יבמות צ״ז א:ט׳-ק״א א:ח׳

that they will say a matter of halakha in my name in this world when I have passed on to another world. As Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: With regard to any Torah scholar in whose name a matter of halakha is said in this world, his lips mouth the words in the grave, as though he is talking. Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Ze’eira said, and some say this was stated by Shimon the Nazirite: What is the verse from which it is derived? “And the roof of your mouth is like the best wine that glides down smoothly for my beloved, moving gently the lips of those who are asleep” (Song of Songs 7:10).,He explains: This is like a pile [komer] of grapes left to warm before they are pressed: Just as in the case of a pile of grapes, when a person places his finger on it, immediately it moves, as the wine bursts through and the whole pile shakes, so too with Torah scholars: When a teaching is said in their name in this world their lips mouth the words in the grave. For this reason Rabbi Yoḥanan wanted his Torah statements to be attributed to him, so that he would earn eternal life.,§ The Gemara addresses the statement of the mishna that this is the halakha both for a boy who is nine years and one day old as well as a twenty-year old who has not developed two pubic hairs. In both cases, their sexual relations are not considered proper intercourse with regard to levirate marriage. And the Gemara raises a contradiction against this from the following source: With regard to a man twenty years old who has not developed two pubic hairs, they must bring proof that he is twenty years old, and he is established as a eunuch, who may neither perform ḥalitza nor perform levirate marriage.,Likewise, in the case of a woman who is twenty years old and has not developed two pubic hairs, they must bring proof that she is twenty years old, and that she is a sexually underdeveloped woman, who may neither perform ḥalitza nor enter into levirate marriage. This shows that the status of a nine-year-old male and a twenty-year old man without pubic hairs are not the same, as the intercourse of a nine-year-old is considered of some significance, whereas that of a eunuch is entirely disregarded, as he may not even perform ḥalitza.,The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated with regard to this baraita that Rav Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said that Rav said: And this halakha applies only if he developed other signs of a eunuch by the age of twenty. The mishna, by contrast, is referring to one who merely showed the signs of maturity at a late age. Rava said: The language of the baraita is also precise, as it teaches: And he is the eunuch. One can learn from here that this is referring to one who is definitely a eunuch.,The Gemara asks a question with regard to the halakha itself: And in a case where he does not develop the signs of a eunuch, until what age is he considered a minor? The school of Rabbi Ḥiyya taught: Until most of his years have passed, i.e., until he reaches the age of thirty-five, i.e., halfway to seventy, the standard length of a man’s life.,On the same issue, the Gemara relates: When they would come before Rava to inquire about someone who had reached the age of maturity but had not yet developed the physical signs, if the person in question was thin, he would say to them: Go and fatten him up before we decide on his status. And if he was fat, he would say to them: Go and make him thin. As these signs, the pubic hairs of maturity, sometimes they fall off due to thinness and sometimes they fall off due to fatness. It is therefore possible that after his bodily shape is adjusted he will develop the signs of maturity and will not have the status of a eunuch.,,MISHNA: One may marry a relative, e.g., the sister or the mother, of the woman he raped and of the woman he seduced. However, one who rapes and one who seduces a relative of the woman who is married to him is liable to receive capital punishment or karet for engaging in prohibited sexual intercourse, depending on the particular family relationship. A man may marry a woman raped by his father, or a woman seduced by his father, or a woman raped by his son, or a woman seduced by his son. Rabbi Yehuda prohibits marriage in the case of a woman raped by his father or a woman seduced by his father.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that which the Sages teach in a baraita: If a man raped a woman, he is permitted to marry her daughter. If he married a woman, it is prohibited for him to marry her daughter. However, the Gemara raises a contradiction from another baraita: One who is alleged to have engaged in intercourse with a particular woman is prohibited from marriage with her mother, and with her daughter, and with her sister. Apparently, as a consequence of non-marital intercourse, there is a prohibition against the man marrying the woman’s relatives. The Gemara answers: This is merely prohibited by rabbinic decree, lest the man continue to engage in intercourse with this particular woman after marrying one of her relatives, thereby transgressing a Torah prohibition.,The Gemara asks: And anywhere that there is a rabbinic prohibition, does the mishna teach that one may marry the woman ab initio? Since the marriage is prohibited by rabbinic decree, the mishna should have taught that if he marries her, he is exempt from punishment. The Gemara answers: When we learned in the mishna that he may marry her ab initio, it was dealing with their marriage after the death of the woman that he raped or seduced. The rabbinic prohibition does not relate to this case, as concern with regard to forbidden relatives is not relevant there.,The Gemara asks: With regard to the mishna’s ruling, from where are these matters derived? It is as the Sages taught: With regard to all other prohibited sexual relations, lying is stated, whereas here, with regard to a man’s intercourse with his wife’s relatives, taking is stated. This is to tell you that the Torah prohibited intercourse with these relatives only through taking, i.e., the man’s acquisition of his wife through marriage. It did not prohibit intercourse with the relative of a woman with whom he engaged in nonmarital relations.,Rav Pappa said to Abaye: However, if that interpretation is so, then with regard to intercourse with one’s sister, concerning whom it is written: “And if a man takes his sister, his father’s daughter, or his mother’s daughter” (Leviticus 20:17), you must also say that is it is only intercourse through taking, i.e., marriage, that is prohibited. But intercourse through lying, i.e., without marriage, is permitted. How can this be?,Abaye said to Rav Pappa: When the term taking is stated in the Torah without specification, it is interpreted in accordance with the context. With regard to the context of a relationship that has potential for taking through marriage, this verb is interpreted as taking through marriage. In the context of a relationship that has potential only for lying, as their marriage would be invalid, taking the woman is understood to mean lying with her.,Rava said: The halakha that if a man raped a woman it is permitted for him to marry her daughter is derived from here. It is stated: “The nakedness of your son’s daughter, or of your daughter’s daughter, even their nakedness…you may not uncover” (Leviticus 18:10). It may be inferred from here that the daughter of the woman’s own son from a different relationship, and the daughter of her own daughter, may be uncovered, i.e., intercourse with them is not prohibited.,And it is also written: “You may not uncover the nakedness of a woman and her daughter; you may not take her son’s daughter, or her daughter’s daughter, to uncover her nakedness; they are near kinswomen, it is lewdness” (Leviticus 18:17). How so? How can the two verses be reconciled? Evidently, the former verse is stated with regard to rape. A man may marry the daughter or granddaughter of the woman he raped, provided they are not his own offspring. The latter verse is stated with regard to marriage. Marrying the relatives of one’s wife is prohibited.,The Gemara asks: Perhaps I should reverse the resolution of the contradiction between the verses and state that the daughter or granddaughter of his rape victim is forbidden, whereas the relatives of his wife are permitted. The Gemara answers: With regard to those with whom intercourse is forbidden, the concept of kinship is stated (see Leviticus 18:13, 17). In marriage there is kinship, whereas in the case of rape there is no kinship. Therefore, the prohibition against intercourse with a woman and her daughter or granddaughter is clearly referring to the daughter and granddaughter of one’s wife and not of the woman he raped.,§ It is taught in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda prohibits marrying a woman raped by his father or a woman seduced by his father. Rav Giddel said that Rav said: What is the reasoning for the ruling of Rabbi Yehuda? It is as it is written: “A man may not take his father’s wife, and may not uncover his father’s skirt” (Deuteronomy 23:1), meaning that one may not uncover the skirt that his father has seen.,And from where is it apparent that this verse is written with regard to a woman raped by his father and not with regard to his father’s wife? It is as it is written just before that verse, with regard to rape: “And the man who lay with her shall give the young woman’s father fifty shekels of silver” (Deuteronomy 22:29).,And how do the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yehuda, respond to this proof? If the prohibition stated had been juxtaposed with the verse dealing with rape, it would be as you said. However, now that it is not juxtaposed with it, as there is another prohibition in between, namely “a man may not take his father’s wife” (Deuteronomy 23:1), the prohibition of “he may not uncover his father’s skirt” is necessary to teach that which Rav Anan taught, as Rav Anan said that Shmuel said: The verse is speaking of a widow waiting for her brother-in-law, who is this man’s father, to perform levirate marriage. And what is the meaning of the phrase “his father’s skirt”? The skirt that is potentially his father’s, he may not uncover.,The Gemara questions this interpretation: Why does the Torah need to explicitly prohibit intercourse with the yevama of one’s father? Derive that intercourse is prohibited due to the fact that she is his aunt, as she is his father’s brother’s widow. The Gemara answers: The Torah purposely rendered this act a more serious offense. By specifying that it is prohibited for one to engage in sexual relations with his father’s yevama, one who engaged in intercourse with her has violated two prohibitions. The Torah specifically prohibited his father’s yevama in order to have one who engages in relations with her violate two prohibitions, the prohibition proscribing relations with his aunt and the prohibition proscribing relations with his father’s yevama, thereby rendering it a more serious offense.,The Gemara asks: But why not derive that one violates two prohibitions because there is also a prohibition against a yevama engaging in intercourse with a member of the public, i.e., someone other than her yavam. The Gemara answers: The Torah prohibited one’s father’s yevama so that one who engaged in intercourse with her will have violated three prohibitions: Intercourse with one’s aunt, with one’s yevama, and with one’s father’s yevama. And if you wish, say instead that the verse that prohibits his father’s yevama is referring to the period after the death of his father, who has no additional brothers, so there is no prohibition against the yevama engaging in intercourse with a member of the public. § The opinion that a man may marry a woman raped or seduced by his father can lead to the existence of an unusual family relationship. A woman says: I have a half brother from my father and not from my mother, and my half brother is the husband of my mother, and I am the daughter of his wife. Rami bar Ḥama said: This state of affairs is not legitimate according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the mishna, who holds that a man may not marry a woman with whom his father engaged in intercourse, even if they were not married. However, according to the Rabbis, a woman whose father was not married to her mother can legitimately have a paternal half brother who is married to her mother.,The Gemara cites another riddle about a bizarre family relationship. A woman says: He is my brother and he is my son; I am the sister of this one, whom I carry on my shoulders. What is the solution? You find it in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with his daughter, and she bore him a son, who is therefore both her brother and her son. The Gemara is referring to a gentile because it does not wish to entertain the idea that a Jew would act in such a manner.,The Gemara cites another riddle: Peace upon you, my son; I am the daughter of your sister. You find the solution in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with the daughter of his daughter, who bore him a son. This son’s mother is related to him from her mother’s side as well, as she is his sister’s daughter.,The Gemara cites another riddle: Water drawers, who draw water in buckets to irrigate fields, let this cryptic riddle fall among you: This boy whom I carry is my son, and I am the daughter of his brother. You find the solution in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with the daughter of his son, as their son is also her uncle.,The Gemara cites another riddle: Woe, woe [baya, baya] for my brother, who is my father, and who is my husband, and who is the son of my husband, and who is the husband of my mother, and I am the daughter of his wife; and he does not provide bread for his brothers, who are orphans, the sons of me, his daughter. You find the solution in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with his mother, and she bore him a daughter. This daughter is both his sister and his daughter. And he engaged in intercourse with that daughter. And then the old man, his father, engaged in intercourse with her, and she bore him sons. This woman is therefore the wife of her father-brother, and he is also the son of her husband, the old man. Her father’s brothers, i.e., the sons she had with the old man, are his daughter’s sons.,The Gemara cites another riddle: You and I are siblings; your father and I are siblings; your mother and I are siblings. You find the solution in the case of a gentile who engaged in intercourse with his mother, and she bore him two daughters, and he then engaged in intercourse with one of them, and she bore him a son. And the sister of the son’s mother calls him and says this statement to him, as she is his sister from his father’s side and his father’s sister from their mother’s side, and she is his mother’s sister from both sides.,The Gemara cites another riddle: You and I are cousins; your father and I are cousins; your mother and I are cousins. You find the solution to this riddle in a permitted manner as well. For example, Reuven, who has two daughters, and his brother Shimon came and married one of them, and the son of Levi, the third brother, came and married the other one of them. And the son of Shimon says this statement to the grandson of Levi. They are cousins from their mothers’ sides, Shimon’s son and Levi’s son are cousins from their fathers’ sides, and Shimon’s son and the mother of Levi’s grandson are cousins from their fathers’ sides.,MISHNA: With regard to a female convert whose sons converted with her, they do not perform ḥalitza for each other’s wives, and they do not perform levirate marriage with them, as their conversions are considered rebirth, and they are considered unrelated. This is so even if the conception of the first son was not in the sanctity of Israel, i.e., the mother had not yet converted when she conceived of him, but his birth was in the sanctity of Israel, as his mother had converted by the time she gave birth to him, whereas the second son was both conceived and born in sanctity. The first son is considered a convert, who is unrelated to his brother. And this halakha similarly applies to a maidservant whose sons were freed with her, as they too are not considered relatives.,GEMARA: The sons of Yudan the maidservant were freed. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov allowed them to marry each other’s wives after divorce. Rava said to him: Didn’t Rav Sheshet prohibit marriage in that case? Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said to him: He prohibited it and I permit it. I disagree with his ruling.,The Gemara explains: If the two freed slaves or converts are half brothers from their father’s side and not from their mother’s side, everyone agrees that the marriage is permitted, as even a gentile and certainly a convert are considered unrelated to their father’s family. If they are half brothers from their mother and not from their father, everyone agrees that it is prohibited.,When they disagree, it is a case where they are brothers both from their father and from their mother. The one who permits the marriage claims that we trace them after their father. Their paternal lineage is followed, since they are called the sons of so-and-so, their father. Since they are recognized by their paternal lineage, it is well known that they are considered unrelated, and there is no concern that people will infer that a man may marry his sister-in-law. And Rav Sheshet maintains that they are also called the sons of so-and-so, their mother. Therefore, this concern does exist, as it is not common knowledge that a convert is considered reborn and unrelated to his mother’s family.,And some say a different version of this dispute: Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov disagrees with Rav Sheshet, even with regard to maternal half brothers. And what is the reasoning behind this opinion? The legal status of a convert who just converted is like that of a child just born, and all his previous family relationships are disregarded, whether from his father’s side or from his mother’s side.,We learned in the mishna: With regard to a female convert whose sons converted with her, they do not perform ḥalitza with each other’s wives, and they do not perform levirate marriage with them. What is the reason that they may not perform levirate marriage? Is it not because they are prohibited from marrying them, contrary to Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov’s opinion? The Gemara answers: No, the mishna means that these wives are not included in the law of ḥalitza and levirate marriage, as they are considered unrelated, and each wife is therefore permitted to marry anyone. And they, too, are permitted to marry her.,The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the mishna teach that this is so even if the mother converted while pregnant with the first son, and the second converted independently? Granted, if you say that they are prohibited from marrying each other’s wives, this explanation is consistent with that which is taught: Even so they are prohibited from marriage. Although the first son was not conceived in sanctity and only his birth was in sanctity, whereas the second was both conceived and born in sanctity, and therefore they are like the sons of two different mothers, even so they are prohibited from performing levirate marriage with their sisters-in-law. But if you say they are permitted to marry each other’s wives, what is the meaning of the word even?,The Gemara answers: The mishna means that although both of them were born in sanctity, and people might come to confuse them with Jews from birth, who may not marry their sisters-in-law, nevertheless they are permitted to marry each other’s wives.,There are those who say a different version of this inference: So too, it is reasonable that they are permitted to marry their sisters-in-law, as the mishna teaches: Even if the mother converted while pregnant. Granted, if you say that they are permitted, this explanation is consistent with that which is taught: Even so they are permitted. Although both of them were born in sanctity, and people might come to confuse them with Jews from birth, nevertheless, they are permitted. But if you say that they are prohibited, what is the meaning of the word even?,The Gemara answers: The mishna means that although the first son was not conceived in sanctity and only his birth was in sanctity, whereas the second was both conceived and born in sanctity, so that they are like the sons of two mothers, nevertheless, they are prohibited from marrying each other’s wives.,The Gemara cites another proof. Come and hear: Two twin brothers who are converts, and similarly twin brothers who are freed slaves, do not perform ḥalitza for each other’s wives, and they do not perform levirate marriage with them, and if they engage in intercourse with them they are not liable to receive karet for engaging in intercourse with a brother’s wife. If they were not conceived in sanctity and only their birth was in sanctity, they do not perform ḥalitza or levirate marriage, but they are liable for engaging in intercourse with a brother’s wife. If they were conceived and born in sanctity, they are like Jews from birth in all of their matters. In any event, the baraita is teaching that regular converts are not liable for engaging in intercourse with a brother’s wife. It can be inferred that while there is no liability by Torah law, there is a rabbinic prohibition, contrary to Rav Aḥa’s opinion. The Gemara answers: The same is true that there is no prohibition, either. And since the baraita wanted to teach in the latter clause that if they were born in sanctity they are liable, it also taught in the first clause that they are not liable. For this reason, the baraita mentions only the absence of liability.,Rava said: With regard to that which the Sages said, that a gentile has no patrilineage, do not say that it is because they are so steeped in licentiousness that they do not know the identity of their fathers with certainty, but if that identity is known, we are concerned that the paternity is recognized, with regard to the prohibition of intercourse with forbidden paternal relatives and other halakhic issues. Rather, even when it is known, we are still not concerned.,The proof is from the case of two identical twin brothers, who were one drop that was divided into two and obviously have the same father, and yet it is taught in the latter clause of the baraita: They do not perform ḥalitza and they do not perform levirate marriage, although they certainly have the same father. Learn from this that the Merciful One dispossesses the male gentile of his offspring, as it is written with regard to Egyptians: “Whose flesh is the flesh of donkeys, and whose semen is the semen of horses” (Ezekiel 23:20), i.e., the offspring of a male gentile is considered no more related to him than the offspring of donkeys and horses.,The Gemara resumes its discussion of the dispute between Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov and Rav Sheshet. Come and hear another proof, as Rabbi Yosei said: An incident took place involving Niftayim the convert, who married the wife of his maternal half brother, and the incident came before the Sages, and they said that there is no valid marriage for a convert. The Gemara asks: Is this possible? And if a convert betroths a woman who is not related to him, is his betrothal to her indeed ineffective? Rather, modify the baraita and say that with regard to a convert there is no prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife. The Gemara concludes: What, is the baraita not referring to a case where the brother, her first husband, married her when he was already a convert, thereby proving that a convert is permitted to marry the wife of his deceased brother who was also a convert, even if they were maternal brothers?,The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is referring to a case where the brother married her while he was still a gentile, and since he converted they are no longer married. The Gemara asks: If he married her while he was a gentile, what is the purpose of stating this obvious halakha? The Gemara answers: Lest you say the Sages should decree that the marriage is prohibited even in a case where the first husband married her while he was a gentile, due to the prohibition against their marriage if the brother married her when he was already a convert. The baraita therefore teaches us that there is no such decree.,Come and hear another proof, as ben Yasiyan said: When I went to cities overseas, I found one convert who married the wife of his maternal half brother. I said to him: My son, who permitted this to you? He said to me: There is a local woman and her seven sons to whom this was permitted. On this very bench [safsal], Rabbi Akiva sat and said two statements: He said that a convert may marry the former wife of his maternal half brother, and he said that the verse “And the word of the Lord came to Jonah a second time, saying” (Jonah 3:1) implies that the Divine Presence spoke with him only a second time. However, a third time the Divine Presence did not speak with him, i.e., Jonah did not receive any more prophecies. In any event, this baraita teaches that a convert may marry the wife of his maternal brother. What, is it not referring to a case where the convert’s brother married her when he himself was already a convert?,The Gemara answers: No, the baraita is referring to a case where the brother married her while he was still a gentile. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating this obvious halakha? The Gemara answers: Lest you say we should decree that marriage between a convert and the former wife of his brother is prohibited even if the brother married her while he was still a gentile, due to the prohibition against their marrying if the brother married her when he was already a convert. The baraita therefore teaches us that there is no such decree.,And is that convert who cited Rabbi Akiva a reliable witness, despite the fact that the ruling affects him personally? Didn’t Rabbi Abba say that Rav Huna said that Rav said: With regard to any Torah scholar who teaches a ruling of halakha in a certain case and it comes to be, if he said it before the incident, one listens to him. And if not, if the ruling followed the incident, one does not listen to him.,The Gemara answers: If you wish, say that the convert taught the ruling, and only afterward it came to be that he himself married his sister-in-law. And if you wish, say that he is reliable because he supported his ruling by stating that there was a practical case involving a woman and her seven sons, in which Rabbi Akiva ruled that this kind of marriage is permitted. And if you wish, say that here it is different, as the convert stated a different incident with it. Since he cited an unrelated teaching of Rabbi Akiva in the same testimony, this teaching is also considered reliable.,The Master said that Rabbi Akiva inferred from the verse “And the word of the Lord came to Jonah a second time, saying” that the Divine Presence spoke with him only a second time. However, a third time the Divine Presence did not speak with him. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written with regard to King Jeroboam ben Joash: “He restored the border of Israel from the entrance of Hamath to the Sea of the Arabah, according to the word of the Lord, the God of Israel, which He spoke by the hand of His servant Jonah the son of Amittai, the prophet” (II Kings 14:25)? Evidently, Jonah prophesied at least once more.,Ravina said: Rabbi Akiva was saying that Jonah did not prophesize a third time about the issue of Nineveh. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said that this is the meaning of the phrase “According to the word of the Lord, the God of Israel, which He spoke by the hand of His servant Jonah the son of Amittai, the prophet”: It is not that Jonah had prophesized about the conquests of Jeroboam ben Joash, but rather that just as the fortune of Nineveh turned from bad to good, so too, in the days of Jeroboam ben Joash, Israel’s fortune turned from bad to good.,The Gemara resumes discussion of the dispute between Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov and Rav Sheshet. Come and hear another proof: A convert whose birth was in sanctity but whose conception was not in sanctity has maternal kinship, i.e., his relationship to his mother’s relatives is recognized. However, he does not have paternal kinship. How so? If he married his maternal half sister, who was born before him and converted, he must divorce her. Although by Torah law they are considered unrelated, the Sages rendered it prohibited for them to marry, lest he marry a maternal half sister who was born after him and is forbidden to him. If she is his paternal half sister, he may maintain her as his wife. If he married his father’s maternal half sister, he must divorce her. If she is his father’s paternal half sister, he may maintain her as his wife. If she is his mother’s maternal half sister, he must divorce her. If she is his mother’s paternal half sister, Rabbi Meir says he must divorce her, and the Rabbis say he may maintain her. This is as Rabbi Meir would say: Any relative forbidden due to kinship with the mother, whether the woman is his paternal relative, e.g., his father’s maternal half sister, or his maternal relative, he must divorce her. However, if she is forbidden due to the father, he may maintain her.,And he is permitted to marry his maternal brother’s wife and his father’s brother’s wife, and all other forbidden relatives are also permitted to him. The expression: And all other relatives are also permitted to him, is added to include the father’s wife.,With regard to one who married a woman and her daughter and they converted, he may remarry one but must divorce the other one. He should not marry her ab initio. If his wife, the daughter, died, he is permitted to maintain his mother-in-law as his wife. And some teach that he is prohibited from maintaining his mother-in-law.,In any event, this baraita teaches that he is permitted to marry his brother’s wife. The Gemara asks: What, is it not referring to a case where his brother married her when he was already a convert? The Gemara answers: No, it is referring to a case where he married her while he was a gentile. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the purpose of stating this obvious halakha? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that the Sages should decree that the marriage is prohibited if the brother married her while he was a gentile, due to the prohibition against their marriage if the brother married her when he was already a convert. The baraita therefore teaches us that there is no such decree.,The Master said: If one married a woman and her daughter and they converted, he may remarry one but must divorce the other one. He should not marry her ab initio. The Gemara asks: Now that he must divorce her, is it necessary to state that he should not marry her ab initio? The Gemara answers: That statement is standing there, i.e., it is referring to the previous sentence, and this is what it is saying: Those wives that the Sages said that he may maintain, e.g., his paternal half sister, he should not marry them ab initio.,The baraita taught: If his wife, the daughter, died, he is permitted to maintain his mother-in-law as his wife. And some teach that he is prohibited to maintain his mother-in-law. The Gemara comments: One of the teachings is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and the other one is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.,The one who prohibits the convert from maintaining his mother-in-law is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who said that one’s mother-in-law after his wife’s death remains forbidden to him to the same degree as during her lifetime. And therefore, with regard to a convert, the Sages decreed that she is forbidden to him, lest one marry his mother-in-law who is a Jew from birth after his wife’s death. And the one who permits him to maintain her is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that the prohibition against engaging in intercourse with one’s mother-in-law is weakened after his wife’s death, as they are not liable to receive the death penalty. And therefore, with regard to a convert, the Sages did not decree that she is forbidden to him.,MISHNA: With regard to five women whose offspring were mixed, i.e., their lineage became indeterminate, and they had other sons as well who were not mixed, and the mixed sons matured and married women and subsequently died, then four sons who were not mixed, each one from a different mother, must perform ḥalitza with one of the widows, as she might be the sister-in-law of any of them. And one son of the mother whose sons did not perform ḥalitza may perform levirate marriage with her instead of ḥalitza; even if she is not his sister-in-law, once she has received ḥalitza from the others she may marry any man.,Subsequently, he and three of the four other sons must perform ḥalitza with one of the remaining widows, and the other one may perform levirate marriage. When this process has been completed for all the widows, four ḥalitzot and a levirate marriage are found altogether for each and every widow.,GEMARA: The Gemara infers from the mishna that ḥalitza specifically is performed first, and afterward levirate marriage. However, levirate marriage may not be performed first, as that would breach the prohibition against a yevama engaging in intercourse with a member of the public, if she is not his sister-in-law.,The Gemara asks: What is the reason for the mishna’s ruling that the son who performed levirate marriage and three of the four others must perform ḥalitza with one of the remaining widows, and the remaining son may perform levirate marriage? Why can’t the same son who performed levirate marriage with the first widow be the one to perform levirate marriage with the other widows, too, after the other four sons perform ḥalitza? The Gemara answers: Do not say that one of the brothers may perform levirate marriage with all of them. Rather, each one of them should perform levirate marriage with one, as perhaps one will happen upon his own sister-in-law, whereas if one performs levirate marriage with all of them, the others will not have a chance to perform the mitzva.,§ A continuation of a case in the mishna is stated in a baraita: If some of them are brothers, and some of them are not brothers, the brothers perform ḥalitza and those who are not brothers perform levirate marriage. The Gemara asks: What is the baraita saying? Rav Safra said that this is what it is saying: If some of the sons who were not mixed are only paternal brothers of the mixed sons, and some of them, in addition to being paternal half brothers, are also maternal half brothers of other members of the mixed group, then the maternal half brothers must perform ḥalitza with all of the women, since each of them might be his maternal sister-in-law, who is forbidden to him, as levirate marriage applies only to a paternal sister-in-law. And those who are only paternal brothers perform levirate marriage.,The baraita continues: If some of them are priests and some of them are not priests, the priests perform ḥalitza, and those who are not priests perform levirate marriage, as it is prohibited for a priest to marry a woman who underwent ḥalitza. If some of them are priests and some of them are maternal half brothers, both these and those perform ḥalitza and not levirate marriage. § The Sages taught: There is a case in which one performs ḥalitza with his mother due to uncertainty, or with his sister due to uncertainty, or with his daughter due to uncertainty. This is the halakha despite the fact that a levirate bond cannot be created between these relatives.,How so? If his mother and another woman had two sons, one each, and they then gave birth to two other sons in hiding, whose identities were confused, such that their lineage was consequently indeterminate, and the known son of this woman came and married the mother of that other known son, and the known son of that woman married this son’s mother, and they died without children, the halakha is that this one of the mixed sons performs ḥalitza with both women, as it is unknown which is his mother and which his yevama, and that one likewise performs ḥalitza with both women. It is therefore found that each one of them performs ḥalitza with his mother, due to the uncertainty.,There is a case where a man performs ḥalitza with his sister due to uncertainty. How so? If his mother and another woman gave birth to two females in hiding, and they were mixed, and the paternal, but not maternal, half brothers of this man and of the son of the other woman came and married them, and those half brothers died without children, the halakha is that the living half brothers perform ḥalitza with both wives, each with his half sister-in-law. It is therefore found that one performs ḥalitza with his half sister due to uncertainty.,There is a case where one performs ḥalitza with his daughter due to uncertainty. How so? If his wife and another woman gave birth to two females in hiding, and they were mixed, and his brothers and the brothers of the other woman’s husband came and married them, and they died without children, then this one performs ḥalitza with his daughter due to uncertainty, and that one also performs ḥalitza with his daughter due to uncertainty.,§ Following the previous baraita, the Gemara cites two additional baraitot that discuss unusual family situations. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Meir would say: A man and a woman can sometimes bear children of five nations, i.e., of five separate categories of lineage.,How so? If a Jew bought a slave and a maidservant from the market, and the slave and maidservant had two children at the time, and one of these children converted, it is found that one child is a convert and the other one is a gentile. If the master immersed the slave and maidservant for the sake of giving them the status of slaves, and they engaged in intercourse with each other and had a child, here there are three children in the family who are a convert, and a gentile, and a slave. If he freed the maidservant, which renders her a Jewess, and her husband the slave engaged in intercourse with her, and they had another child, here there are a convert, a gentile, a slave, and a mamzer. The offspring of a slave and a Jewess, according to Rabbi Meir, have the same status as a son born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship. If the master subsequently freed both the maidservant and the slave and married them to each other and they had another child, here there are a convert, a gentile, a slave, a mamzer, and a regular Jew.,The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara answers: It is teaching us that if a gentile or a slave engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, their offspring is a mamzer.,The Sages taught: There is a case in which a man sells his father in order to collect his mother’s marriage contract for her. How so? A Jew bought a slave and a maidservant from the market, and they had a son, and the master freed the maidservant and married her, and he arose and wrote that all his property should go to her son, including her son’s father, the slave. It is found that this son, after receiving the master’s property, might sell his father to collect for his mother her marriage contract.,The Gemara asks: What is the baraita teaching us? The Gemara answers: The entire baraita is the statement of Rabbi Meir, and it is teaching us that although the legal status of a slave is like that of movable property, and there are those who hold that movable property cannot be mortgaged, Rabbi Meir holds that movable property is mortgaged for a marriage contract. This is also Rabbi Meir’s ruling elsewhere. Therefore, one might be obligated to sell his slave to pay a marriage contract. And if you wish, say that it is teaching us this: The legal status of a slave is like that of real estate, and therefore, according to all opinions one is obligated to sell his slave to pay a marriage contract.,MISHNA: With regard to a woman whose offspring was mixed with the offspring of her daughter-in-law, and their lineage was consequently indeterminate, and the mixed sons matured and married women, and subsequently they died, the certain sons of the daughter-in-law perform ḥalitza with the wives, but not levirate marriage, as with regard to each wife it is uncertain whether she is his brother’s wife, and therefore his yevama, and uncertain whether she is his father’s brother’s wife, who is forbidden to him.,However, the certain sons of the elder woman, i.e., the mother-in-law, perform either ḥalitza or levirate marriage, as with regard to each wife it is uncertain whether she is his brother’s wife, in which case levirate marriage is valid, or his brother’s son’s wife, in which case she is permitted to him, after having performed ḥalitza with a son of the daughter-in-law.,If the sons of certain, unflawed lineage were the ones who died, then the mixed sons perform ḥalitza with the widows of the elder woman’s sons but not levirate marriage, as it is uncertain whether she is his brother’s wife or his father’s brother’s wife. With the widows of the certain sons of the daughter-in-law, one of the mixed sons performs ḥalitza, in case she is his brother’s wife. And the other one performs levirate marriage, as even if she is his brother’s son’s wife, she is permitted to him.,In the case of a priestess whose offspring was mixed with her maidservant’s offspring, they may partake of teruma, as both a priest and the slave of a priest partake of teruma. And they receive one share of teruma in the granary. And they may not become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, as each of them might be a priest. And they may not marry women, whether unflawed women, who may not marry a slave, or women unfit to marry into the priesthood, as with regard to each of them it is uncertain whether he is a priest or a slave. If the mixed sons matured and freed each other, they may marry women fit to marry into the priesthood, as a freed slave may marry such women. However, neither may marry a woman unfit for the priesthood, in case he is a priest.,And they may not become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse, since they are uncertain priests. However, if they became impure, they do not receive the forty lashes, as each of them might not be priest. And they may not partake of teruma, as one of them is not a priest. However, if they ate teruma unwittingly they do not pay the principal and the additional fifth, as each of them might be a priest. And they do not receive a share of teruma in the granary, as neither can prove that he is a priest. However, they may sell the teruma that they remove from their own produce, and although they may not eat it, the money is theirs. Since it cannot be proven with regard to either of them that he is not a priest, teruma cannot be appropriated from them.,And they do not receive a share of the consecrated offerings of the Temple, as each of them might not be a priest. And one may not give them consecrated offerings to sacrifice for the same reason. However, the hides of their own offerings may not be appropriated from their possession, as it cannot be proven with regard to either of them that he is not a priest.,And they are exempt from giving a priest the foreleg, and from giving him the jaw, and from giving him the maw of their non-consecrated kosher animals. And with regard to either of them, the firstling of his kosher animal should graze until it becomes unfit to be sacrificed, i.e., until it gets a blemish. It is against his interest to sacrifice the animal before it gets a blemish, thereby letting it be eaten by the priests. Once it gets a blemish, it cannot be appropriated from him. Since he is possibly a priest, he may claim that the animal is the property of a priest. The animal then becomes his private property, and he may eat it if he wishes. And in general, we place upon him both the stringencies of priests and the stringencies of Israelites.,GEMARA: It is stated in the mishna that if the sons of certain, unflawed lineage were the ones who died, the mixed sons perform ḥalitza with the widows of the elder woman’s sons, but not levirate marriage. The Gemara asks: Does this indicate that because these sons were mixed up they are rendered unfit? The fact that their lineage is unclear should not render them unfit. Rava Pappa said: Say that the correct wording is: And if the certain sons were the ones who died.,It is stated in the mishna that with the widows of the certain sons of the daughter-in-law, one of the mixed sons performs ḥalitza and the other one performs levirate marriage. The Gemara comments that ḥalitza is specifically performed first, and afterward levirate marriage. However, levirate marriage is not performed first, because if she is not his own yevama but rather his brother’s daughter-in-law, doing so breaches the prohibition against a yevama engaging in intercourse with a member of the public.,§ It is stated in the mishna that in the case of a priestess whose offspring was mixed with her maidservant’s offspring, they receive one share of teruma in the granary. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that they receive one share and no more? Rather, say that they receive a share as one, i.e., they receive a share at the granary only if they come together.,The Gemara comments: According to this modification, we have learned in the mishna a ruling that is in accordance with the one who said that one may distribute teruma to a slave only if his master is with him, as it is taught in a baraita: One may distribute teruma to the slave of a priest who is possibly a priest himself only if his master is with him; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says that teruma is distributed to him alone, even without the accompaniment of his master, as he can say: If I am a priest, give me teruma due to my own priesthood, and if I am the slave of a priest, give me due to my master.,The Gemara explains the background behind this dispute: In Rabbi Yehuda’s place, they would elevate a person to the presumptive status of priesthood for the purpose of lineage on the basis of his having received teruma. If they saw a person receive teruma, they would assume that he is a priest and testify to that effect. Therefore, teruma was not distributed to someone who might be a slave, unless he was accompanied by his master, lest the slave be assumed to be a priest himself. Conversely, in Rabbi Yosei’s place they would not elevate a person to the presumptive status of priestly lineage on the basis of his having received teruma. Therefore, he was allowed to receive teruma independently.,It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok said: In all my days I never had the opportunity to testify in court, besides one testimony, and they promoted a slave to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of my word. Although they presumably examined the matter carefully, an error occurred.,The Gemara asks: Can it enter your mind that they actually promoted him? Now consider: If, even through the animals of the righteous, the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not bring about a stumbling block, then through the righteous themselves, all the more so is it not so that He does not bring about stumbling blocks?,Rather, say that this is what Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok meant: They sought to promote a slave to the presumptive status of priesthood on the basis of my word. How did this happen? Rabbi Elazar bar Tzadok saw a man receiving teruma in Rabbi Yosei’s locale and went and testified in Rabbi Yehuda’s locale about what he saw, not realizing that this testimony would be sufficient grounds to assume that the man is a priest. Since teruma is distributed there only to priests, the slave was almost promoted to the presumptive status of priesthood erroneously.,§ The Sages taught: There are ten types of priests to whom one may not distribute teruma in the granary, and they are: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, a person whose sexual organs are concealed [tumtum], and a hermaphrodite, and a slave, and a woman, and an uncircumcised man, and a ritually impure man, and one who marries a woman who is unfit for him, i.e., who is unfit to marry a priest. And with regard to all of them, one may send teruma to them, to their homes, with the exception of a ritually impure man and one who marries a woman who is unfit for him.,The Gemara asks: Granted, teruma may not be distributed to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, and a minor, as they are not competent, and it is unbecoming to give them teruma in public. It is also inappropriate to distribute teruma to a tumtum and a hermaphrodite, as they are each an unusual creature of their own kind. With regard to a slave it is also clear, since if he is given teruma, perhaps the court will come to elevate him to the presumptive status of priestly lineage. Teruma may not be distributed to an uncircumcised man and a ritually impure man, because these situations are repulsive and it is unseemly to give them teruma in public. One may not distribute teruma to one who marries a woman unfit for him, due to a penalty that expropriates his priestly rights as long as he persists in his transgression. But for what reason is teruma not distributed to a woman?,Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, disagree on this issue. One said that it is due to the case of an Israelite woman who was married to a priest and got divorced, thereby losing her permission to partake of teruma. Teruma is not distributed to women in public at all, lest this divorcée continue to receive teruma. And the other one said that it is due to the concern that the owner and the woman might be alone together in the granary.,The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between them? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is in the case of a granary that is close to town but is not frequented by people. Because it is close to town, the owner of the granary would know if she was divorced. However, since there are not many people there, the concern about their being alone together remains. Alternatively, there is a practical difference in the case of a granary that is distant but is frequented by people. There, there is concern that the owner of the granary might not know if she was divorced, but the concern that they might be alone together does not exist.,It is stated in the baraita under discussion: And with regard to all of them, one may send teruma to them, to their homes, with the exception of a ritually impure man and one who marries a woman unfit for him. The Gemara infers: However, to an uncircumcised man one may send it. What is the reason? How does he differ from an impure man?,The Gemara answers: One may send him teruma. It is because of circumstances beyond his control, i.e., the death of his brothers from their circumcision, that he was not circumcised. The Gemara asks: Isn’t an impure man also in his state due to circumstances beyond his control? Why is teruma not sent to him? The Gemara answers: This man is uncircumcised because of circumstances entirely beyond his control, as circumcision is considered life-threatening for him, whereas that impure man is not under circumstances entirely beyond his control, as one can protect himself from ritual impurity.,§ The Sages taught: One may not distribute teruma to a slave or a woman if they are in the granary. And in a place where people do distribute it to them, the woman is given first and released immediately. The Gemara asks: What is this saying? If one may not distribute teruma to them, how can there be a place where it is distributed?,The Gemara explains that this statement is not referring to teruma. This is what it is saying: In a case where the poor man’s tithe is distributed to the poor from the owner’s house, the woman is given first. What is the reason? She is given the tithe first because it is demeaning for a woman to have to wait in the company of men for a lengthy period of time.,Rava said: Initially, when a man and a woman would come for judgment before me, each for a different case, I would resolve the man’s quarrel first. I would say that since he is obligated in many positive mitzvot I should not waste his time by causing him to wait. However, since I heard this baraita, I resolve the woman’s quarrel first. What is the reason? I resolve her quarrel first because it is demeaning for her to be waiting in the company of men.,§ It is stated in the mishna: If the mixed sons matured and freed each other, they may marry women fit for the priesthood. The use of the past tense indicates that this halakha applies after the fact. If one of the sons desires to free the other, he may, but if he does not desire to do so, he is not obligated. And why not? Neither of them can marry a maidservant in case he is a priest, nor can either of them marry a free woman, as he might be a slave. They are therefore unable to fulfill the mitzva to be fruitful and multiply in their current state and should be obligated to free each other. Rava said: Say that the mishna means that we coerce them and they free each other.,It is stated in the mishna that we place upon them both the stringencies of priests and the stringencies of Israelites. The Gemara asks: With regard to what halakha is this stated, beyond those cited specifically in the mishna? Rav Pappa said: It is stated with regard to their meal-offering: The handful is taken from it like the meal-offering of an Israelite, unlike that of a priest, which is burned in its entirety. However, the offering does not get eaten, like the meal-offering of priests. How so? How is the practice performed so that both stringencies are kept? The handful is sacrificed and burned by itself, and the remainder of the offering is offered by itself.,The Gemara asks: How can it be performed in this manner? There is a principle that should apply here, that whatever is partly burned in the fire on the altar is subject to the prohibition of “you may not make…as an offering” (Leviticus 2:11). This principle states that if part of an item, e.g., the blood of an animal offering or the handful of a meal-offering, is burned on the altar, then burning any of its other parts, which are not designated for burning, is prohibited. How, then, can the remainder of the meal-offering be sacrificed?,Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Shimon ben Pazi, said that the remainder is brought up to the altar only for the purpose of wood, i.e., as fuel for the altar, not as an offering. In this manner, it is permitted. This answer is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar said: “But they shall not come up for a sweet savor on the altar” (Leviticus 2:12). This verse indicates that you may not bring up leaven and honey as a “sweet savor,” i.e., an offering. However, you may bring up leaven, and honey, and other materials for the purpose of wood.,The Gemara asks: This works out well according to Rabbi Elazar. However, according to the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Elazar and hold that it may not be burned for the purpose of fuel, what can be said? What is to be done with the remainder? The Gemara answers that the offering is treated in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: The handful is sacrificed by itself, and the remainder is scattered over the place of the ashes. And even the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, only with regard to a sinner’s meal-offering that belongs to priests, as it is fit to be sacrificed in its entirety. However, here, in the case of an uncertain priest, even the Rabbis agree that the remainder is scattered over the ashes, as it cannot be offered in case he is a non-priest.,MISHNA: With regard to a woman who did not wait three months after separating from her husband, and remarried and gave birth to a son, and it is not known if he was born after nine months of pregnancy to the former husband or if he was born after seven months to the latter husband, if she had sons of certain patrilineage from the first husband and sons of certain patrilineage from the second one, and the son of uncertain patrilineage married and died childless, then the brothers from both husbands must perform ḥalitza with his wife, as they might be his paternal brothers. But they may not perform levirate marriage with her, in case he is only their maternal half brother, and his wife is forbidden to them. And similarly, with regard to him and their wives, if one of them dies childless, he performs ḥalitza and not levirate marriage. If he had half brothers from the first husband and half brothers from the second, not from the same mother but from the same father, he performs ḥalitza or levirate marriage with their widows. If he is indeed their paternal half brother, then the widows are his yevamot; if not, he may marry them like any other man. And similarly, with regard to them and his wife, one half brother from one father performs ḥalitza and one from the other father performs levirate marriage.,If one of his two uncertain fathers was an Israelite and one was a priest, he may marry only a woman fit to marry a priest, due to the possibility that he is a priest. And he may not become ritually impure with impurity imparted by a corpse because he might be a priest. But if he became impure, he does not receive the forty lashes, as he might be a non-priest. Likewise, he does not partake of teruma, in case he is a non-priest. However, if he ate teruma he does not pay the principal and the additional fifth, as he might be a priest. And he does not receive teruma at the granary. However, he may sell the teruma of his own produce and the money is his. It cannot be taken away from him due to the uncertainty with regard to his status.,And he does not receive a share of the sacred of the consecrated offerings, and one may not give him the consecrated offerings to sacrifice. However, the hides of his own offerings may not be appropriated from his possession. And he is exempt from giving a priest the foreleg, and the jaw, and the maw of his non-consecrated animals. And the firstling of his animal should graze until it becomes unfit to be sacrificed because it gets a blemish. And in general, we place upon him the stringencies of priests and the stringencies of Israelites.,If both uncertain fathers were priests, then if they die he is in a state of acute mourning over each of them, in case the deceased is his father. And if he dies, they are both in a state of acute mourning over him, as one of them is his father. He may not become ritually impure to bury them, as each one may not be his relative, and they may not become ritually impure to bury him for the same reason. He does not inherit from them, as the heirs of both husbands can reject his claims. However, they inherit from him if he has no sons and split his inheritance equally.,And he is exempt from capital punishment for striking and for cursing both this father and that one. Although one who strikes or curses his father or mother is liable to receive the death penalty, he cannot be held liable, as it is unknown which of the men is his father. He must ascend to the Temple service with the priestly watch of this father and of that one, as he belongs to one of these watches and is obligated to serve with them. However, he does not receive a share of the portion of the offerings that gets eaten, as the members of each watch can claim that he is a member of the other watch. If both uncertain fathers were in one priestly watch, he receives one share, as he certainly belongs to that watch.,GEMARA: The mishna stated that if the son has paternal half brothers from each of his two uncertain fathers and he dies childless, a half brother from one father performs ḥalitza and the other performs levirate marriage. The Gemara comments that ḥalitza is specifically performed first and only afterward levirate marriage. However, levirate marriage is not performed first, as that would breach the prohibition against a yevama engaging in intercourse with a member of the public in the event that she is not his yevama but rather the yevama of the other half brother.,Shmuel said that if ten priests were standing in one place, and one of them, who is unidentified, left the group and engaged in intercourse with a woman, and she gave birth, the child is a silenced one, i.e., a child whose father’s identity is not known. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the phrase silenced one [shetuki] in this regard? If we say that he is silenced from any claim to his father’s property, this is obvious; do we know who his father is? Rather, it means that he is silenced from the status of priesthood, as well. Although his father certainly is a priest, he is not given this status.,The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara answers that the verse states: “And it shall be to him and to his seed after him, the covenant of an everlasting priesthood” (Numbers 25:13). It is derived from “and to his seed after him” that we require a priest’s descendants to be attributed to his lineage, and here that is not the case, as there is no certain father.,Rav Pappa strongly objects to this: However, if that is so, since the same phrase is written with regard to Abraham: “To be a God to you and to your seed after you” (Genesis 17:7), what is the Merciful One warning him there? Can it possibly mean that one who cannot identify his parents is not obligated to serve God as a Jew? The Gemara answers that this is what He said to him: You may not marry a gentile woman or a maidservant, so that the status of your offspring will not follow her status, as the child of a Jewish man and a gentile woman or maidservant receives the status of his mother.,The Gemara raises an objection: A baraita (37a) teaches that if a priest performed levirate marriage with his brother’s wife within three months of his brother’s death, and she gave birth to a son who is either her deceased husband’s son or her brother-in-law’s son, this first son born after the levirate marriage is fit even to be a High Priest. But don’t we require his descendants to be attributed to his lineage, and that is not so in this case, as the father’s identity is unknown? The Gemara answers: The requirement that his descendants be attributed to his lineage is rabbinic law, and the verse is a mere support, not the actual source. And when the Sages decreed that one whose father’s identity is unknown is not a priest, they did so only with regard to a case of licentious intercourse. With regard to a case of marriage, as is the case in the baraita, the Sages did not apply the decree.,The Gemara asks: And with regard to a case of licentious intercourse, did the Sages in fact issue a decree? Didn’t we learn in the mishna about a woman who did not wait three months after separating from her husband and remarried and gave birth to a son?,What is the meaning of the phrase: After separating from her husband? If we say it means after her husband’s death, say the latter clause of the mishna: If they die, he is in a state of acute mourning over each of them, and if he dies, they are both in a state of acute mourning over him. Granted, if they die, he is in a state of acute mourning over them. You find this case with regard to his uncertain father from his mother’s marriage to the second man. If the second husband dies, the child must mourn for him, and he is also in a state of acute mourning following the gathering of the bones of the first husband, who died before he was born. When the bones of a person who was buried are dug up for proper burial in his ancestor’s plot, his relatives mourn for him a second time. But with regard to the statement that if he dies they are in a state of acute mourning for him, how can you find these circumstances? The first husband is already dead.,And assume the mishna’s statement is rather with regard to a divorcée. And accordingly what is the meaning of the phrase: After separating from her husband? It means: After she received a bill of divorce from her husband. If so, say the latter clause of the mishna: He may not become impure to bury them, and they may not become impure to bury him. Granted, they may not become impure to bury him, as the ruling is stringent, as with regard to each one of them perhaps he is not his son. However, why may he not become impure to bury them?,Granted, for the second one he should not become impure, as he might not be his son. However, for the first he should be allowed to become impure whichever way you view it: If he is his son, it is appropriate for him to become impure to bury him, as even a priest must become ritually impure to bury his father. And if he is the son of the latter one, it is appropriate for him to become impure to bury him, as he, the son, is a ḥalal. If his mother is a divorcée, his father, the latter husband, is prohibited as a priest to marry her, and a child born from this relationship is a ḥalal, who is unfit for the priesthood. There would then be no prohibition against his becoming ritually impure.,Rather, is the mishna’s statement not with regard to the licentious intercourse of an unmarried woman? And what is the meaning of the phrase: After she separated from her husband [ba’ala]? Is it not: After separating from the man with whom she engaged in intercourse [bo’ala], meaning that she engaged in intercourse with a man less than three months before marrying another man, and therefore she does not know the identity of the father? And it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna that the son ascends to the Temple service with the priestly watch of this one and of that one, which implies that he is considered a priest, although the identity of his father is uncertain due to the licentious intercourse of his mother. And this appears to be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel.,Rav Shemaya said: The mishna’s statement pertains to a girl who refused her husband. A minor girl who was orphaned from her father may be married off by her brothers. However, she may subsequently refuse her husband before reaching majority. This nullifies the marriage entirely, so she is not considered a divorcée, for whom it is prohibited to marry a priest. In the case of the mishna, she did not wait three months after her refusal before marrying again, so she does not know who the father of her child is.,The Gemara asks: Can a girl who refuses her husband give birth? Didn’t Rav Beivai teach before Rav Naḥman that women in three situations may engage in intercourse with a contraceptive resorbent, despite the fact that this practice is generally prohibited: A minor girl, a pregnant woman, and a nursing woman? A minor girl may do so lest she become pregnant and die, as the fetus might endanger her life. A pregnant woman may do so lest she get pregnant a second time and her previous fetus becomes a sandal, i.e., it is squashed by the pressure of the second fetus. A nursing woman may do so lest she wean her child prematurely, as pregnancy will cause her milk to dry up, and he will die of hunger. And who is considered a minor girl in this context? A girl from the age of eleven years and one day until the age of twelve years and one day. If she is younger than this or older than this, she should go ahead and engage in intercourse in her usual manner. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir.,And the Rabbis say: Both this one and that one, i.e., women in any cases, should go ahead and engage in intercourse in their usual manner, and Heaven will have mercy and prevent them from getting pregnant, as it is stated: “The Lord preserves the simple” (Psalms 116:6). Evidently, a girl who is a minor and therefore young enough to refuse her husband cannot become pregnant without endangering her health.,The Gemara answers: You find a solution in the case of a mistaken betrothal. For example, if the first husband betrothed her conditionally and the condition was unfulfilled, the marriage is nullified. This woman may marry a priest. If she did so within three months, the identity of her child’s father is uncertain, which fits the statement in the mishna. And this is in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: The verse states with regard to a sota: “Neither was she [hi] coerced in the act” (Numbers 5:13). It may be inferred that she is forbidden to her husband only if she was not coerced by the adulterer; if she was coerced she is permitted to him.,And the superfluous word “she” indicates that you have another woman who, although she engaged in intercourse willingly and was not coerced, is nevertheless permitted to her husband, as the intercourse is not considered adultery. And who is this? This is referring to a woman whose betrothal was a mistaken betrothal, as even if her child is riding on her shoulders, she may refuse her husband and go off on her way. She is considered an unmarried woman, and she is therefore permitted to return to her husband, even if she engaged in intercourse with another man. The mishna may therefore be explained in a way that does not contradict Shmuel. § It is stated in the mishna that if both uncertain fathers were priests, the son is exempt from punishment for striking and for cursing them. The Sages taught: If he struck this uncertain father, and then struck that one, or if he cursed this one and then cursed that one, or if he cursed both of them simultaneously or struck both of them simultaneously, in all these cases he is liable to receive capital punishment, as one of them is certainly his father. Rabbi Yehuda says: Although if he struck or cursed both of them simultaneously he is liable, if he struck or cursed them one after the other, he is exempt.,The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: He is exempt even if he struck or cursed them simultaneously? The Gemara answers: These are the opinions of two tanna’im, and they each expressed their opinion in accordance with that of Rabbi Yehuda.,The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning of the one who exempts the son from punishment? Rabbi Ḥanina said: Blessing is stated below (Leviticus 20:9), with regard to cursing parents, and blessing is stated above (Exodus 22:27), with regard to cursing God. The Sages used the word blessing as a euphemism for cursing, as it was their custom to avoid uncouth language. Just as the statement above, in Exodus, is referring to a curse that does not involve partnership, as God is One, so too the statement below, in Leviticus, is referring exclusively to a curse of a parent that does not involve partnership, i.e., when there is no doubt with regard to his identity. And striking is juxtaposed with cursing. Just as one is not liable for cursing when it is unclear who his father is, the same applies to striking.,§ It is stated in the mishna: And he ascends to the Temple service with the priestly watch of both uncertain fathers. However, he does not receive a share of the offerings of either watch. The Gemara asks: Since he does not receive a share, why does he ascend? The Gemara is puzzled by this question: Why does he ascend? Doesn’t he naturally say: I wish to perform a mitzva by serving as a priest? The Gemara explains: However, note that the mishna does not state: If he ascended, but rather: He ascends, in the present tense. Apparently he is obligated to ascend, even against his will. ,Why is he under obligation to serve in the Temple? Rav Aḥa bar Ḥanina said that Abaye said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: He is obligated due to the potential family flaw, i.e., harm to the family name. If he does not serve with these watches, people will infer that both families are unfit for the priesthood, which is not the case.,It is stated in the mishna: And if both uncertain fathers were in one priestly watch, he receives one share. The Gemara asks: What is different about the case in which the uncertain fathers belonged to two priestly watches, with regard to which the mishna states that the son does not receive a share, and the case in which they belonged to the same watch? Just as in the case where they belonged to two watches, he goes to this watch to receive a share and they reject him, claiming that he belongs to the other watch, and he goes to that watch and they reject him in the same manner, so too, where they belonged to one watch, he goes to this patrilineal family to receive a share on their day, and they reject him, and the other patrilineal family rejects him too, as his true patrilineal family is unknown.,Rav Pappa said that this is what the mishna is saying: If they were both in one priestly watch and one patrilineal family, he receives one share, as he cannot be rejected.,,MISHNA: The mitzva of ḥalitza, the ritual through which the yavam frees the yevama of her levirate bonds, must be performed before three judges, and the ritual does not require the judges to be experts fit to adjudicate other matters, as even if all three are laymen, it is acceptable. If she performed ḥalitza while he was wearing a shoe made of soft leather that covers the whole foot, her ḥalitza is valid, but if she performed ḥalitza while he was wearing a soft shoe [anpileya] made of cloth, her ḥalitza is invalid, as it is not considered a real shoe. If ḥalitza was performed while he was wearing a sandal, i.e., footwear made of hard leather, that has a heel, it is valid; but if performed with a sandal without a heel, it is invalid ḥalitza.,If the leg of the yavam was amputated anywhere from the knee down and she performed ḥalitza as he wore a shoe on the stump of his leg, it is valid ḥalitza. If, however, the leg was amputated anywhere from the knee and above, and she performed ḥalitza as he wore a shoe on the stump of his leg, it is invalid ḥalitza. If she performed ḥalitza while the man was wearing a sandal that did not belong to him, or a sandal made of wood, or on the left shoe, which was being worn on his right foot, it is valid ḥalitza. If she performed ḥalitza as the man was wearing a shoe that was too large for him but which he can still walk in, or a shoe that was too small but that covered most of his foot, her ḥalitza is valid.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Now that the mishna says that even three laymen are qualified for ḥalitza, why do I need it to mention judges? It would be sufficient to say that the mitzva requires three people. The Gemara answers: This teaches us that we require three people who can at least dictate the verses read during the ḥalitza ritual to the participants like judges, as they are not complete laymen in that they are literate. The Gemara comments: We already learned this halakha in a baraita, as the Sages taught: The mitzva of ḥalitza is performed before three individuals who know how to dictate the verses like judges. Rabbi Yehuda says: Ḥalitza must be performed before five individuals acting as judges.,The Gemara discusses the dispute as to how many individuals must conduct the ḥalitza: What is the reason of the first tanna, who requires three? As it is taught in a baraita concerning ḥalitza: “His yevama shall ascend to the gate to the Elders” (Deuteronomy 25:7). Since the minimum number of the plural term “Elders” is two, and since, in order to prevent a paralyzing disagreement between an even number of judges, a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, one more is added to them. Therefore, there are three judges. And Rabbi Yehuda interprets the verse otherwise, for one verse states: “And the Elders of his city shall call him” (Deuteronomy 25:8), indicating a minimum of two judges, and it says in the following verse “Elders” another time, indicating an additional two people, and since a court may not be composed of an even number of judges, one more is added to them. Therefore, there are five judges.,The Gemara asks: And what does the first tanna do with this second appearance of the word “Elders”? The Gemara explains: He requires it for allowing the inclusion of even three laymen as presiding judges for ḥalitza. The word “Elders” would seem to limit ḥalitza to recognized judges, but since it is mentioned twice, it becomes an instance of the hermeneutic principle that one restrictive expression appearing after another restrictive expression comes to include some additional halakha. Therefore, repeating the restrictive term “Elders” twice actually comes to include laymen rather than exclude them.,The Gemara asks: From where does Rabbi Yehuda derive the halakha that ḥalitza can be done in the presence of laymen? The Gemara answers: He derives it from what is written: “Before the eyes of the Elders” (Deuteronomy 25:9), for the Master said: “Before the eyes of” excludes blind individuals from being the judges conducting the ḥalitza.,And since it was necessary to say “before the eyes of” to exclude blind individuals from being judges for ḥalitza, learn from here that even laymen are qualified to be judges for ḥalitza. For if it enters your mind to say that we require expert judges who are fit to sit on the high court of the Sanhedrin, then why do I need to exclude blind individuals? For that matter can be derived from a baraita that Rav Yosef taught, as Rav Yosef taught: Just as a court must be clean in righteousness, as they are careful to judge others justly, and are free of guilt and suspicion, likewise a court must be clean of any physical blemish, with judges who are physically complete.