זבחים נ׳ ב:י״ב-נ״א א:ב׳

And it is stated below, with regard to the bull sin offerings that are burned, the terms skin, flesh, and dung, in the verse: “But the skin of the bull, and all its flesh, with its head, and with its legs, and its innards, and its dung” (Leviticus 4:11). Just as below it is prepared for burning by means of cutting it into pieces but not by means of flaying, as derived by the verbal analogy, so too here it is prepared for burning by means of cutting it into pieces but not by means of flaying. Evidently, a halakha derived via a verbal analogy can then teach another halakha via a verbal analogy.,§ The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers: That question itself can be answered with an a fortiori inference: And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a matter derived via a verbal analogy, which can teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rav Pappa (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?,The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who accepts the statement of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept the statement of Rav Pappa, i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, what is there to say?,Rather, this can be derived through a different a fortiori inference: And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot then teach its halakha via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a matter derived via a verbal analogy, which can teach its halakha via another verbal analogy, as proven from the statement of Rami bar Ḥama (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?,The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via a verbal analogy can teach its halakha to another matter via a paradigm? The question shall stand unresolved.,§ The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a juxtaposition? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference: And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rav Pappa (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via a juxtaposition?,The Gemara clarifies: This works out well according to the one who accepts the statement of Rav Pappa. But according to the one who does not accept the statement of Rav Pappa, i.e., Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, what is there to say? The Gemara comments: The question shall stand unresolved.,The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference. And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via a verbal analogy, as proven from the statement of Rami bar Ḥama (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via a verbal analogy?,The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara answers that this itself can be derived via an a fortiori inference. And just as a halakha derived via a verbal analogy, which cannot be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement of Rabbi Yoḥanan (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference, as we have said, with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference?,The Gemara comments: And this is an a fortiori inference that is the son of, i.e., is derived from, another a fortiori inference. The Gemara challenges this last statement: It is not the son of an a fortiori inference, but the grandson of an a fortiori inference, which cannot be used. The very fact that a matter derived via a verbal analogy can then teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference is itself derived from an a fortiori inference, as the Gemara stated.,Rather, the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via an a fortiori inference can be derived via another a fortiori inference. And just as a matter derived via a juxtaposition, which cannot be derived via a juxtaposition, as proven either from the statement of Rava or from the statement of Ravina (49b), can nevertheless teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), with regard to a halakha derived via an a fortiori inference, which can be derived from another halakha derived via a juxtaposition, as proven from the statement that the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught (50a), is it not logical that it should teach its halakha via an a fortiori inference? The Gemara comments: And this is an a fortiori inference that is the son of another a fortiori inference.,The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via an a fortiori inference can teach its halakha to another matter via a paradigm? Rabbi Yirmeya says: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (69a–b): If a priest pinched the nape of a bird offering properly and it was then found to be a bird with a wound that would have caused it to die within twelve months [tereifa], which disqualifies it from being used as an offering and renders it prohibited for consumption by the priests, Rabbi Meir says: An olive-bulk of its meat does not render one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat, as is the halakha concerning a bird carcass, as the fact that it underwent pinching means that it is not in the category of a carcass. Rabbi Yehuda says: Its status is like that of any other carcass of a kosher bird, and its meat renders one who swallows it ritually impure when it is in the throat.,The mishna continues: Rabbi Meir said: My opinion can be proved via an a fortiori inference. And just as with regard to the carcass of an animal, which transmits impurity to a person through touching it and carrying it, its slaughter nevertheless purifies its tereifa from its impurity, with regard to the carcass of a bird, which possesses less severe impurity, as it does not transmit impurity through touching it and carrying it, but only when it is in the throat, is it not logical that its slaughter purifies its tereifa from its impurity? And once it is established that slaughter purifies a bird that is a tereifa, it can be derived: Just as we found with regard to a bird’s slaughter that it permits it for consumption and it purifies its tereifa from its impurity, so too its pinching, which permits bird offerings with regard to consumption, should purify its tereifa from its impurity.,Rabbi Yosei says: Although one can derive from the case of an animal that slaughter purifies the tereifa of a bird from its impurity, that derivation cannot be extended to pinching. The same restriction that applies to every a fortiori inference, namely, that a halakha derived by means of an a fortiori inference is no more stringent than the source from which it is derived, applies here: It is sufficient for the halakhic status of the carcass of a bird that is a tereifa to be like that of the carcass of an animal of a kosher species that is a tereifa; i.e., that only its slaughter purifies it, but not its pinching.,The Gemara rejects this proof: And that is not so. Let it remain there, i.e., one cannot learn from it, as that is a case that comes from the slaughter of non-sacred animals. The halakha of the pinching of a consecrated bird is derived through a paradigm from the halakha of the slaughter of a non-sacred bird, and the halakha of the slaughter of a non-sacred bird is derived through an a fortiori inference from the halakha of the slaughter of a non-sacred animal. Outside of the realm of consecrated matters there is no question that a matter derived via one of the hermeneutical principles can then teach its halakha via another principle. The entire question under discussion is only with regard to the realm of consecrated matters.,§ The Gemara asks: What is the halakha as to whether a matter derived via a paradigm can teach its halakha to another matter via a juxtaposition or via a verbal analogy or via an a fortiori inference or via a paradigm?,The Gemara states: Resolve at least one of those questions. The Gemara cites a lengthy baraita before stating the resolution inferred from that baraita. For what reason did the Sages say that in the case of blood left overnight it is fit, i.e., if blood of an offering had been left overnight and was then placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is as it is in the case of sacrificial portions, where if they are left overnight they are fit. From where is it derived that in the case of sacrificial portions which are left overnight, they are fit? This is as it is in the case of meat, where if it is left overnight it is fit, because the meat of a peace offering may be eaten for two days and one night.,From where is it derived that if an offering that has left the Temple courtyard is then placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, since an offering that leaves its area is fit in the case of an offering brought on a private altar.,From where is it derived that if an offering that has become ritually impure is placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, since one is permitted to offer an impure offering in the case of communal rites, i.e., communal offerings. In cases of necessity, the communal offerings may be sacrificed even if they are ritually impure.,From where is it derived that in the case of an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it beyond its designated time [piggul], if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? The halakha applies there since the sprinkling of its blood effects acceptance of the offering notwithstanding its status of piggul. The status of piggul takes effect only if the sacrificial rites involving that offering were otherwise performed properly. This indicates that it still has the status of an offering, so it need not be removed from the altar.,From where is it derived that in the case of an offering that was disqualified due to the intention of the priest who slaughtered it to consume it outside its designated area, if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived by a paradigm, since it is juxtaposed to an offering that was slaughtered with intent to consume it beyond its designated time.,From where is it derived that in the case of an offering for which priests who are disqualified collected and sprinkled its blood, if it was placed on the altar it need not be removed? This is derived from the halakha of these priests who are generally disqualified because they are impure, yet who are fit to perform the communal rites, i.e., to sacrifice communal offerings, when all the priests or the majority of the Jewish people are impure. In any event, the halakha of the sacrificial portions was derived via a paradigm from the halakha of meat that was left overnight, and then the halakha of blood was derived via a paradigm from the halakha of the sacrificial portions. Evidently, a matter derived via a paradigm can teach its halakha to another matter via a paradigm.,The Gemara questions the derivations of the baraita: But can one deduce the halakha of a matter that is not fit, i.e., sacrificial portions that are disqualified due to having been left overnight, from the halakha of a matter that is fit, i.e., the peace offering, which is permitted to be eaten for two days and one night? Similarly, how can the baraita derive the halakha of meat that was removed from the Temple courtyard from the halakha of a private altar, which has no sacred area surrounding it?,The Gemara answers: The tanna relied on the verse: “Command Aaron and his sons, saying: This is the law of the burnt offering: It is that which goes up on its firewood upon the altar all night until the morning; and the fire of the altar shall thereby be kept burning” (Leviticus 6:2), which amplified it, teaching that many types of disqualified offerings may be left upon the altar. The derivations written in the baraita are mere supports for those halakhot.,§ The mishna teaches with regard to the sin offerings whose blood is presented inside the Sanctuary: As to the remainder of the blood which is left after the sprinklings, a priest would pour it onto the western base of the external altar. But if he did not place the remainder of the blood on the western base, it does not disqualify the offering. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that it must be poured on the western base? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to the bull offering of the High Priest: “And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the corners of the altar of sweet incense before the Lord, which is in the Tent of Meeting; and all the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:7). This means that he must pour it on that base which he encounters first when he leaves the Tent of Meeting, which is the western base.,The Sages taught in a baraita: There are three verses that contain the same phrase. With regard to pouring the remainder of the blood of a bull offering of the High Priest, the verse states: “All the remaining blood of the bull he shall pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:7). This teaches that it must be on the base of the external altar, but not on the base of the inner altar, where he had sprinkled the blood.,The baraita continues: With regard to the bull sacrificed for an unwitting communal sin the verse states: “And he shall sprinkle the blood upon the corners of the altar which is before the Lord, that is in the Tent of Meeting, and all the remaining blood shall he pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18). This teaches that the inner altar itself has no base at all.,Finally, the verse states with regard to the sin offering of a king: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar of the burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25). This teaches that you must give a base to the altar of the burnt offering, i.e., that the remainder of any blood placed on the altar must be poured on the base.,The baraita continues: Or perhaps it is not so, but rather the verse serves to teach that any sprinkling of blood on the corners of the altar of the burnt offering will be done on a part of the altar where there is a base. Rabbi Yishmael said: There is no need for the verse to teach that halakha, because it can be derived via an a fortiori inference: Just as the remainder of the blood, which does not effect atonement, requires pouring on the base of the altar, with regard to the initial sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, which effects atonement, is it not logical that it requires a part of the altar where there is a base?,Similarly, Rabbi Akiva said: Just as the remainder of the blood, which does not effect atonement and does not come for atonement, nevertheless requires pouring on the base of the altar, with regard to the initial sprinkling of the blood of a burnt offering, which effects atonement and comes for atonement, is it not logical that it requires a part of the altar where there is a base?,The baraita concludes: If so, why must the verse state: “At the base of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25)? It is to teach that you must give a base to the altar of the burnt offering, i.e., that the remainder of the blood of the offering must be poured on the base.,The Gemara discusses this baraita. The Master says: The verse states: “At the base of the altar of burnt offering, which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18). This teaches that it must be on the base of the external altar, but not the base of the inner altar. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that necessary for the matter itself, to teach that the remainder of the blood must be poured onto the base of the external altar? The Gemara answers: That halakha is derived from: “Which is at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” (Leviticus 4:18), referring to the external altar. Therefore, the verse mentions the altar of burnt offering to exclude the base of the inner altar.,The baraita teaches with regard to the sin offering of a king: The verse states: “And the priest shall take of the blood of the sin offering with his finger, and place it upon the corners of the altar of burnt offering, and the remaining blood thereof shall he pour out at the base of the altar of burnt offering” (Leviticus 4:25).