּס? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״זֹאת״.,אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ מִשּׁוּם בַּר קַפָּרָא, אָמַר קְרָא: ״תִּשָּׁחֵט״ – בְּנִשְׁחָטוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר.,וְאֵימָא בְּנֶאֱכָלוֹת הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר – כְּדִכְתִיב: ״בְּמָקוֹם קָדוֹשׁ תֵּאָכֵל״, אֲבָל פְּנִימִיּוֹת לָא! רַבִּי רַחֲמָנָא ״תּוֹרַת״.,אִי הָכִי, אֲפִילּוּ חַטַּאת הָעוֹף נָמֵי! מִיעֵט רַחֲמָנָא ״זֹאת״.,וּמָה רָאִיתָ? מִסְתַּבְּרָא דְּחַטַּאת [בְּהֵמָה] פְּנִימִיּוֹת הֲוָה לֵיהּ לְרַבּוֹיֵי – שֶׁכֵּן בְּהֵמָה, שְׁחִיטַת צָפוֹן, וְקַבָּלַת כְּלִי,

English Translation

MISHNA: Any offering that is more frequent than another precedes the other offering. Therefore, the daily offerings precede the additional offerings, which are sacrificed only on certain days. When Shabbat and the New Moon coincide, the additional Shabbat offerings precede the additional New Moon offerings. Likewise, the additional New Moon offerings precede the additional New Year offerings. The mishna cites the source for the principle that the frequent precedes the less frequent: As it is stated with regard to the additional offerings of the first day of Passover: “Besides the burnt offering of the morning, which is for a daily burnt offering, you shall offer these” (Numbers 28:23). The verse indicates that the daily offering is sacrificed first, and then the additional offerings are sacrificed.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the principle that the frequent precedes the less frequent? The Gemara expresses puzzlement at this question: From where do we derive this? One must say that the reason is stated in the mishna, which says that it is derived from the verse: “Besides the burnt offering of the morning.” The Gemara explains: If that verse is the only source, it could be claimed that perhaps it is only the daily offerings that precede the additional offerings, because they are far more frequent, as they are sacrificed daily. With regard to the precedence of a relatively frequent additional offering over a relatively less frequent additional offering, the question arises: From where do we derive this?,Rabbi Ile’a said that it is derived from the fact that the verse states with regard to the additional offerings of Passover: “Like these you shall offer daily, for seven days” (Numbers 28:24). This verse, which immediately follows the one cited previously, indicates that the principle that governs these additional offerings shall be like the principle governing those daily offerings and additional offerings mentioned previously, i.e., the more frequent precedes the less frequent.,The Gemara challenges: But that verse is required to teach its own halakha, that the additional offerings of the first day of Passover recur on each day of Passover. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse write: These you shall offer daily. Since the Torah writes: “Like these,” both the halakha that these additional offerings are brought on each day of Passover and the principle concerning precedence can be derived from this verse.,The Gemara rejects this suggestion: If the verse had written only: These you shall offer daily for the seven days, I would say that these offerings mentioned in the previous verse are sacrificed in total, over the seven days. Therefore, the Torah writes: “Like these,” to teach that they are all sacrificed each day. The Gemara counters: That interpretation is not possible, as the phrase: “You shall offer daily,” is written in the verse, which indicates that these offerings are sacrificed on each of the seven days.,The Gemara challenges: And still, one can say that these specific offerings are required for the first day; but with regard to the other days, I do not know how many offerings are to be sacrificed. Therefore, the term “like these” is needed to teach this, and cannot be used for the principle that relatively frequent additional offerings precede relatively less frequent additional offerings. The Gemara answers: That interpretation is also not possible, as the verse states: “You shall offer [ta’asu],” indicating that all the sacrificial rites [asiyyot] on all the days of Passover should be equal. Therefore, the term “like these” is in fact superfluous and can be cited as the source of the principle of precedence.,Abaye said: The application of the principle of precedence to all frequent offerings can be derived from the verse itself, cited in the mishna. The reason is that if so, that only the daily offering precedes less frequent offerings, let the verse say merely: “Besides the burnt offering of the morning,” and remain silent from the rest of the verse. Why do I need the additional phrase: “Which is for a daily burnt offering”? This serves to say that this offering that is more frequent, i.e., any more frequent offering, should precede any less frequent offering.,MISHNA: Any offering that is more sacred than another precedes the other offering. The mishna elaborates: If there is blood of a sin offering and blood of a burnt offering to be presented, the blood of the sin offering precedes the blood of the burnt offering because it effects acceptance, i.e., atonement, for severe transgressions punishable by karet. Likewise, if there are limbs of a burnt offering and portions of a sin offering to be burned on the altar, the burning of the limbs of the burnt offering precedes the portions of the sin offering, because the burnt offering is entirely burned in the flames on the altar, whereas only part of the sin offering is burned.,Similarly, although both effect atonement, a sin offering precedes a guilt offering due to the fact that its blood is placed on the four corners of the altar and the remnants of its blood are poured on the base of the altar, whereas the blood of the guilt offering is sprinkled on only two corners of the altar. A guilt offering precedes a thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order, and the others are offerings of lesser sanctity. A thanks offering and a nazirite’s ram precede a peace offering due to the fact that they are eaten for one day, like offerings of the most sacred order, whereas a peace offering is eaten for two days, and the thanks offering and nazirite’s ram require loaves to be brought with them, four types with the thanks offering and two types with the nazirite’s ram.,Sacrifice of the peace offering precedes sacrifice of the firstborn offering due to the fact that the peace offering requires placing the blood on the altar, in the form of two placements that are four, and placing hands on the head of the offering, and libations, and the wavings of the breast and the thigh by the priest and the owner; none of which is required for the firstborn offering. The firstborn offering precedes the animal tithe offering because it is sanctified from the womb, i.e., unlike the animal tithe offering it does not require consecration, and it is eaten by the priests, whereas everyone may partake of the animal tithe offering.,The animal tithe offering precedes bird offerings due to the fact that it requires slaughtering, whereas the bird’s nape is pinched; and there are two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood that is presented on the altar and its portions that are burned on the altar, whereas with regard to bird offerings only the blood is presented on the altar. The bird offerings precede meal offerings due to the fact that they are types whose blood is presented, and atonement is effected by the blood. The meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering due to the fact that it comes to atone for a sin. For the same reason the sacrifice of the bird sin offering precedes the sacrifice of the bird burnt offering, and likewise with regard to its consecration, the sin offering takes precedence. GEMARA: The mishna teaches that the placement of the blood of a sin offering precedes the sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, whereas the burning of the limbs of a burnt offering precedes the burning of the portions of a sin offering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers: This is as the Sages taught in a baraita discussing a verse about the consecration of the Levites: “Then let them take a young bull, and its meal offering, fine flour mingled with oil; and a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering” (Numbers 8:8).,The baraita explains: If this verse comes to teach that they are two bulls, this is superfluous, as it is already stated: “And offer the one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering” (Numbers 8:12). Why must the verse state: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering”? As one might have thought that the sin offering should precede all the rites of the burnt offering, therefore the verse states: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering,” which indicates that the sin offering actually comes second to the burnt offering.,The baraita continues: If the verse had stated only that the sin offering is the second bull, one might have thought that the burnt offering precedes the sin offering with regard to all its rites. Therefore, the verse states: “And offer the one for a sin offering and the other for a burnt offering,” indicating that the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. How can these verses be reconciled? The placement of the blood of the sin offering precedes the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering because it effects acceptance, whereas the burnt offering does not effect atonement. And burning the limbs of the burnt offering on the altar precedes burning the portions of the sin offering, in fulfillment of the phrase: “And a second young bull you shall take for a sin offering.”,The Gemara asks: But why do all four placements of the blood of the sin offering precede the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering? Let only the first placement of blood, which effects atonement, take precedence, and those other placements should not come before the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering.,Ravina said: In the verse here, we are dealing with the sin offering brought by the Levites for their consecration. And even though it does not effect atonement and is therefore comparable to a burnt offering, the Merciful One states that the sin offering precedes the burnt offering with regard to the presentation of the blood. This indicates that in general, all four placements of the blood of a sin offering precede the sprinkling of the blood of the burnt offering, despite the fact that only the first placement effects atonement. In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say there is another answer: Once the priest commenced with the placements of the blood of the sin offering, he completes all of them before sprinkling the blood of the burnt offering.,§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is blood of a sin offering and limbs of a burnt offering to be sacrificed, which of them precedes the other? Does the blood of the sin offering take precedence, due to the fact that it effects acceptance? Or perhaps the limbs of the burnt offering take precedence, due to the fact that they are entirely burned in the flames of the altar.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna teaches that the blood of a sin offering precedes the blood of a burnt offering. One can infer from this that the blood of the sin offering does not precede all elements of the burnt offering; it is only with regard to the blood of the burnt offering that it takes precedence, whereas it does not take precedence with regard to the limbs of the burnt offering.,The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, the opposite conclusion can be inferred from the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches that limbs of a burnt offering precede the portions of the sin offering consumed on the altar. This indicates that it is only with regard to the portions of the sin offering consumed on the altar that the limbs of the burnt offering take precedence, but they do not take precedence with regard to the blood of the sin offering. The Gemara concludes: Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna concerning this matter.,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is blood of a burnt offering to be sprinkled and portions of a sin offering to be burned, which of them precedes the other? Does the blood of the burnt offering take precedence, as it comes from an offering that is burned in its entirety on the altar? Or perhaps the portions of the sin offering to be burned take precedence because they come from an offering that effects atonement.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna teaches that the blood of the sin offering precedes the blood of the burnt offering. One can infer from this that it is only the blood of the sin offering that precedes the blood of the burnt offering, but the portions of the sin offering to be burned do not take precedence.,The Gemara rejects this proof: On the contrary, the opposite conclusion can be inferred from the latter clause of the mishna, which teaches that the limbs of the burnt offering precede the portions of the sin offering to be consumed on the altar. This indicates that it is only the limbs of the burnt offering that precede the portions of the sin offering to be burned, but the blood of the burnt offering does not. The Gemara again concludes: Rather, no inference is to be learned from this mishna concerning this dilemma.,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is blood of a burnt offering and blood of a guilt offering to be sprinkled on the altar, which of them precedes the other? Does the blood of the burnt offering take precedence, as it comes from an offering that is burned in its entirety on the altar? Or perhaps the blood of a guilt offering takes precedence, as it effects atonement.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna teaches that the blood of the sin offering precedes the blood of the burnt offering. One can infer from here: But the blood of a guilt offering does not precede the blood of a burnt offering.,The Gemara rejects this proof: By right the mishna should have taught this halakha with regard to blood of a guilt offering. One could then have inferred that the blood of a sin offering, which takes precedence over the blood of a guilt offering, also precedes blood of a burnt offering. But since the mishna wants to teach the latter clause: The burning of the limbs of a burnt offering precedes the portions of a sin offering, it also mentions a sin offering in the former clause.,The Gemara explains why the latter clause had to mention a sin offering rather than a guilt offering: As, had the mishna taught this principle of the latter clause with regard to the portions of a guilt offering, I would say that it is only the portions of a guilt offering over which the limbs of a burnt offering take precedence, but they do not take precedence over the portions of a sin offering, as a sin offering is of greater sanctity than a guilt offering. Due to this reason the mishna in the former clause also taught this principle with regard to a sin offering, and one cannot infer from this that its halakha does not apply to the guilt offering.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna states that a sin offering precedes a guilt offering. One can infer from this that it is only a sin offering that precedes a guilt offering, but a burnt offering does not. What, is the mishna not referring to the sprinkling of the blood, which would indicate that the blood of a burnt offering does not precede the blood of a guilt offering?,The Gemara rejects this explanation: No, it is referring to the precedence of the sacrificial portions consumed on the altar. The Gemara adds that the language of the mishna is also precise in this regard, as it teaches that the sin offering takes precedence due to the fact that its blood is placed on the four corners of the altar, rather than simply teaching: It is placed on the four corners of the altar, as it would have taught had it been speaking of the blood. One can therefore conclude from the statement of the mishna that its subject is the sacrificial portions burned on the altar, not the blood.,§ The mishna teaches: A sin offering precedes a guilt offering due to the fact that its blood is placed on the four corners of the altar and the remainder of its blood is poured on the base of the altar. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, the guilt offering should precede the sin offering, as it has a fixed minimal value of two shekels, as stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 5:15), whereas the sin offering has no minimal value. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the sin offering requires more placements of the blood on the altar is of greater importance.,The mishna further teaches: A guilt offering precedes a thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, the thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram should precede the guilt offering, as they require loaves to be brought with them. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the guilt offering is an offering of the most sacred order is of greater importance.,The mishna teaches: A thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram precede a peace offering due to the fact that they are eaten for only one day. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, peace offerings should precede the thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram, as they are offered by the community as well as by the individual. A communal peace offering is sacrificed on the festival of Shavuot, but there is no communal thanks offering or nazirite’s ram. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the thanks offering and the nazirite’s ram are eaten for only one day is of greater importance.,A dilemma was raised before the Sages: If there is a thanks offering and a nazirite’s ram to be sacrificed, which of them precedes the other? Does the thanks offering take precedence, as it requires four types of loaves, whereas the nazirite’s ram requires only two? Or perhaps the nazirite’s ram takes precedence, as there are other offerings whose blood is placed on the altar together with the nazirite’s ram. A nazirite is required to sacrifice a burnt offering and a sin offering, as well as a ram. The Gemara answers: Come and hear a baraita that explicitly discusses this case: This offering precedes that offering, as this offering, i.e., the thanks offering, requires four types of loaves, and that offering, the nazirite’s ram, requires only two types of loaves.,The mishna teaches: And the peace offering precedes the firstborn offering due to the fact that the peace offering requires two placements of the blood on the altar that are four, and the placement of hands on the animal’s head, and libations, and the wavings of the breast and thigh. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, the sacrifice of the firstborn offering should precede the peace offering, as it is sanctified from the womb and it is eaten only by the priests, whereas the peace offering may be eaten by non-priests. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that additional mitzvot are performed in the case of the peace offering is of greater importance.,The mishna further teaches: The firstborn offering precedes the animal tithe offering because it is sanctified from the womb and is eaten only by the priests. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, the animal tithe offering should precede the firstborn offering, as if one mistakenly called the ninth or eleventh animal that emerged from the pen the tenth, those animals that came out before or after the tenth are also sanctified. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the firstborn is sanctified from the womb is of greater importance.,The mishna teaches: The animal tithe offering precedes bird offerings due to the fact that it requires slaughtering, whereas the bird’s nape is pinched; and furthermore, there are two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood, which is presented on the altar, and its portions that are burned on the altar. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, bird offerings should precede the animal tithe offering, as they are offerings of the most sacred order, whether they are burnt offerings or sin offerings. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that the animal tithe is a type of offering that requires slaughtering is of greater importance.,§ Ravina bar Sheila says with regard to the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar: Sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood are disqualified. And the tanna of the mishna also taught: The animal tithe offering precedes bird offerings due to the fact that it requires slaughtering, and there are two elements of the animal tithe offering that have the status of offerings of the most sacred order: Its blood and its sacrificial portions consumed on the altar.,The Gemara explains how Ravina bar Sheila interprets the mishna in support of his opinion: Granted, there are no sacrificial portions consumed on the altar from a bird offering, but its blood at least is sprinkled. Why, then, does the mishna mention the blood? Rather, is it not mentioned in order to teach us that the status of the sacrificial portions consumed on the altar from the animal tithe offering and other offerings of lesser sanctity is comparable to the status of its blood?,The Gemara explains the implications of this comparison. Just as its blood referred to in the mishna is blood before its sprinkling on the altar, as afterward it no longer has any sanctity, so too, the sacrificial portions mentioned in the mishna are from before the sprinkling of the blood, and the mishna calls them at this stage offerings of the most sacred order. And therefore one can infer from this that just as the animal tithe’s blood is disqualified by leaving the Temple courtyard, so too, the sacrificial portions to be burned on the altar are disqualified by leaving the courtyard.,The Gemara attempts to prove the opinion of Ravina bar Sheila. Let us say that the following dispute between amora’im supports his statement: With regard to flesh of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is fit and Reish Lakish says that it is disqualified.,The Gemara clarifies this dispute: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is fit, since it will ultimately leave the Temple courtyard, as offerings of lesser sanctity may be eaten anywhere within the walls of Jerusalem. Reish Lakish says that it is unfit, as its time to leave the Temple courtyard has not yet arrived because the flesh cannot be taken out until after the sprinkling of the blood. The Gemara infers that these amora’im disagree only with regard to the flesh of the offering, which will eventually leave the Temple courtyard. But with regard to the sacrificial portions of the offering, which will never leave the courtyard, they do not disagree, as Rabbi Yoḥanan concedes that those portions are disqualified.,The Gemara rejects this proof: The same is true with regard to the sacrificial portions, i.e., these amora’im also disagree in that case, as Rabbi Yoḥanan holds they are fit. And the reason that they disagree explicitly with regard to the flesh is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Reish Lakish, as even with regard to the flesh, which will ultimately leave the Temple courtyard, he says that it is disqualified, because its time to leave the courtyard has not yet arrived.,The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this dispute between amora’im is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im: With regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, Rabbi Eliezer says that one who benefits from them is not liable for misuse of consecrated property, and one is not liable to receive karet for them due to prohibitions against eating piggul or notar, or for partaking of the flesh while he is ritually impure. All these prohibitions apply only if the sacrificial portions are otherwise fit for sacrifice. Rabbi Akiva says that one who benefits from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property, and one is liable to receive karet for eating them due to the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or partaking of the flesh while he is ritually impure.,The Gemara explains: What, is it not correct to say that they disagree with regard to a case where after taking the portions to be burned out of the Temple courtyard one then brought them back into the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood? And, if so, it is with regard to this very point that they disagree: As one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the portions are disqualified by leaving the courtyard, and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that the portions are not disqualified by leaving the courtyard.,The Gemara rejects this claim: Rav Pappa said that with regard to a case where after taking these portions out of the Temple courtyard one then brought them back into the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, everyone agrees they are fit. And here they disagree with regard to a case where these portions are outside the courtyard when the blood is sprinkled on the altar. And they disagree with regard to this following matter: As one Sage, Rabbi Eliezer, holds that the sprinkling of the blood is not effective with regard to those portions that were taken out of the courtyard, i.e., it does not render them fit, and one Sage, Rabbi Akiva, holds that the sprinkling of the blood is effective with regard to those portions that were taken out of the courtyard, i.e., it renders them fit.,The Gemara challenges: But Rav Pappa’s statement here apparently contradicts his claim concerning the two loaves brought with the two sheep on the festival of Shavuot. The sprinkling of the blood of the sheep renders those two loaves fit for consumption by the priests, and the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva also applies in that case. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Pappa is the one who said that with regard to a situation where the two loaves are outside the Temple courtyard when the blood of the two sheep is sprinkled on the altar, everyone, even Rabbi Akiva, agrees that the sprinkling does not render the two loaves fit, and therefore if one eats them he is not liable to receive karet due to the prohibition against eating piggul. Rather, the tanna’im disagree with regard to a case where one returned the loaves to within the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood.,The Gemara answers: This statement of Rav Pappa applies only to the two loaves, as they are not part of the offering itself. But with regard to the sacrificial portions, which are part of the offering itself, everyone agrees that they are rendered fit if they are within the Temple courtyard at the time the blood is sprinkled on the altar. Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree only with regard to a case where they are outside the Temple courtyard when the blood is sprinkled on the altar.,§ The mishna teaches: The bird offerings precede meal offerings due to the fact that they are types whose blood is presented, and atonement is effected by the blood. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, meal offerings should precede bird offerings, as they are sacrificed both as communal offerings and as individual offerings, whereas there are no communal bird offerings. The Gemara explains: Even so, the fact that bird offerings are types whose blood is sprinkled is of greater importance.,The mishna further teaches: The meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering. The Gemara challenges: On the contrary, a voluntary meal offering should precede the meal offering of a sinner, as it requires oil and frankincense. The Gemara explains: Even so, the meal offering of a sinner, which comes due to a sin, is of greater importance, as it effects atonement.A dilemma was raised before the Sages: With regard to the meal offering of a sota, a woman suspected by her husband of having committed adultery, and a voluntary meal offering being brought by someone at the same time, which of them precedes the other? Does the voluntary meal offering take precedence, as it requires oil and frankincense? Or perhaps the meal offering of a sota takes precedence, as it comes to clarify the woman’s transgression, as part of the rite performed with a sota.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear, as the mishna states that the meal offering of a sinner precedes a voluntary meal offering. One can infer from this that it is only the meal offering of a sinner that precedes a voluntary meal offering, but the meal offering of a sota does not. The Gemara rejects this proof: Is the mishna teaching that the meal offering of a sinner takes precedence due to the fact that it effects atonement? The mishna teaches: Due to the fact that it comes because of a sin, and the meal offering of a sota also comes because of a sin, as she secluded herself with another man.,The Gemara further suggests: Come and hear the statement of a baraita: This meal offering precedes that meal offering, as this meal offering comes from wheat, and that meal offering comes from barley. What, does this baraita not refer to the precedence of a voluntary meal offering to the meal offering of a sota? The Gemara rejects this proof as well: No, the baraita is referring to the precedence of the meal offering of a sinner over the meal offering of a sota.,The Gemara responds: If the baraita is referring to the meal offering of a sinner, why is its precedence to the meal offering of a sota derived from the fact that the meal offering of a sinner comes from wheat, whereas the meal offering of a sota is brought from barley? I could derive the precedence of the meal offering of the sinner due to the fact that the meal offering of a sinner effects atonement and the meal offering of a sota does not effect atonement.,The Gemara counters: Rather, what is the baraita referring to? Is it referring to the precedence of a voluntary meal offering over the meal offering of a sota? If so, I could derive its precedence from the fact that this voluntary meal offering requires oil and frankincense and that meal offering of a sota does not require oil and frankincense. Rather, one cannot prove anything from the omission of an alternative explanation, as whichever way one interprets the baraita it clearly cited one of two reasons.,§ The mishna states: The sacrifice of the bird sin offering precedes the sacrifice of the bird burnt offering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? The Gemara answers: This is as the Sages taught in a baraita with regard to the bird sin offering and the bird burnt offering that a poor sinner sacrifices instead of an animal sin offering. The verse states: “And he shall offer that which is for the sin offering first” (Leviticus 5:8). Why must the verse state this? As there is no need for the verse to state this in order to teach that the sin offering is sacrificed first, as it is already stated: “And he shall prepare the second for a burnt offering” (Leviticus 5:10).,Rather, this verse established a paradigm for all sin offerings, teaching that they should precede the burnt offering that comes with them; whether in the case of a bird sin offering taking precedence over a bird burnt offering, whether in the case of an animal sin offering taking precedence over an animal burnt offering, and even with regard to a bird sin offering taking precedence over an animal burnt offering.,The Gemara summarizes: Therefore, the precedence of a bird sin offering over a bird burnt offering is learned from the verse: “And he shall prepare the second for a burnt offering.” The precedence of an animal sin offering over an animal burnt offering is derived from the fact that the Merciful One extends the halakha derived from the sin offering of the Levites (see 89a). Finally, the precedence of a bird sin offering over an animal burnt offering is derived from the principle stated in this baraita, that this verse established a paradigm for all sin offerings, teaching that they should precede the burnt offering that comes with them.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a further proof from a baraita. The Torah states that a woman who has given birth must bring a sheep as a burnt offering and a bird as a sin offering. If she is poor she may bring two birds: “One for a burnt offering and the other for a sin offering” (Leviticus 12:8). Rabbi Eliezer says: In every other instance where a bird offering is exchanged for an animal sin offering, the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. For example, in the case of the sliding scale sin offering brought for entering the Temple while ritually impure, where a poor person brings two birds, one as a sin offering and the other as a burnt offering, the sin offering comes first. But here, in the case of a woman who gave birth, the burnt offering takes precedence, as it takes the place of an animal burnt offering, mentioned first in the verse: “She shall bring a lamb in its first year for a burnt offering, and a pigeon or a dove for a sin offering (Leviticus 12:6).,Furthermore, in every instance where the sin offering comes because of a sin, the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. But here, in the case of a poor woman who gave birth, where the sin offering effects ritual purity rather than atonement, the burnt offering precedes the sin offering. And in every instance where two birds come instead of an animal for a sin offering, the sin offering precedes the burnt offering. But here, in the case of a poor woman who gave birth, the bird burnt offering replaces the animal burnt offering of a rich woman, whereas the bird sin offering is sacrificed even by a rich woman who gave birth. Therefore, in this particular case of a woman who gave birth, the burnt offering precedes the sin offering.,The straightforward reading of this baraita contradicts the statement of the previous baraita, which teaches that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering. In order to reconcile the two baraitot, Rava said: The fact that the verse mentions the animal burnt offering first is only with regard to reading it, but in practice the sin offering is sacrificed first.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear another baraita which apparently contradicts this principle. When there are different animal offerings to be sacrificed, bulls precede rams, and rams precede sheep, and sheep precede male goats. What, is it not referring to the additional offerings of the festival of Sukkot? If so, the baraita is teaching that bulls, rams, and sheep, which are burnt offerings, precede the sin offerings of male goats. The Gemara answers: No, with regard to all these animals the baraita is referring to gift offerings. The Gemara interprets the baraita in accordance with this explanation: Bulls precede rams, as they require a greater quantity of libations; and likewise rams precede sheep for the same reason. Sheep precede male goats, although their libations are identical, as the portions of the sheep consumed on the altar are greater; the sheep’s tail is burned, whereas the goat’s tail is not.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a baraita which seems to contradict the principle that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering: The bull of the anointed priest, i.e., the High Priest, which he sacrifices if he issues and then acts upon an erroneous halakhic ruling, precedes the bull for an unwitting communal sin, sacrificed if the Sanhedrin issues an erroneous halakhic ruling and the community then acts upon it. Similarly, the bull for an unwitting communal sin precedes the bull sacrificed as a burnt offering to atone for an unwitting communal sin involving idol worship.,The baraita continues: The bull sacrificed as atonement for communal idol worship precedes the male goats that atone for idol worship, i.e., the goat sacrificed together with the bull. This is the halakha even though the bull that atones for idol worship is a burnt offering, and the male goats sacrificed as atonement for idol worship are sin offerings. This baraita seems to contradict the statement of the previous baraita that a sin offering always precedes a burnt offering.,The Gemara responds: But you can say that the opposite conclusion is derived from the first clause of that baraita, as at least the first clause supports the principle that sin offerings take precedence: The bull for an unwitting communal sin, which is a sin offering, precedes the bull sacrificed to atone for an unwitting communal sin involving idol worship, which is a burnt offering.,The Gemara dismisses this answer: In any event, with regard to offerings that are both of one species of animal, we did not say there is any doubt that a sin offering takes precedence. When we say there is a contradiction between the rulings of the baraitot, it is with regard to offerings of two species. According to the earlier baraita, even a bird sin offering precedes an animal burnt offering, whereas here we find a burnt offering that precedes a sin offering.,The Gemara answers: They say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, in the name of Rava bar Mari: The sin offering sacrificed to atone for idol worship is written without an alef (see Numbers 15:24). It is written lamed, ḥet, tet, tav. This indicates that it is different from other sin offerings in that it does not precede the burnt offering. Ravina says that the term “according to the ordinance” is written with regard to the offerings sacrificed to atone for idol-worship, in the verse: “The congregation shall offer one young bull…according to the ordinance, and one goat for a sin offering” (Numbers 15:24). This mention of an ordinance indicates that they must be sacrificed in the precise order stated by the verse.,The Gemara comments: Now that you have arrived at this explanation, the previous baraita can be explained in a similar manner: Even if you say that the baraita is referring to the bulls and other offerings of the festival of Sukkot, there is also no difficulty with regard to the burnt offering sheep taking precedence over the sin offering male goats, as the term “according to their ordinance” is written concerning these offerings as well (see Numbers 29:33).,A dilemma ensuing from the conclusion of the previous discussion was raised before the Sages: If there is a bird sin offering, and an animal burnt offering, and an animal tithe offering to be sacrificed, which of them precedes the others? If you say that the bird sin offering should take precedence, there is the animal tithe offering that generally precedes it, since it requires slaughtering, as stated by the mishna. If you say that the animal tithe offering should take precedence, there is the animal burnt offering that precedes it, as the burnt offering is an offering of the most sacred order. If you say that the animal burnt offering should take precedence, there is the bird sin offering that precedes it, as the Gemara previously concluded.,The Gemara answers: Here, in Babylonia, they explained that the fact that the animal tithe offering is a type of offering that requires slaughtering is of greater importance than the other factors. Therefore, the animal tithe offering is sacrificed first, followed by the bird sin offering, and finally the animal burnt offering. In the West, Eretz Yisrael, they say: The animal burnt offering has an effect on the bird sin offering sacrificed with it and raises its importance above that of the animal tithe offering. Therefore, the bird sin offering is sacrificed first, followed by the animal burnt offering, and finally the animal tithe offering.,MISHNA: All the sin offerings mandated by the Torah take precedence over the guilt offerings, as explained in the previous mishna (89a), except for the guilt offering of a leper, because it comes to render one fit. One who has been cured of leprosy must undergo a process through which he is rendered ritually pure before coming into contact with consecrated items. Although he must also bring a sin offering, his guilt offering is more central to that process of purification and therefore it takes precedence over the sin offering.,All the guilt offerings mandated by the Torah come as rams in their second year, and come worth two silver shekels, except for the guilt offering of a nazirite and the guilt offering of a leper, as they come from sheep in their first year, and do not need to come worth two silver shekels, as they have no fixed value.,Just as the more sacred offerings precede other offerings with regard to their sacrifice, as taught in the previous mishna (89a), they also precede the others with regard to their consumption. If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a peace offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the peace offering from today. If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: The sin offering precedes the peace offering, due to the fact that it is an offering of the most sacred order. Likewise, the guilt offering precedes the peace offering, as it is also of the most sacred order.,And with regard to all of the offerings that are eaten, the priests are permitted to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. Therefore, the priests are permitted to eat them roasted, or boiled, or cooked, and to place in the cooking pot non-sacred spices or teruma spices. This is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Meir says: One may not place teruma spices in it, so that he will not bring the teruma to a state of disqualification. Consumption of consecrated foods is permitted only for a limited period, after which they are disqualified and burned. Adding teruma spices might cause those spices to be similarly disqualified.,GEMARA: A dilemma was raised before the Sages: The mishnayot (89a) taught that a frequent offering precedes other offerings, and also that an offering of greater sanctity precedes others. If there is a frequent offering and an offering of greater sanctity to be sacrificed, which of them precedes the other? Does the frequent offering take precedence, due to the fact that it is frequent, or perhaps the offering of greater sanctity takes precedence, as it is of greater sanctity? The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the ruling of the first mishna in this chapter, that the daily offerings precede the additional offerings because they are frequent. And even though the additional offerings are of greater sanctity, as they are sacrificed due to the sanctity of Shabbat, the frequent offering precedes the offering of greater sanctity. The Gemara rejects this proof: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the additional offerings but does not affect the daily offerings brought on Shabbat? Rather, the sanctity of Shabbat elevates the sanctity of the daily offerings as well, and as both are of equal sanctity, the frequent daily offering precedes the additional offerings.,The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the continuation of this mishna: The additional Shabbat offerings precede the additional New Moon offerings because they are more frequent, despite the fact that the New Moon elevates the sanctity of its additional offerings. The Gemara rejects this proof in a similar manner: Is that to say that the sanctity of the New Moon affects the sanctity of its additional offerings but does not affect the additional offerings of Shabbat? These additional offerings are also imbued with the sanctity of the New Moon.,The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the continuation of this mishna: The additional New Moon offerings precede the additional New Year offerings because they are more frequent, even though the New Year is of greater sanctity. The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Is that to say that the sanctity of the New Year affects the sanctity of its additional offerings but does not affect the additional offerings of the New Moon?,The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear a baraita (Tosefta, Berakhot 5:25) that discusses the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel with regard to the order of blessings in kiddush. After stating one reason for the opinion of Beit Hillel that one recites the blessing on the wine before the blessing of the sanctity of the day, the Tosefta adds: Alternatively, Beit Hillel say: The blessing over wine is recited frequently, and the blessing over the day is not recited frequently, and there is a principle: When a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice. This applies even though the blessing of the day is of greater sanctity, as it is recited due to the sanctity of Shabbat. The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the blessing of the day but does not affect the sanctity of the blessing on the wine?,The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: If one did not recite the additional prayer on Shabbat until the time of the afternoon prayer arrived, the halakha is that a person prays the afternoon prayer and afterward the additional prayer, as the afternoon prayer is more frequent. This ruling applies despite the fact that the additional prayer is of greater sanctity. Once again the Gemara rejects the proof: Is that to say that the sanctity of Shabbat affects the sanctity of the additional prayer but does not affect the sanctity of the afternoon prayer?,The Gemara cites yet another proof. Come and hear the mishna: If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the others; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. One can infer from this that if both this offering and that offering are from today, the sin offering or guilt offering takes precedence, and this is the halakha even though the peace offering is more frequent, as people sacrifice voluntary peace offerings more often than sin offerings or guilt offerings.,Rava said in response: Are you speaking of a common offering? Although peace offerings are sacrificed more often than sin offerings, there is no obligation to sacrifice them at any particular frequency. We raise the dilemma only with regard to a clash between a frequent offering and one of greater sanctity, but we do not raise the dilemma with regard to a common offering.,Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Is that to say that a common obligation is not considered tantamount to a frequent obligation? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to positive mitzvot whose intentional neglect results in the punishment of karet but whose unwitting transgression does not entail the sacrifice of a sin offering: I should exclude the neglect of the Paschal offering from the obligation to sacrifice a sin offering, as it is not frequent, and I should not exclude the neglect of the mitzva of circumcision, as it is frequent? Circumcision is considered a frequent mitzva, as it is performed more often than the Paschal offering, despite the fact that there is no obligation to perform circumcisions at any particular frequency.,Rava answers: What is the meaning of frequent in that context? It means that circumcision is frequent in terms of the numerous mitzvot commanded with regard to its fulfillment. And if you wish, say instead that circumcision in relation to the Paschal offering is considered like a frequent obligation, as it occurs far more often, whereas peace offerings are brought only somewhat more often than sin offerings. In sum, one cannot infer from the mishna that an offering of greater sanctity precedes a frequent offering.,§ An additional dilemma with regard to precedence was raised before the Sages: If the priest had two offerings to sacrifice, a frequent offering and an infrequent offering, and although he should have initially sacrificed the frequent offering he slaughtered the infrequent offering first, what is the halakha? Do we say that since he already slaughtered the infrequent offering he also proceeds to sacrifice it? Or perhaps he does not yet sacrifice it but gives it to another priest, who stirs its blood to prevent it from congealing, until he sacrifices the frequent offering; and then he sacrifices the infrequent offering.,Rav Huna from Sura said: Come and hear an answer from the mishna: If one has a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the peace offering from yesterday precedes the sin offering from today. It can be assumed that the mishna is not discussing a case where none of the offerings have been slaughtered, as the peace offering would not take precedence in this situation. Rather, it is discussing a peace offering from yesterday that was slaughtered but its blood has not yet been presented. One can infer from this that only a peace offering from yesterday takes precedence in this situation, but in the case of a peace offering from today that is similar in other aspects to a peace offering from yesterday, the peace offering does not take precedence.,The Gemara explains: And what are the circumstances of this case? This is a situation where one first slaughtered the peace offering from today. In this case the sin offering or guilt offering takes precedence, although the peace offering is already slaughtered, as both of them are of greater sanctity. The same should apply to an infrequent offering that was slaughtered before a frequent offering: The frequent offering is slaughtered before the blood of the infrequent offering is presented.,The Gemara rejects this answer: Perhaps when the mishna makes reference to a peace offering from yesterday and a sin offering or a guilt offering from today, the circumstances should be understood differently. How can you find these other circumstances? The mishna discusses a case where the priest already slaughtered both of them, the peace offering and the sin or guilt offering, and the blood of both awaits presentation on the altar. But had he not yet slaughtered both of them, but only the peace offering, you can still raise the dilemma of whether the priest should set aside the blood of the peace offering in order to slaughter the sin offering first, due to its greater sanctity.,The Gemara cites another proof: Come and hear the aforementioned baraita: Alternatively, Beit Hillel say: With regard to the order of blessings in kiddush, the blessing on wine is recited frequently and the blessing of the day is not recited frequently, and there is a principle: When a frequent practice and an infrequent practice clash, the frequent practice takes precedence over the infrequent practice. The obligation to recite the blessing of the day is due to the sanctity of Shabbat and applies at the start of Shabbat, before wine is placed on the table. Nevertheless, the blessing on the wine takes precedence due to its frequency. So too, the slaughtering of the frequent offering should take precedence, even if the priest had already commenced the sacrificial rites of the infrequent offering.,The Gemara rejects this proof: Here too, with regard to kiddush, the circumstances are different, since wine is available when one recites kiddush, and therefore the obligation of both blessings come together. This means that it is comparable to a situation where one already slaughtered both animals.,The Gemara cites yet another proof: Come and hear, as Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The halakha is that a person prays the afternoon prayer and afterward the additional prayer, despite the fact that the obligation of the additional prayer applies first, which is similar to an offering slaughtered first. The Gemara rejects this proof: Here too, since the time of the afternoon prayer has now arrived, one is obligated in both prayers, and again this is comparable to a situation where one already slaughtered both animals.,Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ashi, said to Ravina that an answer to this dilemma can be found in a mishna (Pesaḥim 61a): If one slaughtered the Paschal offering before midday it is disqualified, because it is stated in its regard: “In the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). If he slaughtered it before the daily afternoon offering was slaughtered it is valid, even though the daily offering should be sacrificed first, but someone should stir its blood to prevent it from congealing until he slaughters and sprinkles the blood of the daily offering. Although the infrequent Paschal offering is already slaughtered, the priest first slaughters the frequent daily offering and then sprinkles the blood of the Paschal offering.,The Gemara rejects this proof as well: Here we are dealing with a case where he gave precedence to the daily offering and slaughtered it first, and then slaughtered the Paschal offering before sprinkling the blood of the daily offering. Since the blood of both offerings requires sprinkling on the altar, the blood of the daily offering takes precedence. Rav Aḥa the Elder said to Rav Ashi that the wording of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches: Until the blood of the daily offering is sprinkled, and does not teach: Until he slaughters and sprinkles the blood. This indicates that the daily afternoon offering has already been slaughtered. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from its wording that this is the meaning of the mishna.,§ The mishna teaches: And with regard to all of the offerings that are eaten, the priests are permitted to alter the manner of their consumption and eat them as they choose. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this halakha? The Gemara answers: The verse states, with regard to the gifts of the priesthood: “Of all the consecrated items of the children of Israel to you have I given them lemoshḥa (Numbers 18:8). Targum Onkelos renders this term as: For greatness, indicating that the flesh of the offerings should be eaten in the manner that kings eat their food, i.e., prepared in any way they want.,MISHNA: Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard for consumption by the priests and you seek to ascertain its nature, you do not need to ask what it is. Rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites after they smeared a bit of oil on them, or it is left over from the log of oil of a leper after a small amount of the oil was placed on him.,If you saw oil that is placed on the flames of the altar in the manner of an offering, you do not need to ask what it is. Rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offering of priests, or it is the leftover oil from the meal offering of the anointed priest, which requires a great deal of oil and which is burned in its entirety on the altar. The mishna adds: One cannot say that the oil distributed to priests or burned on the altar was brought as a gift offering, as one may not contribute oil as a gift offering. Rabbi Tarfon says: One may contribute oil as a gift offering. GEMARA: Shmuel says: According to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that oil may be sacrificed as a gift offering, in the case of one who contributes oil, a priest removes a handful of the oil and sacrifices it on the altar, and its remainder is eaten by the priests. What is the reason for the ruling of Shmuel? The verse states: “And when one brings a meal offering [korban minḥa]” (Leviticus 2:1). The superfluous word korban teaches that one may contribute oil, and its status is like that of a meal offering: Just as with regard to a meal offering the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten, so too with regard to oil, the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten.,Rabbi Zeira said that we learn this halakha in the mishna as well: Rabbi Shimon said: If you saw oil that is being distributed in the Temple courtyard, you do not need to ask what it is; rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offerings of Israelites, or it is left over from the log of oil of a leper, as one does not contribute oil as a gift offering. Rabbi Zeira learns by inference from the mishna that according to the one who says that one may contribute oil, it is distributed to the priests for consumption and it is not sacrificed entirely.,Abaye said to Rabbi Zeira: Say the last clause of the mishna: If you saw oil that is placed on the flames of the altar, you do not need to ask what it is; rather, it is left over from the oil of the wafers of the meal offering of priests or it is left over from the meal offering of the anointed priest, as one does not contribute oil as a gift offering. Abaye learns by inference from the mishna that according to the one who says that one may contribute oil, it is burned in its entirety in the flames on the altar. This contradicts Shmuel’s statement that according to Rabbi Tarfon only a handful of the oil is burned on the altar. The Gemara comments: For Abaye the inference from the first clause of the mishna is difficult, while for Rabbi Zeira the inference from the last clause is difficult.,The Gemara continues: Granted, according to Rabbi Zeira, the inference from the first clause that the oil is distributed for consumption by the priests can be explained as referring to the remainder of the oil, whereas the inference from the last clause that the oil is burned on the altar is referring to the handful removed from the oil. But according to Abaye, the contradictory inferences pose a difficulty. The Gemara answers: One cannot infer anything from the first clause, as the mishna taught the first clause due to the last clause. That is, as the tanna of the mishna wishes to teach the last clause in a certain manner, he teaches the first clause in a similar style, despite the fact that one might come to an erroneous conclusion from the wording of the first clause.,The Gemara asks: Granted, a tanna may teach the last clause of a mishna due to the first clause, i.e., a tanna might teach in a similar formulation to one he had already used. But would a tanna teach the first clause of a mishna due to the last clause? The Gemara answers: Yes; they say in the West, Eretz Yisrael, that a tanna taught the first clause due to the last clause.,The Gemara cites a proof: Come and hear a baraita: If one contributes wine, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva that one may contribute wine, it is poured into the basins adjacent to the corner of the altar. If one contributes oil, according to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that one may contribute oil, it is burned in the flames of the altar. What, is it not possible to infer from the fact that the wine is poured in its entirety into the basins that the oil is likewise burned in its entirety in the flames of the altar, contrary to Shmuel’s statement? The Gemara rejects this proof: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is and that case is as it is, i.e., the donations of wine and the oil are separate cases, and the two statements of the baraita need not accord with each other.,Rav Pappa said: Shmuel’s statement is like one side of a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One who contributes oil should not bring less than a log. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Three log. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do the first tanna and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagree? The Sages said this before Rav Pappa: They disagree with regard to the nature of an inference by means of verbal analogy or juxtaposition: Is the secondary case equated to the primary case in all aspects, in accordance with the exegetical principle: Infer from it and again from it; or does the comparison extend only to one specific issue derived from the primary case, in accordance with the principle: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place, i.e., in all other aspects the cases are not equated?,The Gemara explains that this is the difference between them, as the Rabbis hold by the principle: Infer from it and again from it. The Gemara explains the application of this principle: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too, oil is contributed, as inferred from the verse addressing the meal offering. And again one infers from this source: Just as a meal offering requires a log of oil, so too here, an offering of oil alone must be a log of oil. And just as with regard to a meal offering the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten, so too with regard to oil, the priest removes a handful and its remainder is eaten.,And the other, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, holds by the principle: Infer from it but interpret the halakha according to its own place. The Gemara explains that here too, one infers from the case of a meal offering: Just as a meal offering is contributed, so too, oil is contributed. But with regard to all other aspects of this halakha, interpret the halakha according to its own place, and its status is like that of wine libations, which are similar to oil in that they are also poured onto the altar: Just as one contributes libations of three log, so too, when one contributes oil one contributes three log; and just as libations are poured in their entirety into the basins, so too, the oil is burned in its entirety in the flames of the altar.,Rav Pappa said to Abaye: If Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi cited the source of the gift offering of oil from the verse addressing the meal offering he would not disagree with the Rabbis, as everyone employs the principle of: Infer from it and again from it. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives the gift offering of oil from a verse that deals with libations: “All that are homeborn shall do these things after this manner, in presenting an offering made by fire” (Numbers 15:13). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi derives from here that just as one may contribute wine libations, so too, one may contribute oil. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi compares oil to wine libations: Just as one contributes libations of three log, so too, one contributes three log of oil.,Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: How can you say that, i.e., that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi the source of the gift offering of oil is not from the meal offering? But isn’t it taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And when one brings a meal offering [korban minḥa]” (Leviticus 2:1), that the superfluous word korban teaches that one may contribute oil? The baraita continues: And how much must one contribute? Three log. The Gemara explains the question: And whom did you hear who says the gift offering of oil is three log? This is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and yet he cites the source of the gift offering of oil from the word korban, which is referring to a meal offering. Rav Pappa said to him: If this baraita is taught, it is taught; and I cannot take issue with it.,§ Shmuel says: One who contributes wine brings it and sprinkles it on the flames of the altar. What is the reason for this? The verse states: “And you shall present for the libation half a hin of wine, for an offering made by fire, of a pleasing aroma to the Lord” (Numbers 15:10). The verse indicates that there is a type of wine libation which is an offering made by fire. The Gemara challenges: But he thereby extinguishes the fire on the altar, and the Torah states: “A perpetual fire shall be kept burning on the altar, it shall not go out” (Leviticus 6:6). The Gemara explains: Extinguishing in a partial manner is not called extinguishing; in other words, this act is not included in the prohibition.,The Gemara asks: Is that so? But doesn’t Rav Naḥman say that Rabba bar Avuh says: One who takes down a coal from upon the altar and extinguishes it is liable for violating the prohibition: “It shall not go out”? The Gemara answers: This statement is referring to a situation where there is only this coal on the altar, and therefore the fire is entirely extinguished. If you wish, say instead that even if partial extinguishing is prohibited, extinguishing for the sake of a mitzva, as in the case of sprinkling wine on the altar, is different, and is permitted.,The Gemara challenges: Come and hear a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov teaches: Since the Torah gave a mitzva to remove the ashes of the offerings from the altar, one might have thought that it is permitted to extinguish the coals so that they become ashes and then to remove them. Therefore, you say: He shall not extinguish, in accordance with the verse: “It shall not go out.” Although this is a case of extinguishing for the sake of a mitzva, the baraita deems it prohibited. The Gemara explains: It is different there, as it is possible for the priest to sit and wait until some of the coals become ashes, and then remove them. By contrast, with regard to wine, there is no alternative to sprinkling the wine on the fire, and therefore it is permitted.,The Gemara challenges: Come and hear a baraita that prohibits sprinkling wine on the fire of the altar: If one contributes wine, according to the statement of Rabbi Akiva that one may contribute wine, it is poured into the basins on the altar. If one contributes oil, according to the statement of Rabbi Tarfon that one may contribute oil, it is poured onto the flames of the altar. And it is furthermore taught in a baraita: The wine libation is poured into the basins. The baraita suggests: Or perhaps it is not so; rather, it is poured onto the flames. Therefore, you say: He shall not extinguish.,The Gemara answers: This is not difficult, as that baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that even an unintentional action, i.e., a permitted action from which a prohibited action inadvertently ensues, is prohibited; and this statement of Shmuel is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that a permitted action from which a prohibited action inadvertently ensues is permitted. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? But doesn’t Shmuel say: One may extinguish a piece of white-hot metal in a public thoroughfare on Shabbat so that the masses will not be injured by it; but one may not extinguish a wood coal, because extinguishing it is prohibited by Torah law? And if it enters your mind that Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, it should be permitted to extinguish even a wood coal. Rabbi Shimon maintains that extinguishing a coal is prohibited by Torah law only when one intends to use the extinguished coal. Otherwise, this constitutes a labor performed on Shabbat which is not necessary for its own sake, which is not prohibited by Torah law.,The Gemara answers: Shmuel’s statements are not contradictory, as with regard to an unintentional act, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. But with regard to labor not necessary for its own sake, he holds that it is prohibited by Torah law, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.Rav Huna says: With regard to wine libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement of wood by themselves and burns them there, without removing them from the Temple courtyard. This is due to the fact that it is stated with regard to a disqualified sin offering: “In the sacred place…it shall be burned with fire” (Leviticus 6:23). This requirement of burning in the sacred place applies to all offerings that are meant to be sacrificed on an altar and became disqualified. This is also taught in a baraita: With regard to the blood, the oil, the meal offerings, and the libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement of wood by themselves and burns them there.,The Gemara relates: Shmuel said to Rav Ḥana of Baghdad: Bring me an assembly of ten men and I will tell you in their presence this halakha that I wish to disseminate: With regard to libations that became ritually impure, one prepares for them an arrangement of wood by themselves and burns them there.,,MISHNA: In the case of the blood of a sin offering designated for presentation that was sprayed on a garment, that garment requires laundering, as is stated with regard to a sin offering: “And when any of its blood shall be sprinkled on a garment, you shall launder that on which it shall be sprinkled in a sacred place” (Leviticus 6:20). Although the verse is speaking only of sin offerings that are eaten and whose blood is presented on the outer altar, as it is stated: “In a sacred place shall it be eaten” (Leviticus 6:19), the principle is not exclusive to eaten sin offerings. With regard to the blood of both the sin offerings that are eaten and the sin offerings that are wholly burned and not eaten and whose blood is presented on the inner altar, garments sprayed with blood from each of these offerings require laundering. As it is stated at the start of that passage: “This is the law of the sin offering” (Leviticus 6:18), it is understood: There is one law for all the sin offerings.,That is the halakha with regard to sin offerings fit for sacrifice. With regard to a disqualified sin offering, its blood does not cause a garment to require laundering whether the offering had a period of fitness when its blood was fit for presentation or whether it did not have a period of fitness. Which offering is the disqualified sin offering that had a period of fitness? It is one that was left overnight and then became disqualified; or it is one that became ritually impure; or it is one that emerged from the Temple courtyard. Which offering is the disqualified sin offering that did not have a period of fitness? It is one that was slaughtered with the intent to eat it or present its blood beyond its designated time or outside its designated area; or it is one whose blood was collected by people disqualified for Temple service and they sprinkled its blood.,GEMARA: The mishna teaches: In the case of the blood of a sin offering that was sprayed on a garment, the garment must be laundered, and this is the halakha concerning the blood of sin offerings that are eaten and sin offerings that are wholly burned, as it is stated: “This is the law of the sin offering”; there is one law for all sin offerings. The Gemara asks: And if there is one law for all sin offerings, even the blood of a bird sin offering should also require laundering. If so, why is it taught in a baraita: One might have thought that the blood of a bird sin offering requires laundering. To counter this, the verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering.” The word “this” teaches that the halakha is to be restricted to the blood of an animal sin offering and it does not apply to the bird sin offering.,Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Kappara: The verse states: “This is the law of the sin offering…shall the sin offering be slaughtered” (Leviticus 6:18). The verse is speaking specifically of sin offerings that are slaughtered and not of bird offerings, which are killed by pinching the nape of the neck, rather than slaughtering with a knife.,The Gemara challenges: And I might say that the halakha is to be learned in another manner, and the verse is speaking specifically of sin offerings that are eaten, as it is written: “In a sacred place shall it be eaten” (Leviticus 6:19); but internal sin offerings, which are not eaten, should not be included. The Gemara explains: The Merciful One amplifies the halakha by stating: “This is the law of the sin offering,” which includes all sin offerings, even those that are not eaten.,The Gemara suggests: If so, then even the blood of the bird sin offering should be included. The Gemara explains: The Merciful One restricts the halakha by stating: “This is the law,” which excludes bird offerings.,The Gemara asks: And what did you see that indicated that the verse is to be understood as including internal sin offerings and excluding bird offerings, and not the opposite? The Gemara answers: It stands to reason that internal animal sin offerings should have been included by the inclusive language of the verse, as internal sin offerings resemble eaten animal sin offerings in several ways: Each variety is a large animal and not a bird; each variety is subject to slaughter on the north side of the Temple courtyard; and the blood of each requires collection in a vessel;

About This Text

Source

Zevachim

Category

Talmud

Reference

Zevachim 89a:1-92a:5

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