זבחים ל״ה ב:כ״א-ל״ו א:א׳

derive instead as follows: But if he intended, with regard to the sacrificial portions of the bulls, to burn them beyond their designated time, the sacrificial portions themselves are rendered piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for eating them. The flesh of the bulls is never rendered piggul.,The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (Me’ila 9a): In the case of the bulls that are burned and the goats that are burned, one who derives benefit from them is liable for misuse of consecrated property from the time that they were consecrated. Once they were slaughtered, they are susceptible to being rendered disqualified for sacrifice through contact with one who immersed that day, and through contact with one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, and through being left overnight without the requirements of the offering having been fulfilled.,The Gemara derives: What, is it not referring to the flesh being left overnight, which would render it not valid? And conclude from the mishna that since the flesh is rendered disqualified by being left overnight, the flesh is also rendered disqualified by the intention to burn the sacrificial portions the next day, i.e., it is subject to piggul, which is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar.,The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to leaving overnight the sacrificial portions of the offering, not the flesh. Likewise, only the sacrificial portions are rendered piggul by intent to eat them after their designated time. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that the latter clause teaches: One who derives benefit from all of them by the place of the ashes where they are burned is liable for misuse of consecrated property until the flesh is completely scorched, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is also referring to the flesh being left overnight. The Gemara answers: Are the cases comparable? This case is as it is, and that case is as it is. The first clause is referring to the sacrificial portions that are consumed on the altar, and the latter clause is referring to the flesh.,Rabba raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar from a baraita: And these are portions of the offering that do not render an offering piggul, and they do not become piggul: The wool that is on the head of the lambs, the hair that is in the beard of the goats, the hide, the gravy, the spices that amass at the bottom of the pot together with small amounts of meat, a tendon in the neck, the crop, the bones, the tendons, the horns, the hooves, the fetus, the placenta, the milk of sacrificial animals, and the eggs of doves.,The baraita continues: All of these do not render other items piggul in the case of intent to consume them after their designated time, and they are not rendered piggul, and one is not liable to receive karet for them, neither due to the prohibition of piggul, nor the prohibition of notar, nor the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. And one who offers up one of these outside the Temple is exempt, since they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar.,Rabba explains: What, does the baraita not mean that all of these items do not render the offering piggul if one intends to partake of them beyond the designated time, and they are also not rendered piggul due to the rest of the offering having been rendered piggul? This includes the fetus and placenta, and is therefore not in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar that the rest of the offering does render them piggul.,The Gemara responds: No, it means that they do not render the offering piggul, and they are not rendered piggul due to themselves if one had intent to partake of them beyond the designated time. But such intent with regard to the offering can render them piggul. The Gemara asks: If so, concerning that which is taught in the latter clause: All of these do not render other items piggul and they are not rendered piggul, why do I also need this? Doesn’t it teach that they are not rendered piggul due to the rest of the offering?,The Gemara answers: And according to your reasoning that the additional statement is necessary, then with regard to that which it says a third time: One is not liable to receive karet for them due to the prohibition of piggul, why do I also need this? Rather, the third statement does not teach an additional halakha, but since the tanna wants to teach that one is not liable to receive karet due to violating the prohibition of notar and the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure, he taught the halakha with regard to piggul as well.,Here too, it can be explained similarly: Since the tanna wants to teach the halakha that one who offers up one of these items outside the Temple is exempt, he also taught: And all of these do not render other items piggul and they are not rendered piggul. It may be that the rest of the offering does in fact render them piggul, as Rabbi Elazar stated.,Rava says: We learn in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Elazar in the mishna as well: One who slaughters sacrificial female animals with the intent to eat the fetus of those animals or their placenta outside their designated area has not rendered the offering piggul. And one who pinches doves, i.e., slaughters them for sacrifice by cutting the napes of their necks with his fingernail, with the intent to eat their eggs that are still in their bodies outside their designated area, has not rendered the offering piggul.,And then it is taught: One who consumes the milk of sacrificial female animals or the eggs of doves is not liable to receive karet for it due to the prohibition of piggul, nor due to the prohibition of notar, nor due to the prohibition against partaking of the meat while ritually impure. But it can be inferred that one who partakes of the fetus or placenta, which are not mentioned, is liable to receive karet due to the prohibition of piggul.,Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that here, they are rendered piggul due to the offering, and there, due to themselves, i.e., if he had improper intent concerning them, then they are not rendered piggul. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that it is so.,§ The baraita cited by Rabba is now discussed in a different context: We learned in a mishna there (84a) that if disqualified offerings are nevertheless brought upon the altar, they are removed, and blemished animals are also included in this halakha. Rabbi Akiva deems blemished animals fit, and if they were brought upon the altar they are not removed.,Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit only an animal with a blemish on the cornea of the eye and similar blemishes that are not noticeable, since they are valid in the case of birds. And in addition, this is the halakha provided that its consecration preceded its blemish, i.e., when the animal was consecrated it was still entirely fit.,Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba says: And Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female burnt offering that was brought upon the altar that since a burnt offering may be only a male animal, it is comparable to a case where its blemish preceded its consecration, since the disqualifying factor was there from the outset. Therefore, if it was brought upon the altar it must be removed.,Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to this from the baraita cited by Rabba: One who offers up one of these outside the Temple is exempt, as they are not fit to be sacrificed on the altar. But it can be inferred that if he were to sacrifice from the flesh of the mother of one of these outside the Temple, he would be liable. And how can you find these circumstances? It is only in the case of a female burnt offering. This is because with regard to a peace offering, which may also be from a female animal, its flesh is not burned on the altar but is eaten. Therefore, there would be no liability for sacrificing it outside the Temple.,Rabbi Zeira explains his objection: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Akiva holds with regard to a female burnt offering that if it ascended onto the altar it does not descend, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is that of Rabbi Akiva. This is because one is liable for sacrificing any offering outside the Temple that may be sacrificed on the altar, including one that was brought upon the altar inappropriately but is not removed. But if you say that with regard to a female burnt offering if it ascended the altar it must descend, and it entirely lacks the status of an offering fit to be sacrificed on the altar, in accordance with whose opinion is this baraita?,The Gemara answers: Say that the inference should be as follows: One who offers up one of those items outside the Temple is exempt, but if he sacrificed from the sacrificial portions of the mother of one of these, he is liable. This halakha can apply to both a sin offering and a peace offering, for which a female may be brought and whose sacrificial portions are burned on the altar.,The Gemara challenges: But the baraita teaches this halakha with the term: Of one of these, indicating that it is referring to one who sacrifices the flesh, and not the sacrificial portions alone. And the case of their mother is similar to that of them, and is therefore referring to sacrificing the flesh of the mother outside the Temple, and not the sacrificial portions. Rather, say as follows: One who offers up part of their sacrificial portions outside the Temple is exempt, but one who offered up some of the sacrificial portions of the mother of one of these is liable.,MISHNA: If one slaughters the animal in order to leave its blood or its sacrificial portions for the next day, or to remove them outside the designated area, but not in order to sacrifice them the next day, Rabbi Yehuda deems the offering unfit, and the Rabbis deem it fit. In the case of one who slaughters the animal in order to place the blood upon the ramp or on the wall of the altar that is not opposite the base of the altar, or in order to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or to place the blood that is to be placed below the red line above the red line, or the blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary outside the Sanctuary, or the blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary inside the Sanctuary; and likewise, if he slaughtered the animal with the intent that ritually impure people will partake of it, or that ritually impure people will sacrifice it, or that uncircumcised people will partake of it, or that uncircumcised people will sacrifice it; and likewise, with regard to the Paschal offering, if he had intent during the slaughter to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or to eat from the meat of the Paschal offering partially roasted, or to mix the blood of an offering with the blood of unfit offerings, in all these cases, although he intended to perform one of these prohibited acts, some of which would render the offering unfit, the offering is fit.,The reason is that intent does not render the offering unfit except in cases of intent to eat or to burn the offering beyond its designated time and outside its designated area, and in addition, the Paschal offering and the sin offering are disqualified by intent to sacrifice them not for their sake.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems the offering unfit if there was intent to leave it over until the next day or to take it out of its designated area? Rabbi Elazar said: There are two verses that are written with regard to notar. One verse states: “You shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, and that which remains of it until the morning you shall burn with fire” (Exodus 12:10), and one verse states: “He shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). If the additional verse is not necessary for the matter of the prohibition against leaving it overnight, which is already mentioned by the first verse, apply it to the matter of intent of leaving it overnight, which would therefore be prohibited as well.,The Gemara asks: But according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, does this verse come to teach this idea? This verse is necessary for him to derive that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving shall be eaten on the day of his offering; he shall not leave any of it until the morning” (Leviticus 7:15). From the words: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings for thanksgiving,” we learned with regard to a thanks offering that it is eaten for a day and a night.,With regard to animals exchanged for thanks offerings, and the offspring of thanks offerings, and the substitutes of thanks offerings, from where is it derived that they too are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “And the flesh [uvesar],” and the additional “and” includes them. With regard to a sin offering and a guilt offering, from where is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “Sacrifice,” to include other types of offerings.,The baraita continues: And from where is it derived to include the peace offering of a nazirite, i.e., the ram that a nazirite brings at the close of his term of naziriteship, and the peace offering of Passover? The verse therefore states: “His peace offerings,” in the plural. With regard to the loaves of the thanks offering, and the loaves and wafers that are part of the offering brought by a nazirite, from where is it derived that they are eaten for only a day and a night? The verse states: “His offering.” With regard to all of them I will read the phrase “He shall not leave any of it until the morning” as being applicable. Evidently, this verse is necessary to teach numerous halakhot concerning the allotted time to partake of offerings.,The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse state: And you shall let nothing of it remain until the morning, as stated in the other verse. What is indicated by the phrase “He shall not leave any of it”? If it is not necessary for the matter of the prohibition against leaving it overnight, apply it to the matter of intent to leave it overnight.,The Gemara now questions the source cited by Rabbi Elazar: This works out well to explain the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda with regard to one who had intent to leave the sacrificial portions overnight. But with regard to disqualifying the offering due to one who had intent to remove them from the Temple, what can be said to explain the source of Rabbi Yehuda, as it cannot be derived from these verses?,And furthermore, the statement of Rabbi Elazar can be questioned, as the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda is based on logical reasoning and is not derived from a verse. This is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: Do you not concede that if he left it over until the next day that it is disqualified? So too, if he intended to leave it over until the next day it is disqualified. Clearly, Rabbi Yehuda bases his opinion on logical reasoning, as he equates intent with action. The Gemara asks: Rather, is the rationale of Rabbi Yehuda based on logical reasoning and not derived from the verse? But if so, Rabbi Yehuda should also disagree with regard to all of the other cases in the mishna due to the same reasoning.,The Gemara rejects this: With regard to which case should Rabbi Yehuda disagree? Should he disagree with regard to one who slaughters the offering with intent to break the bones of the Paschal offering, or with intent to partake of the Paschal offering while it is partially roasted? Even had he actually realized such intent, would the offering itself thereby be disqualified? It presumably would not, as the presenting of the blood effects acceptance.,Likewise, if a rite was performed on the condition that ritually impure individuals will partake of it, or that ritually impure individuals will sacrifice it, i.e., burn the sacrificial portions on the altar, would the offering itself be disqualified if such actions occurred? Likewise, if it was done with the intent that uncircumcised individuals will partake of it, or that uncircumcised individuals will sacrifice it, would the offering itself be disqualified if this occurred? The Gemara presents another version of this question: Is it in his power to execute these actions that are contingent upon the will of others?,With regard to a case where one had intent to mix their blood with the blood of unfit offerings, where Rabbi Yehuda also does not disagree with the ruling of the mishna that the offering is valid, he conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood. Therefore, even if one would actually mix the two types of blood, it would not be disqualified. Likewise, in cases where one had intent to place the blood that is to be placed above the red line below the red line, or those that are to be placed below the red line above the red line, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he says: Blood that was not placed in its proper place on the altar is also considered to be placed in its proper place, and it effects acceptance of the offering.,The Gemara suggests: And let him disagree with regard to a case of blood that is to be placed inside the Sanctuary that was placed outside, and blood that is to be placed outside the Sanctuary that was placed inside, as the verse explicitly states that an external sin offering whose blood was sprinkled inside is disqualified (see Leviticus 6:23).,The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yehuda holds that in order to disqualify an offering with the intent to perform a rite outside its designated area, we require that the intended place have threefold functionality, i.e., for the presenting of the blood, for the eating of the meat, and for the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar, which is true only of the area outside the Temple courtyard, which was valid for these three activities during an era in which it was permitted to sacrifice offerings on private altars. Therefore, intent to present the blood in the Sanctuary, which lacks these three elements, does not disqualify the offering, as the meat and sacrificial portions are never eaten or burned there.,The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda accept this reasoning that it must be a place of threefold functionality? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda says that the verse states: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox, or a sheep, that has a blemish, even any evil thing” (Deuteronomy 17:1). The verse included here a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south and not on the northern side of the Temple courtyard as required, and likewise a sin offering whose blood entered inside, i.e., it was slaughtered with the intent that its blood would be brought inside the Sanctuary, that they are disqualified. This indicates that an offering slaughtered with improper intent with regard to a place that lacks threefold functionality nevertheless renders the offering not valid.,The Gemara responds: And does Rabbi Yehuda not accept the requirement of a place of three functions? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (82a) that Rabbi Yehuda said: If he brought the blood into the Sanctuary unwittingly, the blood remains fit for presenting, from which it may be inferred: But if he brought it in intentionally, it is unfit. And we maintain that Rabbi Yehuda deems it unfit only where one actually effected atonement, i.e., he presented the blood on the inner altar.,Now, it stands to reason that if there, where one actually brought the blood inside, only if he effected atonement, yes, it is unfit, but if he did not effect atonement it is not unfit, then here, where he merely thought to bring it inside, all the more so is it not clear that it should be valid? The Gemara answers: There are two tanna’im, and they disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda concerning a place with threefold functionality.,The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda hold that with regard to a sin offering that one slaughtered in the south,