שבת צ״ו א:ד׳-ק״ב א:י״ג

This statement, that a hole must be large enough to enable a pomegranate to go out in order to purify the vessel, is referring to large vessels. And this statement, that teaches that a vessel is purified only when the majority of the vessel is broken, is referring to small vessels. Rav Asi said that they teach this halakha: With regard to an earthenware vessel, the measure of the hole that renders it unable to become ritually impure is large enough to enable liquid to enter it. And they only said: The measure of a small hole from which liquid seeps, with regard to the impurity of a shard [gistera]. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this? The Gemara answers that Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, said: A shard is used as a plate beneath a perforated earthenware vessel. If the shard is also perforated and leaks, it is no longer of any use. Because one does not say: Bring another shard to seal the leak of a shard, but throws it out immediately.,Ulla said: Two amora’im in the West, Eretz Yisrael, disagree about this topic: They are Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Avin, and Rabbi Yosei bar Zavda. One said: The measure of a hole that purifies an earthenware vessel is large enough to enable a pomegranate to go out. And one said: The size of a small root. And your mnemonic to remember that neither holds that the measure is size of an olive is the expression: Both one who increases and one who decreases. They hold extreme positions in this dispute and eschew the intermediate position. Rav Ḥinnana bar Kahana said an intermediate position in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: An earthenware vessel becomes ritually pure with a hole large enough to enable olives to go out. And Mar Kashisha, son of Rabba, concluded this halakha in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: And vessels that have been perforated are like dung vessels, and so too, stone vessels and earth vessels that were not baked in a kiln, which neither become impure by Torah law nor by rabbinic law. And, as far as the matter of an earthenware vessel with a sealed cover in a room with a corpse, it maintains its impurity until the majority of it is broken.,,MISHNA: One who throws an object on Shabbat from the private domain to the public domain or from the public domain to the private domain is liable. However, one who throws an object from the private domain to the other private domain, and the object passes through the public domain between the two, Rabbi Akiva deems him liable for carrying into the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.,How so? If there are two balconies [gezuztra’ot] that are private domains opposite each other on either side of the public domain, one who passes or throws an object from the one on this side to the one on that side is exempt. However, if the balconies were on the same level on the same side of the public thoroughfare, and the public domain separated the two, one who passes from one to the other is liable, and one who throws is exempt, as that method, passing, was the service of the Levites who carried the beams of the Tabernacle.,In the Tabernacle, two wagons along the same level stood behind one another in the public domain, and the Levites passed the beams from one wagon to the other through the public domain on the same side of a thoroughfare. But they did not throw from one wagon to another because the beams were heavy. Passing, which was performed in the Tabernacle, is prohibited. Throwing, which was not performed in the Tabernacle, is not prohibited. GEMARA: With regard to the main issue, the Gemara asks: After all, throwing is a subcategory of carrying out. Where is the primary category of prohibited labor of carrying out itself written in the Torah? Isn’t it necessary to clarify the primary category before discussing the subcategory? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: As the verse said: “And Moses commanded, and they passed a proclamation throughout the camp saying: Neither man nor woman should perform any more work to contribute to the Sanctuary; and the people stopped bringing” (Exodus 36:6). According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, Moses commanded the people to cease bringing contributions in order to prevent them from bringing their contributions on Shabbat. He then explains: Where was Moses sitting? He was in the camp of the Levites, and the Levites’ camp was the public domain. And he said to Israel: Do not carry out and bring objects from the private domain, your camp, to the public domain, the camp of the Levites.,The Gemara asks: And how do you know that he was standing and commanding the people on Shabbat? Perhaps he was standing during the week, and Moses commanded the cessation of contributions because the labor of the Tabernacle was completed, since all the necessary material was already donated, as it is written: “And the work was sufficient for them for all of the work to perform it, and there was extra” (Exodus 36:7). Rather, derive this by means of a verbal analogy between passing mentioned in this context and passing mentioned with regard to Yom Kippur.,It is written here, with regard to the Tabernacle: “And they passed a proclamation throughout the camp,” and it is written there, with regard to Yom Kippur: “And you shall pass a blast of a shofar on the tenth day of the seventh month, on Yom Kippur you shall sound a shofar throughout your land” (Leviticus 25:9). Just as there, with regard to the shofar of the Jubilee Year, passing is on a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor, so too, here passing is on a day on which it is prohibited to perform labor.,The Gemara asks: We found a source prohibiting carrying out from a private domain into the camp of the Levites. From where do we derive that carrying in is also considered a prohibited labor? The Gemara answers: It is a logical inference. After all, carrying is from one domain to another, so what difference is there to me whether it is carrying out or carrying in? Carrying from one domain to another is prohibited; the direction in which the object is carried makes no difference. However, carrying out is a primary category, while carrying in is a subcategory, as it is not stated explicitly in the biblical text.,The Gemara now questions the distinction between primary categories and subcategories of labor. After all, one is liable for this, carrying out, and one is liable for that, carrying in. Why is this called a primary category, and why is this called a subcategory? What is the point of the distinction?,The Gemara answers: The practical ramification is that if one performs two different primary categories together, or alternatively, if one performs two subcategories of two different primary categories together, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings. And if one performs a primary category of labor together with its own subcategory, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering.,The Gemara further asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who renders one liable for the performance of a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed together with a primary category, why is this called a primary category, and why is this called a subcategory? The Gemara answers: According to him, that which was a significant labor in the Tabernacle is called a primary category; that which was not a significant labor in the Tabernacle is not called a primary category. Alternatively, perhaps that which is written explicitly in the Torah is called a primary category, and that which is not written explicitly in the Torah is called a subcategory.,And as for the halakha that we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object on Shabbat a distance of four cubits in the public domain and it lands on a wall, if the wall was higher than ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw it into the air, and he is exempt. If the wall was lower than ten handbreadths, it is as if he threw it onto the ground, and one who throws an object a distance of four cubits onto the ground in the public domain is liable.,The Gemara asks: If one threw an object four cubits in the public domain, and it did not go from one domain to another, from where do we derive that he is liable? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yoshiya said: Because the weavers of the tapestries in the Tabernacle throw their needles to each other when they need to borrow the other’s needle. Throwing was a labor performed in the Tabernacle; therefore, one is liable for performing it. The Gemara wonders: Why do weavers need needles? Rather, emend the statement to say: Because those who sewed the tapestries throw their needles to each other.,The Gemara asks: Is it clear that they had to throw needles to each other? Perhaps they sat next to each other. The Gemara answers: It is clear that they kept their distance from each other. If they sat too close, they would reach each other and hurt one another with their needles. The Gemara asks: Perhaps, even though they kept their distance, they sat within four cubits of each other, and they would not throw the needles farther than that. In the absence of proof of their sitting arrangement, this halakha cannot be derived from those who sewed the tapestries.,Rather, Rav Ḥisda said: Throwing an object four cubits in the public domain is prohibited because the weavers of the tapestries in the Tabernacle threw the shuttle, to which the thread of the warp was tied on the tapestry. Weaving entails throwing the thread of the warp through the threads of the woof. The Gemara asks: That is not actually throwing, as didn’t the weaver hold the end of the thread in his hand? One is not liable for throwing an object when part of it remains in his hand. Rather, this must be referring to the final throw, when the weaving was finished and the weaver released the thread from his hand.,The Gemara asks: Doesn’t the shuttle go in an exempt domain? The tapestry was less than four handbreadths wide, rendering it an exempt domain even though it is four cubits long. One who throws in an exempt domain is exempt. Rather, it is because the weavers of tapestries throw the shuttle to those who seek to borrow it from them. The Gemara asks: But perhaps they sat next to each other? The Gemara answers: That is impossible because they would reach one another and disturb one another when tightening the thread at the end of the tapestry.,The Gemara asks: And perhaps they were not in a straight line but staggered. That would enable the weavers to sit adjacent to each other without disturbing each other’s work. And furthermore, did they borrow from each another? Wasn’t the following taught in a baraita of the Sage Luda? The verse states: “And all the wise men who performed all of the work of the Sanctuary came, each one from the work he was doing” (Exodus 36:4). From that verse it is derived: Each performed the labor from his own work, and they would not perform the labor from their friends’ work. Each person had his own tools and did not need to borrow from others.,And furthermore, the Gemara asks: Even if the halakha of throwing was derived from here, from where do we derive that one who carries an object four cubits in the public domain is liable? Rather, apparently, this halakha is not derived from the labor performed in the construction of the Tabernacle. Rather, all the halakhot related to carrying four cubits in the public domain are learned through tradition and not derived from the text.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The wood gatherer who was sentenced to death for desecrating Shabbat (see Numbers 15:33–36) was one who carried four cubits in the public domain. He was stoned for performing the prohibited labor of carrying. It was taught in a baraita: He was one who detached still-growing branches. He was stoned for performing the prohibited labor of detaching. Rav Aḥa, son of Rabbi Ya’akov, said: He was one who gathered sticks together into a pile.,The Gemara asks: What is the practical ramification of determining precisely which prohibited labor the wood gatherer performed? The Gemara answers: The ramification is with regard to the statement of Rav, as Rav said: I found a hidden scroll in the house of Rabbi Ḥiyya. And in it, it is written that Isi ben Yehuda says: The number of primary categories of labor prohibited on Shabbat is forty-less-one. And if one performed all of them in the course of one lapse of awareness, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. The Gemara asks: One and no more? We learned in a mishna: The number of primary categories of prohibited labors on Shabbat is forty-less-one, which the mishna proceeds to list. And we discussed this mishna: Why do I need this tally of forty-less-one? And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tally was included to teach that if one performed all the prohibited labors in the course of one lapse of awareness, during which he was unaware of the prohibition involved, he is liable for each and every one.,This citation from the hidden scroll cannot be accurate. Rather, emend this statement in the hidden scroll and say that one is not liable for one of them. There is a primary category of labor among the thirty-nine primary categories of prohibited labor whose violation does not incur the death penalty. The identity of this category that is not punishable by death was not specified.,It is obvious to Rav Yehuda that one who carries four cubits in the public domain is liable to receive the death penalty. And it is obvious to the baraita that one who detaches is liable to receive the death penalty. And it is obvious to Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov that one who gathers is liable to receive the death penalty. In other words, this Master maintains: With regard to this labor, in any case, there is no uncertainty. And this Master maintains: With regard to that labor, in any case, there is no uncertainty. Each Sage maintains that the prohibited labor that he attributed to the wood gatherer incurs the death penalty and is certainly not the labor referred to in the hidden scroll.,On the topic of the wood gatherer, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in a baraita: The wood gatherer mentioned in the Torah was Zelophehad, and it says: “And the children of Israel were in the desert and they found a man gathering wood on the day of Shabbat” (Numbers 15:32), and below, in the appeal of the daughters of Zelophehad, it is stated: “Our father died in the desert and he was not among the company of them that gathered themselves together against the Lord in the company of Korah, but he died in his own sin, and he had no sons” (Numbers 27:3). Just as below the man in the desert is Zelophehad, so too, here, in the case of the wood gatherer, the unnamed man in the desert is Zelophehad; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva.,Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva, in either case you will be judged in the future for this teaching. If the truth is in accordance with your statement that the wood gatherer was Zelophehad, the Torah concealed his identity, and you reveal it. And if it the truth is not in accordance with your statement, you are unjustly slandering that righteous man. The Gemara asks: However, didn’t Rabbi Akiva derive this by means of a verbal analogy? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira did not learn a verbal analogy. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira had no tradition of this verbal analogy from his teachers, and therefore he disagreed with Rabbi Akiva’s conclusion. The Gemara asks: However, according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, from where was Zelophehad’s liability derived? Why was he executed? The Gemara answers: Zelophehad was among those who “presumed to ascend to the top of the mountain” (Numbers 14:44) in the wake of the sin of the spies.,On a similar note, Rabbi Akiva revealed an additional matter not explicitly articulated in the Torah. You say that when Aaron and Miriam spoke against Moses, both Aaron and Miriam were struck with leprosy, as it written: “And God became angry at them and He left, and the cloud departed from above the tent, and behold, Miriam was leprous like snow. And Aaron turned toward Miriam, and behold, she was leprous” (Numbers 12:9–10). The verse’s statement that God became angry at both of them teaches that Aaron, too, became leprous; this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira said to him: Akiva, in either case you will be judged in the future for this teaching. If the truth is in accordance with your statement, the Torah concealed Aaron’s punishment and you reveal it. And if the truth is not in accordance with your statement, you are unjustly slandering that righteous man.,The Gemara asks: However, didn’t Rabbi Akiva derive this from the plural pronoun them, meaning that God was angry with both of them? The Gemara answers: God’s anger in that verse was manifest in a mere rebuke, not in leprosy. A baraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that Aaron also became leprous, as it is written: “And Aaron turned toward Miriam, and behold, she was leprous” (Numbers 12:10), and it was taught: This teaches that he turned, i.e., he was healed, from his leprosy, as he too had been afflicted.,On the topic of Miriam’s leprosy, the Gemara cites that which Reish Lakish said: One who suspects the innocent of indiscretion is afflicted in his body, as it is written: “And Moses answered and said: But they will not believe me and will not hearken to my voice, for they will say, God did not appear to you” (Exodus 4:1), and it is revealed before the Holy One, Blessed be He, that the Jewish people would believe. The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: They are believers, the children of believers; and ultimately, you will not believe.,They are believers, as it is written: “And the people believed once they heard that God had remembered the children of Israel, and that He saw their affliction, and they bowed and they prostrated” (Exodus 4:31). The children of believers, as it says with regard to Abraham our Patriarch: “And he believed in God, and He counted it for him as righteousness” (Genesis 15:6). Ultimately, you will not believe, as it is stated: “And God said to Moses and to Aaron: Because you did not believe in Me to sanctify Me in the eyes of the children of Israel” (Numbers 20:12). From where do we know that Moses was afflicted in his body? As it is written: “And God said to him further: Bring your hand to your bosom, and he brought his hand to his bosom and he took it out and behold, his hand was leprous like snow” (Exodus 4:6).,On this topic, Rava said, and some say that it was Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, who said: The divine attribute of beneficence takes effect more quickly than the divine attribute of punishment. From where is this derived? While, with regard to the divine attribute of punishment, it is written, “And he took it out and behold, his hand was leprous like snow” (Exodus 4:6), with regard to the divine attribute of beneficence it is written: “And He said: Return your hand to your bosom, and he returned his hand to his bosom and he took it out from his bosom and behold, it had returned to be like his original flesh” (Exodus 4:7). The Gemara analyzes this as follows: It was already from his bosom that it returned to be like his original flesh. Moses’ hand was healed even before he took his hand out.,The Gemara proceeds to discuss another miracle that transpired at that time. With regard to the verse, “And each man threw down his staff and they became serpents, and Aaron’s staff swallowed their staffs” (Exodus 7:12), Rabbi Elazar said: This was a miracle within a miracle. It was Aaron’s staff, not his serpent, that swallowed the other staffs.,We learned in the mishna that there is a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis in a case where one threw an object from the private domain to the other private domain through the public domain between the two. Rabbi Akiva deems him liable, as one who threw an object from the private domain to the public domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt.,Rabba raised a dilemma with regard to their dispute: Are they disagreeing with regard to a case where the object traveled below ten handbreadths from the ground? And, if so, it is with regard to this point that they disagree: As this Master, Rabbi Akiva holds: We say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. The object is considered as if it was actually placed in the public domain after being lifted from the private domain. And this Master, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: We do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. However, with regard to a case where the object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt, and we do not derive the legal status of throwing from the legal status of passing. Although everyone agrees that one who passes an object from a private domain to another private domain via a public domain is liable, even if it was passed above ten handbreadths, as that was the service of the Levites, one who throws an object in that manner is exempt.,Or perhaps, they are disagreeing with regard to a case where the object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, and it is with regard to this that they disagree: As this Master, Rabbi Akiva, holds: We derive the legal status of throwing from the legal status of passing. Therefore, one who throws an object that passes through the airspace of a public domain higher than ten handbreadths from the ground is liable. And this Master, i.e., the Rabbis, holds: We do not derive throwing from passing. However, with regard to a case where the object traveled beneath the ten handbreadth airspace of the public domain, everyone agrees that he is liable. What is the reason for that? An object in airspace is considered at rest.,Rav Yosef said: Rav Ḥisda had a dilemma with regard to this matter, and Rav Hamnuna resolved it for him from this baraita: With regard to an object that travels from the private domain to the other private domain, and it passes through the public domain itself, Rabbi Akiva deems one liable and the Rabbis deem one exempt. From the fact that it says in the baraita: Through the public domain itself, it is obvious that it is with regard to a case where the object traveled below ten handbreadths from the ground that they disagree.,And with regard to what form of transfer is the baraita dealing? If you say it refers to passing an object in his hand, is it only when he passes it below ten handbreadths that he is liable? When he passes it above ten handbreadths is he not liable? Didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: One who carries out a load from a private domain to a public domain above ten handbreadths from the ground is liable, as that was the manner in which the descendants of Kehat, from whom we derived the laws of carrying, carried their burden in the Tabernacle? Rather, isn’t this baraita referring to a case of throwing, and it is in a case where the object travels below ten handbreadths from the ground that one is liable, and above ten handbreadths from the ground one is not liable? Learn from it that it is with regard to whether or not an object in airspace is considered at rest that they disagree. The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, learn from it that this is the crux of their dispute.,And this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Akiva deems one liable even if the object travels above ten handbreadths. And that term that was taught in the baraita, the public domain itself, is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of the Rabbis, who deem one exempt even if the object traveled in the public domain itself, and all the more so if it traveled above ten handbreadths, which is no longer within the bounds of the public domain.,This opinion of Rabbi Elazar disagrees with the opinion of Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi, as Rav Ḥilkiya bar Tovi said: If the thrown object traveled within three handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is liable because the Sages established the principle of lavud. Lavud means that any object within three handbreadths of another object is considered to be attached to it. Therefore, an object that traveled within three handbreadths of the ground is considered to have come to a complete rest. If the thrown object traveled above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt. If the thrown object traveled between three handbreadths and ten handbreadths from the ground, we have come to the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis.,That was also taught in a baraita: Within three handbreadths of the ground, everyone agrees that one is liable; above ten handbreadths from the ground, everyone agrees that one is exempt by Torah law, and it is only prohibited due to rabbinic decree. The Sages prohibited throwing or passing an object from the private domain of one person set to the private domain of another person unless a joining of the courtyards is set. And if both of the private domains were his it is permitted. If the thrown object traveled between three handbreadths and ten handbreadths from the ground, Rabbi Akiva deems one liable and the Sages deem him exempt.,The Master said in the baraita cited above: And if both of the private domains were his, i.e., they belonged to the same person, it is permitted. Let us say that this is a conclusive refutation of Rav’s opinion, as an amoraic dispute was stated with regard to the following case: Concerning two houses on two opposite sides of the public domain, even if they belong to the same person, Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: It is prohibited to throw an object from this private domain to that private domain. And Shmuel said: It is permitted to throw from this private domain to that private domain. The Gemara rejects this and states: Didn’t we already establish that Rav’s statement is referring to a case where one of the houses was elevated and one was low? Due to the disparity in height, the concern is that at times the object will fall into the public domain, and one will come to bring it in from there and thereby violate a Torah prohibition.,Rav Ḥisda said to Rav Hamnuna, and some say that Rav Hamnuna said to Rav Ḥisda: From where is this matter that the Sages stated: Any objects less than three handbreadths apart are considered to be lavud, attached? He said to him: Because it is impossible for the public domain to be made level with planes. Since the space cannot be completely smooth, even the minor differences in the ground level throughout the public domain must be taken into consideration.,He asked him: If so, if that is the reason, objects within three handbreadths should also be considered lavud. Why is it that only objects within less than three handbreadths are considered attached? And furthermore, an inference can be made from that which we learned in the mishna with regard to the halakhot of sukka: If one lowers the walls of a sukka from the top to the bottom, if the bottom of the wall is above three handbreadths from the ground, the sukka is invalid because it is considered to be lacking walls. By inference, if one lowers the walls so that the bottom of the wall is below three handbreadths from the ground, it is valid. In this case, the rationale that it is impossible for the public domain to be made level does not apply.,He rejects this: There, the reason that a space larger than three handbreadths is not considered to be part of the wall is because it, i.e., the wall, is a partition that goats pass through. Therefore, it is a partition incapable of serving its function. Once a partition is below three handbreadths, it will obstruct the passage of the goats. Furthermore, according to this explanation, it works out well when the measure of three handbreadths is below, adjacent to the ground. If any more than three handbreadths of space are between the ground and the wall, it is not considered a wall. However, there are several halakhot in which lavud applies above and not near the ground, e.g., when the roofing of the sukka is not connected to the walls. What, then, can be said to explain that halakha? Rather, the conclusion is that the halakha which states that anything that is less than three is considered to be lavud is a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai, learned through tradition.,The Sages taught a case in a baraita similar to the one discussed in the mishna: One who throws an object from the public domain to the other public domain and the object passes through the private domain between the two, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems him liable for carrying into the private domain, and the Rabbis deem him exempt. With regard to this, Rav and Shmuel both said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds him liable only if the private domain between the two public areas is covered with a roof. In that case, we say that the house is considered full and an object that passes through it is considered as if it landed upon an actual object. However, if the private domain is not covered, he is not liable even according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. On this topic, Rav Ḥana said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings in this case, one for carrying out from the private domain into the second public domain, and one for carrying in, when the object initially entered the private domain.,The Gemara relates that Rav Ḥana was sitting, and the following point was difficult for him: Is that to say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems one liable for a subcategory of prohibited labor when performed with a primary category of prohibited labor? After all, carrying out and carrying in constitute a primary category of prohibited labor and its subcategory.,Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that Shabbat is mentioned in the verse: “These are the things [eleh hadevarim] that God has commanded to perform them” (Exodus 35:1)? Several points are derived from the superfluous emphases in this verse. The Torah could simply have stated: This is a thing [davar]. When it states things [devarim] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article the in the term the things [hadevarim] adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word eleh, which are alef, one; lamed, thirty; and heh, five, is thirty-six. The phrase: These are the things, alludes to three plus thirty-six derivation, i.e., the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai. Since Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that there are a fixed number of primary categories of labor, he would certainly hold a person liable for the primary categories but not for the subcategories. ,Rav Yosef said to him: The Master taught Rav Yehuda’s statement with regard to this, and consequently, he encounters a difficulty. One statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi contradicts another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. We learn the statement of Rav Yehuda with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and therefore there is no difficulty for us.,As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to one who threw an object from the private domain to the public domain, and it traveled four cubits in the public domain, Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable and the Rabbis deem him exempt.,Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Yehuda would deem him liable to bring two sin-offerings in this case, one for carrying out from the private domain into the public domain and one for carrying the object four cubits through the public domain. The Rabbis deem him exempt for carrying four cubits in the public domain. And it must be interpreted that way because if it would enter your mind to say that Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to bring only one sin-offering, by inference, the Rabbis deem him completely exempt. How is that possible? Didn’t he carry an object out from the private domain into the public domain? This proof is rejected: And from where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps I could actually say to you that Rabbi Yehuda deems him liable to bring one sin-offering and the Rabbis deem him completely exempt, and how do you find that circumstance? In a case where he said: My intention is that as soon it, the object, goes out into the public domain it will immediately come to rest.,And they disagree with regard to this: Rabbi Yehuda maintains that we say: An object in airspace is considered at rest, and therefore his intention was fulfilled. As soon as the object enters the airspace of the public domain it is considered to have come to rest. And the Rabbis maintain that we do not say: An object in airspace is considered at rest, and therefore his intention was not fulfilled and he is exempt. However, Rabbi Yehuda does not hold one liable for a subcategory of labor performed together with a primary category of labor.,The Gemara rejects this explanation: It could not enter your mind to say so, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda adds even lining up the threads of the warp and beating the threads of the woof to the list of primary categories of labor. The Rabbis said to him: Lining up is a subcategory subsumed under the primary category of stretching the threads of the warp within the loom, and beating is subsumed under the primary category of weaving. Is this not referring to a case where one performed both lining up and beating together, and learn from it that Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable for both a subcategory and a primary category of labor when they are performed together?,The Gemara rejects this proof: And from where do you draw that conclusion? Perhaps it is actually referring to a case where one performed this action alone and this action alone, and Rabbi Yehuda does not deem one liable for a subcategory of labor performed together with a primary category of labor. And Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this. Rabbi Yehuda maintains as follows: These actions of lining up and beating are additional primary categories of labor, and the Rabbis maintain as follows: These are subcategories.,Know that this is so, as the baraita teaches: Rabbi Yehuda adds. The Gemara explains this quote from the baraita: Granted, if you say that Rabbi Yehuda meant that these are primary categories of labor, what is the meaning of: He adds? It means he adds primary categories of labor. However, if you say that he meant that these are subcategories, what is the meaning of: He adds? It was also stated that it was Rabba and Rav Yosef who both said: Rabbi Yehuda deemed him liable to bring only one sin-offering.,Ravina said to Rav Ashi: And according to what originally entered our mind that Rabbi Yehuda deemed him liable to bring two sin-offerings, how could he be liable for both carrying out from the private domain and for carrying four cubits in the public domain? If one only wanted the object to land here at the beginning of the public domain, he did not want it to land here, four cubits into the public domain. Conversely, if one only wanted the object to land here, four cubits into the public domain, he did not want it to land here, at the beginning of the public domain. Rav Ashi said to Ravina: It is possible in a case where one says: Any place that it wants to come to rest, let it come to rest. One indicated that his intention would be fulfilled wherever the thrown object lands.,Concerning throwing an object on Shabbat from one domain to another and within a single domain, the Gemara raises several issues with regard to intention when throwing. It is obvious that one who intended to throw an object eight cubits in a public domain and actually threw it only four cubits is liable because that case is similar to a case where one wrote the word shem, the first two letters of the name Shimon. In the case of writing shem, the individual performed the prohibited labor of writing a two-letter word, even though he did not complete the word that he originally intended to write. The question is as follows: What is the halakha if one intended to throw an object four cubits and threw it eight? Do we say he did indeed carry the object, or perhaps we say that ultimately the object did not land where he wanted it to land? But is that not precisely what Ravina said to Rav Ashi, as mentioned above? And Rav Ashi said in response that it is referring to a case where one says: Any place that it wants to come to rest, let it come to rest. In such a scenario one is liable, because he expressed the fact that he is contented with any labor that will be performed with the object.,Furthermore, the first case, which seems obvious, also requires clarification. And that which you said, that this is similar to a case where one wrote the word shem, the first two letters of the name Shimon, is it in fact similar? There, as long as the letters of shem, shin and mem, are not written, the name Shimon cannot be written. Here, where one intended to throw the object eight cubits and he threw it only four, is it true that as long as it was not thrown four cubits it cannot be thrown eight? An object can be thrown eight cubits without first landing after four cubits. The question remains unresolved.,The Sages taught: With regard to one who throws an object on Shabbat from the public domain to the other public domain through the private domain, he is liable if he throws an object a total of four cubits in both parts of the public domain. If he throws it less than four cubits, he is exempt, as he is neither liable for carrying from domain to domain nor for carrying in the public domain. The Gemara asks: What is he teaching us with this halakha? The Gemara answers: He is teaching us the following two things. First, that domains join together; even though one public domain is separated from the other by a private domain, they are treated as one domain. And second, that we do not say that an object in airspace is considered at rest. The object is not considered to have landed in a private domain, and therefore the one who threw it is exempt.,Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda said that Rav Abba said that Rav Huna said that Rav said: One who carries an object four cubits in the covered public domain is exempt because it is not similar to the flags of the camp of Israel in the desert, which were not covered. The Gemara wonders: Is that so? Weren’t the wagons on which they transported the beams of the Tabernacle covered? The beams formed a covering over the wagons. And even so, Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: The areas that were beneath the wagons, and between them, and on their sides are all considered to have been the public domain. Apparently, even a covered public domain, like the space beneath the wagons, has the legal status of a public domain. The Gemara answers: When Rav said that the space beneath the wagons had the legal status of a public domain, he was referring to when the beams were arranged in stacks. The beams did not cover the entire area of the wagon. There was space between the stacks.,The Gemara asks: After all, how much was the length of a wagon? It was five cubits. How much was the width of a beam? It was a cubit and a half. How many beams could one place on a wagon? One could place three stacks of beams, totaling four and a half cubits. If so, half a cubit of open space remained. When the Master distributes half a cubit between the stacks of beams it is considered lavud, attached, as the space between each stack was less than three handbreadths. The Gemara answers: Do you maintain that they would place the beams on their width? They would place them on their depth, which was one cubit wide, and therefore there was a greater distance between the rows.,The Gemara asks: Ultimately, how much was the depth of a beam? It was one cubit. How many stacks would they place? They would place four stacks. One cubit of open space remained. When the Master distributes one cubit between the four stacks of beams it is considered lavud, as two handbreadths separated each stack. The Gemara adds: This statement of Rav works out well according to the opinion of the one who said that the beams in the Tabernacle were one cubit thick at the bottom, and they narrowed to a fingerbreadth as they reached the top. According to that opinion, there was a space larger than three handbreadths at least between the tops of the beams, and therefore the area beneath that part of the wagon was not covered. However, according to the opinion of the one who said that just as they were one cubit thick at the bottom, so too, the beams were one cubit thick on top, what can be said? In that case, the space between the stacks was less than three handbreadths, and area beneath the wagon had the legal status of a covered public domain.,Rav Kahana said: When we said that the underside of the wagon was considered to be a public domain, the statement was not referring to when the beams were stacked on them. When the wagon was empty and consisted of the frames that held the beams in place, beneath the wagon was an uncovered public domain. The Gemara asks: But where would they place the frames? On top of the wagon when the beams were already stacked on it and the wagon itself was already covered by the beams, as stated above (ge’onim). Shmuel said: It is referring to the stakes of the Tabernacle. Before the Levites would place the beams on the wagon, they would position the stakes, which were particularly narrow. Therefore, the space between them was greater than three handbreadths, and the area beneath the wagons was therefore considered an uncovered public domain (ge’onim).,The Sages taught: The Tabernacle beams were one cubit thick at the bottom, and they narrowed to a fingerbreadth as they reached the top, as it is stated: “And they shall match at the bottom, and together they will be ended [tamim] at the top toward a single ring; so shall it be for them both, they shall form the two corners” (Exodus 26:24). And below, when the children of Israel crossed the Jordan River, it says: “And those who went down toward the Sea of Arava at the Dead Sea came to an end [tamu]” (Joshua 3:16). Tam means finished or terminated. Here, too, the beams narrowed as they reached the top until they were virtually terminated; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Neḥemya says: Just as they were one cubit thick at the bottom, so too, they were one cubit thick at the top, as it is stated: Together.,The Gemara asks: Isn’t it written: Tamim? The Gemara answers: Rabbi Neḥemya explains that this word teaches that they should bring whole beams and they should not bring planks and attach them. The Gemara asks: And according to the other opinion, Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, isn’t it written: Together? The Gemara answers: That comes to teach that they should not be positioned askew from each other; rather, they should be perfectly aligned.,The Gemara asks further: Granted, according to the one who said: Just as they were one cubit thick at the bottom, so too, they were one cubit thick at the top, it is understandable why it is written: “And for the back of the Tabernacle westward you shall make six beams. And you shall make two beams for the corners of the Tabernacle in the back” (Exodus 26:22–23). This means that the width of these beams comes and covers the remaining thickness of those. However, according to the one who said that they were one cubit thick at the bottom and they narrowed to a fingerbreadth as they reached the top, they would not be perfectly aligned, as at the corners this beam goes in and this beam goes out. Part of the beam would protrude out of the Tabernacle. The Gemara answers that it was not only the thickness of the beam that narrowed. One pared the width of the beams as well so they were sloped like mountains and did not protrude.,Following the dispute over the Tabernacle beams, the Gemara interprets other verses according to the two positions. It is written: “And the middle bar in the midst of the beams shall pass through from end to end” (Exodus 26:28). One of the Sages taught: It stood by means of a miracle, as this verse indicates that the middle bar was a single rod that ran along the length and width of the Tabernacle. The middle bar was miraculously bent through the beams on three sides.,The Gemara cites a verse with regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Neḥemya: “And you shall make the Tabernacle with ten curtains…the length of each curtain shall be twenty-eight cubits and the width of each curtain four cubits; all the curtains shall have the same measurement” (Exodus 26:1–2). Place their length, i.e., the curtains’ length, across the width of the Tabernacle. How much was their length? It was twenty-eight cubits. Subtract ten cubits for the width of the roof of the Tabernacle, and nine cubits remain on this side, and nine on that side. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the beams narrowed to a fingerbreadth, the cubit of the sockets was exposed, as the beams were ten cubits high and the bottom cubit of the beams was placed in the sockets. According to Rabbi Neḥemya, the cubit at the top of the beams must be added to the overall width of the Tabernacle. In addition to the cubit of the sockets, a cubit of the beams themselves was exposed.,Place their width, i.e., the curtains’ width, across the length of the Tabernacle. How much was their width? It was forty cubits. Subtract thirty cubits for the length of the Tabernacle’s roof and ten cubits remain. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the beams narrowed to a fingerbreadth, the curtain hung down the western side of the Tabernacle and the cubit of the sockets was covered. According to Rabbi Neḥemya, the cubit of the sockets was exposed.,It is also written: “And you shall make curtains from goat hair for a tent over the Tabernacle; eleven curtains you shall make them. The length of each curtain shall be thirty cubits and the width of each curtain four cubits; each of the eleven curtains should have the same measurement” (Exodus 26:7–8). Place their length across the width of the Tabernacle. How much was their length? It was thirty cubits. Subtract ten for the width of the roof and there will remain ten on this side and ten on that side. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the cubit of the sockets was covered. According to Rabbi Neḥemya, the cubit of the sockets was exposed.,That was also taught in a baraita. The verse states, “And the cubit on the one side, and the cubit on the other side of what remains of the length of the curtains of the tent shall hang over the sides of the Tabernacle, on this side and on that side to cover it” (Exodus 26:13). What remains of the length of the curtains is to cover the cubit of the sockets; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Neḥemya says: It is to cover the cubit of the beams. Place their width across the length of the Tabernacle. How much was their width? It was forty-four cubits. Subtract thirty for the roof, and fourteen remain. Subtract two for the doubling of the sixth curtain, as it is written: “And you shall double the sixth curtain over the front of the tent” (Exodus 26:9), and twelve remain.,Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that the beams narrowed to a fingerbreadth, and therefore the top of the beams did not take up any of the width of the curtains, which enabled the curtain to cover the entire wall of the Tabernacle with part of the curtain on the ground, it is understandable why it is written: “And as for the overhanging part that remained from the curtains of the tent, the half curtain that remained shall hang over the back of the Tabernacle” (Exodus 26:12). However, according to Rabbi Neḥemya, who maintains that it is necessary for the width of the curtains to cover the thickness at the top of the beams, what is the meaning of the phrase shall hang? The Gemara answers: It means that it will hang more than the others. In his opinion, this curtain is two cubits longer than the other curtains covering the Tabernacle. With regard to this, the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: To what is the Tabernacle similar? It is similar to a woman walking in the marketplace with her skirts following after her.,The Sages taught with regard to the construction of the Tabernacle: The bottoms of the beams were grooved and the sockets were hollow, and the grooves were inserted into the sockets to support the beams. Additionally, the clasps in the loops, which connected the curtains to one another, looked like stars in the sky.,Our Sages taught: The bottom curtains in the Tabernacle were made of sky blue wool, and of purple wool, and of scarlet wool, and of fine linen; and the top curtains were made of goat hair, even though that material is considered to be inferior and common. However, the wisdom that was stated with regard to the top curtains was greater than that which was stated with regard to the bottom ones. This is because, with regard to the bottom curtains, it is written: “And every wise-hearted woman spun with her hands, and they brought that which they had spun, the blue, and the purple, the scarlet, and the linen” (Exodus 35:25); while with regard to the top curtains, it is written: “And all of the women whose hearts inspired them with wisdom spun the goats” (Exodus 35:26). The phrase “whose hearts inspired them” suggests a greater degree of wisdom. Apparently, spinning the goat’s hair curtains required greater skill than spinning the various kinds of wool. And on a similar note, it was taught in a baraita in the name of Rabbi Neḥemya: The hair was rinsed on the goats, and it was even spun from the goats, which required a great deal of skill.,We learned in the mishna with regard to two balconies. Rav said in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: With regard to the wagons on which the beams of the Tabernacle were transported, the areas beneath them, and between them, and to their sides are considered to be the public domain. Abaye said: The space between one wagon and the wagon alongside it equaled the full length of a wagon. And how much was the length of a wagon? It was five cubits. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the wagon to be five cubits long? Four and a half cubits would suffice whether the beams were arranged in three stacks, each a cubit and a half wide, or four stacks, each one cubit wide. The Gemara answers: You need the wagon to be five cubits long so that space remains between the beams and they will not be pressed against each other.,Rava said: The area on the sides of the wagon between the wagon and the wheel and the thickness of the wheel together equaled the full width of the wagon (Tosafot). And how much was the width of the wagon? It was two and a half cubits. The Gemara asks: Why do I need the wagon to be two and a half cubits wide? A cubit and a half would suffice. The Gemara answers: So that the beams would not teeter. Ten-cubit beams on a one-and-a-half-cubit wide surface would be unstable.,The Gemara comments: However, with regard to the principle that we maintain that a thoroughfare in the public domain is sixteen cubits wide; we who derive it from the Tabernacle encounter a difficulty: The thoroughfare associated with the Tabernacle was fifteen cubits wide. When two wagons stood side by side, the width of the wagons plus the space between them and the space on their sides totaled fifteen cubits. The Gemara explains: There was an extra cubit where a member of the tribe of Levi stood, to ensure that if the beams fell, he would take hold of them and restore them to their stack. Therefore, the total width was no less than sixteen cubits.,MISHNA: With regard to the bank surrounding a pit and the boulder that are ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one who takes an object from them to the public domain and similarly one who places an object from the public domain atop them is liable for carrying from one domain to another. If the height or width of the pit or the boulder is less than that height, ten handbreadths, one is exempt because the legal status of those protrusions is not distinct from that of the surrounding public domain.,GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Why do I need to teach in the mishna about the cases of the bank of a pit and a boulder? Let the mishna simply teach about a pit and a boulder. One could derive the halakha with regard to an object that is ten handbreadths high from the case of the boulder, and the halakha with regard to an object that is ten handbreadths deep from the pit. The fact that the mishna taught the case of the bank of a pit supports the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A pit and its bank join together to constitute the total ten handbreadths. If the distance from the bottom of the pit to the top of its bank is ten handbreadths, it is considered a private domain, even though some of the ten handbreadths are above ground and some are below. That halakha was also taught in the following baraita: With regard to a pit in the public domain that is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, one may not fill water from it on Shabbat because the pit itself is a private domain, and carrying water from the pit to the public domain is prohibited unless they constructed a partition around it that is ten handbreadths high. Everything within the partition is then considered a private domain, and one standing within the partition may draw water from the pit. And similarly, one may only drink water from the pit on Shabbat if he inserts his head and most of his body into the well. And a pit and its bank join together to constitute the total of ten handbreadths, as stated by Rabbi Yoḥanan.,Rav Mordekhai raised a dilemma before Rava: In a case where there is a column in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and one threw an object and it landed atop the column, what is the ruling? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that the lifting from the public domain was performed in a prohibited manner and the placing in the private domain was performed in a prohibited manner, and therefore one is liable? Or perhaps, we say that since the object comes from an exempt domain, the one who threw the object would not be liable. Prior to landing on the column, the object traveled through the airspace above the public domain. The airspace of a public domain extends ten handbreadths from the ground. Beyond that point the airspace is an exempt domain.,Rava said to Rav Mordekhai: It is our mishna that states that one who places an object atop a boulder that is more than ten handbreadths high is liable. Rav Mordekhai came and asked Rav Yosef about the same dilemma: Rav Yosef said to him: It is our mishna. Rav Mordekhai came and asked Abaye. He said to him: It is our mishna. Rav Mordekhai said to them: You are all spewing the same spittle. None of you taught anything new. You repeat the same unsatisfactory answer.,They said to Rav Mordekhai: And do you not hold this to be correct? Didn’t we learn explicitly in the mishna: One who takes an object from them, and one who places an object atop them is liable? He said to them: Perhaps the mishna is referring to a needle that can be placed atop the column without passing through the exempt area above ten handbreadths, since it is so small and hardly takes up any space.,They said to him: With regard to a needle, too, it is still impossible that it will not be raised somewhat above the public domain. He answered them: It is possible that the boulder has a protrusion below ten handbreadths from the ground. Since the protrusion is not significant in and of itself, it has the legal status of a hole in the wall of a private domain. One who throws an object into it is liable, just like one who throws into the private domain itself. Alternatively, it is possible that the needle is placed in a groove that is below ten handbreadths from the ground. The needle did not enter the groove from above ten handbreadths. It passed directly into the groove, which is a private domain. Therefore, Rav Mordekhai’s dilemma is not resolved from the mishna.,Rav Meyasha said that Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: There is a wall in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and is not quite four handbreadths wide, and it surrounds a karmelit and renders the area that it encloses the private domain. The wall serves as a partition of this private domain. And if one threw an object from the public domain and it landed atop the wall, what is the ruling? Do we say: Since it is not four handbreadths wide it is an exempt domain, and the one who threw the object is exempt? Or perhaps we say that since it rendered the karmelit the private domain, the wall together with the private domain is considered to be filled. Therefore, the object is considered to have landed on an area that is four handbreadths wide, and the one who threw the object is liable.,Ulla said: The fact that it is considered a private domain is derived by means of an a fortiori inference: If this wall creates a partition that renders other areas surrounded by the wall a private domain, all the more so does it render itself a private domain. It was also stated that Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Ashi said that Rav said, and so too, Rabbi Yitzḥak said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: With regard to a wall in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and is not quite four handbreadths wide, and it surrounds a karmelit and renders the area that it surrounds the private domain, if one threw an object from the public domain and it landed atop the wall, he is liable. If this wall creates a partition that renders other areas a private domain, all the more so does it render itself a private domain.,Rabbi Yoḥanan raised a dilemma: In a case where there is a pit that is nine handbreadths deep, and one dug out a segment of earth from the bottom of the pit and thereby completed the depth of the pit to ten handbreadths, and then he proceeded to throw the earth into the public domain, what is the ruling? The two sides to the dilemma are: Is it that the lifting of the object and establishment of the ten-handbreadth partition came about simultaneously, and he is liable? Or perhaps he is not liable. And if you say: Since the partition was not ten handbreadths deep initially, he is not liable, then in a case where there is a pit that is ten handbreadths deep, and one placed a segment of earth into the pit and thereby minimized its depth to less than ten handbreadths, nullifying its status as a private domain, what is the ruling? The two sides of the question are: Is it that placement of the object and the elimination of the ten-handbreadth partition came about simultaneously, and he is liable? Or perhaps, he is not liable because the partition was not intact throughout the performance of the action.,The Gemara suggests: Resolve Rabbi Yoḥanan’s dilemma from his own statement, as we learned in a mishna: With regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain and it hits the wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, which is an exempt domain, it is as if he threw it in the air, and he is exempt. If it was below ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he threw it and it landed on the ground, and one who throws an object four cubits and it lands on the ground is liable. And we discussed it: How could he be liable for carrying in that case? The object did not come to rest on the wall and there was no placement.,And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is with regard to the case of a juicy cake of figs that sticks to the wall when thrown against it that we learned in the mishna. The Gemara asks: And why is one liable in that case? When the cake of figs sticks to the wall, it reduces the distance the figs traveled from the measure of four cubits that determines liability. If one threw the cake of figs at a distance of exactly four cubits from the wall, and, based on Rabbi Yoḥanan, the object becomes part of the wall, the distance that the cake of figs traveled is slightly less than four cubits, and therefore he should be exempt. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan did not take this into account, apparently, in his opinion, when the placement of the object and the elimination of the partition are simultaneous, one is liable.,The Gemara rejects this and says: The cases are not similar because there, in the case of the cake of figs, the one who threw it does not nullify its independent existence vis-à-vis the wall, as the food will eventually be removed from the wall. Here, in the case of the dirt in the pit, one nullifies its independent existence vis-à-vis the pit, and it eliminates the ten-handbreadth partition.,Rava raised a similar dilemma: In a case where one threw a board and it landed on top of stakes that are ten handbreadths high but not four handbreadths wide, what is the ruling? Once the board lands, the surface is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide. The Gemara asks: What is his dilemma? Does his dilemma pertain to the ruling in a case where the placement of the object and the establishment of the partition came about simultaneously? That is precisely the dilemma raised by Rabbi Yoḥanan.,The Gemara answers: The case where Rava raised a dilemma is more complex. His dilemma is with regard to a case where one threw a board and there was an object resting atop the board. In that case, what is the ruling? The two sides of the dilemma are: Since the board and the object come simultaneously, the legal status is similar to a case where the placement of the object and the establishment of the partition came about simultaneously. The object and the board are a single unit that creates a partition when it lands, and therefore one is exempt. Or perhaps we say that since it is impossible, when they land, for the object not to rise slightly and then land because the object and the board are not connected, it is like the case where the establishment of the partition was completed and the placement of the object followed, and therefore one is liable. These dilemmas remain, and therefore let it stand unresolved.,Rava raised an issue related to the previous dilemmas, and before doing so he sought to clarify certain points. Rava said: It is obvious to me that if one poured water onto water that is its placement, and if one did so from one domain to another he is liable. If one placed a nut onto water, it is not considered its placement. However, Rava raised a dilemma: In a case where there is a nut in a vessel and the vessel is floating on water, what is the ruling? Is it permitted to lift the nut on Shabbat if one is in another domain? The two sides of the dilemma are: Do we say that we go according to the status of the nut, and it is at rest in the vessel? Or perhaps we go according to the status of the vessel, and it is not at rest. No resolution was found to this dilemma. Therefore, let it stand unresolved as well.,However, with regard to oil floating on wine, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri and the Rabbis. As we learned in a mishna: In the case of oil floating on wine, and one who immersed himself during the day, i.e., one who was impure, immersed himself in a ritual bath, but will not become completely pure until sunset, touched the oil, he invalidated only the oil and not the wine. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri says: With regard to the two, i.e., the oil and the wine, they are considered to have a connection to each other. Since he made the oil impure, the wine is also impure. Their dispute is whether or not the oil is considered to be placed atop the wine.,Abaye said: In the case of a pit in the public domain that is ten handbreadths deep and precisely eight handbreadths wide, and one threw a mat into it, he is liable. However, if he divided the pit with a mat that split it in two, each one slightly less than four handbreadths wide, he is exempt because neither part is considered a private domain. The Gemara comments: According to the opinion of Abaye, for whom it is obvious that the mat eliminates the partition of the pit, all the more so that a segment of dirt thrown into a pit that is ten handbreadths deep, rendering it less than ten handbreadths, eliminates the partition, and he has no dilemma with regard to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s case. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who raised a dilemma with regard to a segment of dirt, it is obvious that a mat does not eliminate the partition.,Abaye said: With regard to a pit in the public domain that is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide and filled with water, and one threw an object into it on Shabbat, one is liable because the pit is considered a private domain. And if the pit was filled with fruit and one threw an object into it, he is exempt. What is the reason for the different rulings? Water is not significant enough to eliminate the partition; fruit eliminates the partition. This was also taught in a baraita: One who throws an object from the sea to the street or from the street to the sea is exempt because the sea is considered a karmelit, and one is not liable according to Torah law in that case. Rabbi Shimon says: If the area in the sea where he threw it is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, he is liable, as he is considered as one who threw an object into a private domain. Apparently, the water in the sea does not eliminate the status of a private domain.,MISHNA: With regard to one who throws an object four cubits in the public domain, if the object hits the wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, which is an exempt domain, it is as if one threw it in the air, and he is exempt. If it hits the wall below ten handbreadths from the ground, it is as if he threw it and it landed on the ground, and one who throws an object four cubits and it lands on the ground is liable.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that if one throws an object in the public domain a distance of four cubits and it hits a wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, he is liable if he threw it. The Gemara asks: And we discussed it: How could he be liable for carrying in that case? Since the object did not come to rest on the wall, there was no placement. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is with regard to the case of a juicy cake of figs that sticks to the wall when thrown against it that we learned in the mishna.,Rav Yehuda said that Rav said that Rabbi Ḥiyya said: If one threw a stone at a wall above ten handbreadths from the ground, and it went and came to rest in a hole in the wall of any size less than four handbreadths, we have come to the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis. According to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who said: One carves out the space to complete it, he is liable. We complete the hole by conceptually carving it to four handbreadths because doing so is theoretically possible. Since the hole is considered ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, one is liable for transferring an object from a public domain to a private one. According to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say: One does not carve out the space to complete it, the thrower is not liable because the hole is actually less than four handbreadths wide at present. That was also taught in a baraita: If one threw an object above ten handbreadths, and it went and came to rest in a small hole, Rabbi Meir deems him liable, while the Rabbis deem him exempt.,Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: In the case of a mound that is an inclined plane that gradually attains a height of ten handbreadths over a horizontal space of four cubits, and one threw an object from the public domain and it came to rest atop that mound, he is liable because it is considered a partition. That was also taught in a baraita: An alleyway that is level inside and becomes an inclined or declined plane as it enters the public domain, which is higher or lower than the alleyway, or if the entrance to the alleyway is level when entering the public domain and inside it is inclined, that alleyway requires neither a post alongside its entrance or a beam across its entrance in order to distinguish it from the public domain because the incline itself is considered a partition. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Gamliel says: In the case of a mound that gradually attains a height of ten handbreadths over a horizontal space of four cubits, and one threw an object from the public domain and it came to rest atop that mound, he is liable.,MISHNA: If one threw an object in the public domain, intending for it to land within four cubits, meaning that he had no intention of violating the Torah prohibition of carrying, and the object rolled and went beyond four cubits, he is exempt. However, if one threw an object with the intention of it landing beyond four cubits, and the object rolled back within four cubits, he is liable from when he originally threw the object.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that if one threw an object beyond four cubits and it rolled back within four cubits, he is liable. The Gemara asks: The object did not come to rest beyond four cubits, so how can the one who threw it be liable? Rabbi Yoḥanan said: And that liability was established when the object came to rest atop something. That was also taught in a baraita: If one threw an object beyond four cubits and the wind blew it while still in the air and brought it within four cubits, he is exempt even though it, i.e., the wind, then brought it back out because the object did not come to rest in the place where it was thrown. However, if the wind seized it briefly and it stayed on the ground for a brief period of time (Tosafot), even though the wind then brought it in, the individual is liable.,Rava said: Despite the principle of lavud, which states that within three handbreadths of the ground an object is considered to be attached to it, according to the Rabbis, who maintain that an object in airspace is not considered at rest, the object must come to rest atop something to establish liability. The Gemara relates that Mareimar sat and stated this halakha. Ravina said to Mareimar: Isn’t that what we learned in the mishna, with regard to which Rabbi Yoḥanan said: That liability is when it came to rest atop something, which means that the object must actually land in order for the one who threw it to be liable. Mareimar said to Ravina: Are you saying it is a case of rolling? One cannot cite proof from a rolling object because a rolling object will not ultimately come to rest. However, with regard to this object, which passed within three handbreadths of the ground, I would say: Since it will ultimately come to rest, even though it has not yet come to rest, it is considered as an object that came to rest. Therefore, Rava teaches us that even in that case one is not liable until it actually comes to rest upon something.,MISHNA: One who throws an object four cubits into the sea is exempt. If there was a swamp and the public domain passes through it, one who throws an object four cubits into it is liable like one who carried four cubits in the public domain. And how deep is this swamp? It is less than ten handbreadths deep. In the case of a swamp that the public domain passes through, one who throws an object four cubits into the swamp is liable.,GEMARA: One of the Sages said to Rava: Granted, passing passing is mentioned twice in the mishna; this teaches us that passage under duress is considered passage, but usage under duress is not considered usage. But why do I need it to mention swamp swamp twice? Rava answered him: One case is referring to the summer, and one case is referring to the winter. And both cases are necessary, as had the mishna taught only one mention of swamp, I would have said that these matters, i.e., cases indicating that passage under duress is considered passage, apply only in the summer because people commonly pass through the swamp to cool themselves; however, in the winter I would have thought that it would not be so. And had the mishna taught us only the case of winter, I would have said that since they are filthy from mud anyway, they do not mind walking through the swamp, but in the summer it would not be so.,Abaye said: It is possible to explain this other way. It was necessary for the mishna to state swamp twice because it would have entered your mind to say that these matters apply specifically where the swamp is not four cubits wide because then people walk through the swamp and do not circumvent it, but where the swamp is four cubits wide, people circumvent it. Therefore, it was necessary to teach that people walk through swamps that are both narrow and wide.,Rav Ashi said another explanation: It was necessary for the mishna to state swamp twice because it would have entered your mind to say that these matters apply specifically where the swamp is at least four handbreadths wide, but where the swamp is not four handbreadths wide, people step over it and do not walk through it. The Gemara comments: And Rav Ashi follows his own reasoning, as Rav Ashi said: One who threw an object and it came to rest on one of the beams of a bridge is liable. Even though the width of each beam is less than four handbreadths, it joins together with the other beams to form a single surface of the public domain because even though many people step over the beams, still many people step on it.,MISHNA: One who throws an object from the sea to dry land, or from dry land to the sea, or from the sea onto a boat, or from a boat into the sea, or from one boat to another is exempt because the sea has the legal status of a karmelit. If boats are tied together, one may carry an object from one to the other on Shabbat. However, if they are not tied, even though they are adjacent, one may not carry from one to the other.,GEMARA: It was stated that the Sages disagreed with regard to the manner in which one may draw seawater onto a boat on Shabbat. Rav Huna said: One extends a projection of any size from the side of the boat as a distinctive sign, and fills a receptacle with water from the sea. Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna say: One creates an area, a frame of four by four handbreadths, and fills the water from inside it.,The Gemara explains: Rav Huna, who said that one extends a projection of any size and fills a receptacle with water, maintains that we measure the karmelit from the sea floor. Since the sea itself is deeper than ten handbreadths, the boat is considered to be floating in the air, and the air is an exempt domain, as it is above ten handbreadths from the ground of the karmelit. And by law one should not require a projection because he is drawing water from an exempt domain into a private domain, which is permitted ab initio. Rather, the reason a projection is required is so that he will have a distinctive sign and not come to draw water from a karmelit into a private domain.,Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna say: One creates an area, a frame of four by four handbreadths, and fills a receptacle with water. They maintain that we measure the karmelit from the surface of the water, and the water in the sea has a legal status like that of solid land. Therefore, if one does not create an area of four by four, he will carry from a karmelit to the private domain.,Rav Naḥman said to Rabba bar Avuh: And according to Rav Huna, who said that one extends a projection of any size from the side of the boat and fills a receptacle with water, isn’t there room for concern that at times when the water is not ten handbreadths deep, he will carry from a karmelit into the private domain? He said to him: We learned through tradition that a boat does not travel in water that is less than ten handbreadths deep. He asks: Although a boat has a protrusion at its bow is more than ten handbreadths above the sea floor, the entire length of the boat is not necessarily that far above the bottom. Rav Safra said: Those people who measure the depth of the water with long poles proceed before the ship and ensure that that the water is at least ten handbreadths deep.,Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin: According to Rav Ḥisda and Rabba bar Rav Huna, who say that in order to draw water onto a boat on Shabbat one creates an area of four by four handbreadths and fills a receptacle, how does he throw out his waste water? And if you say he pours it out in the same area from which he draws water, the water that he subsequently draws from there will be disgusting to him. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin answered him: He pours it onto the side of the boat from which it runs into the sea, and he does not pour it directly into the sea. The Gemara asks: Even so, it is accomplished by means of his power. Although he did not pour it directly, he caused the waste water to enter the sea. The Gemara answers: The Sages did not issue a decree to prohibit an action performed by one’s power in a karmelit. They only prohibited throwing an object directly. And from where do you say that this is so? As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to a ship, one may neither carry from it into the sea, nor from the sea into it. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the interior of the boat is ten handbreadths deep and it is not ten handbreadths above the surface of the water, one may carry from it into the sea, but not from the sea into it. The Gemara asks: What is different about carrying from the sea into the ship that one may not do so? Is it because in doing so one is carrying from a karmelit into the private domain? In carrying from the ship into the sea, one is also carrying from the private domain into a karmelit. Rather, is it not that from the ship to the sea is permitted because one throws the object onto the edge of the boat and it falls into the sea on its own, and learn from it that the Sages did not issue a decree prohibiting an action caused indirectly by one’s power in a karmelit? The Gemara summarizes: Indeed, learn from it that this is so.,Rav Huna said: With regard to those small boats of Meishan, which are wide on top and narrow at the bottom, one may carry in them only within four cubits. Because they are less than four handbreadths wide at the bottom, they are not a private domain. And we only said this halakha in a case where the width of the boat does not reach four handbreadths less than three handbreadths from the bottom of the boat. However, if the width of the boat reaches four handbreadths less than three handbreadths from the bottom, we do not have this halakha, as those are considered full-fledged partitions which create a private domain. And, similarly, if one fills the bottom of the boat with reeds and thin willow branches up to the point where the boat reaches four handbreadths, we do not have this halakha. If there are ten handbreadths above the point where the boat reaches four handbreadths, it is a private domain.,Rav Naḥman strongly objects to this: And let us say: Lower the partition. The upper part of the raft is sufficiently wide and its partitions are sufficiently high; why not consider it as if the partitions of the boat descend from the top of the raft in a straight line to the bottom? Was it not taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: One who stuck a stick into the ground in the public domain, and hung a basket atop it that is four by four handbreadths wide, and threw an object from the public domain and it landed upon it, he is liable, like one who carried an object into a private domain? Apparently, we say: Lower the partition of the basket and treat it as if it reaches the ground, creating a column that is considered a private domain. Here, too, let us say: Lower the partition.,Rav Yosef strongly objects to this statement of Rav Naḥman: And did they not hear that which Rav Yehuda said that Rav said, and there are those who determined that this halakha was stated in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya: And it was taught in a baraita: And the Rabbis deem one exempt in the case of a reed stuck in the ground of a public domain? Apparently, the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, is an individual opinion and was not accepted as halakha. Abaye said to him: And do you not hold the principle of extending partitions? Was it not taught in a baraita: With regard to a column in the public domain that is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide, and its base is not four handbreadths wide, and its narrowest point is more than three handbreadths high; and if one threw an object from the public domain and it came to rest atop the column, he is liable? Apparently, we say: Lower the partition. Since the column’s uppermost section is sufficiently wide, its partitions are considered as if they extend to the ground. Here, too, say: Lower the partition.,The Gemara asks: Are the case of the basket and the case of the boat comparable? There, in the case of the basket, it is a partition that goats pass through. A partition that does not serve as a barrier is not considered a partition. Here, it is a partition that goats do not pass through. It is considered a partition. Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Aḥa, said to Rav Ashi: In the case of a boat, too, there is the passage of fish, as they can swim through the lowered partitions of the boat. He said to him: Passage of fish is not considered passage because it is not visible. And from where do you say that this is so? As Rabbi Tavla raised a dilemma before Ravin: With regard to a hanging partition, what is the ruling in terms of it permitting one to carry in a ruin when part of the building’s walls are still intact, and they are still considered partitions? Ravin said to him: A hanging partition only permits one to carry in water. It is a leniency the Sages instituted in water but not in other circumstances. And why were they lenient with regard to a hanging partition in water? Isn’t there the passage of fish? Rather, learn from this that the passage of fish is not considered passage.,We learned in the mishna: If boats are tied together, one may carry an object from one to the other on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: That is obvious, since these boats are like a single domain. Rava said: This mishna was necessary only to permit carrying from one boat to another via a small boat that is between them.,Rav Safra said to him: You, who are as great in this generation as Moses, did you speak well? We learned in the mishna that one may carry only from one to the other, not via a small boat. Rather, Rav Safra said: The mishna was only necessary to obligate one to place an eiruv, a joining of courtyards, between the two boats. Since the boats belong to different people, they must be joined to form a single domain in order to permit carrying from one to the other, as it was taught in a baraita: With regard to boats tied to one another, one places an eiruv and carries from one to the other. If the ties between them were severed, the people on the boats are prohibited to carry from one to the other. If they were then retied, whether unwittingly, i.e., the one who retied them forgot that it was Shabbat, whether intentionally, whether due to circumstances beyond one’s control, whether mistakenly, the boats are restored to their original permitted status.,And similarly, in the case of mats that are unfurled to create a partition between two people and the public domain, one places an eiruv and carries from one to the other. If the mats were furled, the people on the boats are prohibited to carry from one to the other. If the mats were then unfurled again, whether unwittingly, whether intentionally, whether due to circumstances beyond one’s control, whether mistakenly, they are restored to their original permitted status. That is because any partition that is established on Shabbat, whether unwittingly, whether intentionally, is considered a partition.,The Gemara asks: Is that so? Didn’t Rav Naḥman say: They only taught the principle that a partition established on Shabbat is considered a partition with regard to throwing. In that case, a partition creates a domain unto itself, and one who throws an object into it from another domain is liable. However, with regard to carrying within that domain, it is certainly prohibited. The Gemara answers: When that statement of Rav Naḥman was stated, it was stated with regard to an act performed intentionally. One who intentionally establishes a partition is penalized and is not permitted to benefit from it. In principle, though, that partition is considered a full-fledged partition.,Shmuel said: The halakha that one may carry from one ship to another if they are tied together applies even if they were tied with a string used to close the neckline of a cloak. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If the string is capable of holding the ships together, it is obvious that carrying between the ships is permitted as they are tied together. However, if the string is incapable of holding them, why is it permitted?,The Gemara explains: Actually, it refers to a string that can hold them, and Shmuel said this to exclude this case from his own statement. As we learned in a mishna: If one tied a ship with an item capable of holding it and the end of that item was in a tent with a corpse, it transmits impurity to the ship. And if one tied it with something that is incapable of holding it, it does not transmit impurity to the ship. And Shmuel said: When the mishna refers to an item capable of holding it, it is referring to a case where it is tied with an iron chain. It was necessary for Shmuel to establish that although with regard to ritual impurity the halakha applies only to an iron chain, with regard to Shabbat the halakha applies to any item capable of holding the ships together. ,The reason that the halakha is different with regard to impurity is as it is written: “And whoever touches in the open field one slain by sword, or one who dies by himself, or a bone of a man, or a grave, shall be unclean seven days” (Numbers 19:16). The Sages derived from the phrase: One slain by sword that a sword is like one slain, i.e., a corpse. A metal instrument that comes into contact with a corpse assumes the same level of ritual impurity as the corpse itself, the ultimate primary source of ritual impurity. Therefore, it is only an iron chain in a tent with a corpse in it that can render a boat tied to the other end a primary source of ritual impurity. A string made of other materials cannot. However, with regard to Shabbat, since it is capable of holding it and it is a mere distinctive sign that is necessary, even the string of a cloak is sufficient. MISHNA: One who unwittingly throws an object from one domain to another or one who throws an object four cubits within the public domain, and after the object left his hand he remembered that he is in violation of a prohibition, if another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt. Similarly, if one threw a rock on Shabbat to inflict a wound on a person or on an animal, for which one is liable to bring a sin-offering, and he remembered that he was in violation of a prohibition before the wound was inflicted, he is exempt. This is the principle: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting. However, if the beginning of one’s action was unwitting and the conclusion was intentional, as he became aware that he was in violation of a prohibition, or if the beginning of one’s action was intentional and the conclusion was unwitting, the individuals in both of these cases are exempt until both the beginning and the conclusion are unwitting.,GEMARA: We learned in the mishna that if one throws an object unwittingly and then remembers that he was in violation of a prohibition, he is exempt if the object did not come to rest on the ground. The Gemara infers: If the object comes to rest, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Why is he liable? Didn’t he remember the prohibition before it landed, and we learned in the mishna: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action will be unwitting? If one remembered before the act was complete, he should be exempt. Rav Kahana said: With regard to the latter clause of the mishna, we have come to a special case of a bolt and a cord. The bolt is connected to a cord that one holds in his hand, which renders him capable of retrieving the bolt before it lands. Therefore, in a case where the beginning was unwitting and the conclusion was intentional, one is exempt because he is still capable of changing the outcome of the action. However, in the first clause of the mishna, once the object left his hand the action is irreversible, and therefore it is an action whose beginning and conclusion are unwitting.,The Gemara asks: The case of the bolt and the cord is one where one holds it in his hand. Therefore, no act of throwing actually took place, and there is no liability to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara answers: The case of the bolt and the cord was not stated with regard to Shabbat. Rather, it was stated with regard to one who intended to inflict a wound by throwing an object tied to a rope. The Gemara asks: This was also taught explicitly in the mishna: If one threw a rock on Shabbat to inflict a wound on a person or on an animal, and he remembered before the wound was inflicted, he is exempt. Rather, Rava said: This principle was stated with regard to a case of carrying, not throwing an object. Since one is holding the object the entire time while violating the prohibition, and is capable of letting it go at any time, this is a case whose beginning and conclusion are intentional.,The Gemara asks: Wasn’t this principle that was taught, taught with regard to throwing because that is the topic of the mishna? Rather, Rava said: Two separate matters were taught in the mishna. The first case is: One who unwittingly throws an object, and after the object left his hand he remembered that he was in violation of a prohibition. Alternatively, another case where one is exempt is: A case where one did not remember and another caught it, or a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt.,Rav Ashi said: The mishna is incomplete, and it teaches the following: One who throws a rock and remembers the violation after it left his hand, if another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt. By inference, if the object comes to rest, he is liable. Rav Ashi adds: In what case are these matters stated? In a case where one then forgot again before the object came to rest. However, if one did not then forget again, he is exempt because all who are liable to bring sin-offerings are liable only if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting.,We learned in the mishna that this is the principle: All who are liable to bring sin-offerings are only liable if the beginning of their action and the conclusion of their action are unwitting. It was stated that amora’im disputed this point. With regard to a case where one carried an object in the public domain two cubits unwittingly, and then became aware and carried it two more cubits intentionally, and then carried it two additional cubits unwittingly, and then placed the object, can this be characterized as a case in which the beginning of the action and the conclusion of the action are unwitting? Rabba said: One is exempt. Rava said: One is liable. ,The Gemara clarifies the two positions. Rabba said: One is exempt. This is the halakha even according to Rabban Gamliel, who said: There is no awareness for half a measure, and therefore he is liable. Since one is not liable to bring a sacrifice for a half-measure, the fact that he became aware between consumption of the two halves of an olive-bulk is of no significance. One’s awareness does not demarcate between the two half-measures of two cubits with regard to liability to bring a sin-offering. He only said so there, when the measure that determines liability was completed, it was completed unwittingly. However, here, when the measure is completed, it is completed intentionally. In that case, he would say no, he is not liable. The measure that determines liability for carrying in the public domain on Shabbat is four cubits. When the object reached four cubits, he was carrying the object intentionally.,The Gemara explains: And in what case was this stated? If it was stated with regard to a case of throwing, the entire act was unwitting because when he became aware, there was nothing he could do to prevent the object from landing. Rather, it must have been with regard to a case of carrying.,Rava said: One is liable. Even according to the Rabbis, who said: There is awareness for half a measure, and therefore he is exempt, they only said so there, where it is still in his control to complete or terminate the action. But here, where it is not in his control to affect the outcome, they would not say so and would deem him liable. And in what case was this stated? If it was stated with regard to a case of carrying, the outcome is still in his control. Rather, it must have been with regard to a case of throwing. Apparently, Rabba and Rava do not disagree. They are discussing separate cases.,Rabba said: If one unwittingly threw an object from one domain to another or unwittingly threw an object four cubits in a public domain on Shabbat, and it came to rest in the mouth of a dog or in a furnace, he is liable. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: If another caught it, or if a dog caught it, or if it was burned, he is exempt? The Gemara answers: There, the case of the mishna where one is exempt, one did not intend to throw it into the dog’s mouth. A dog came and snatched the object, preventing it from landing at its intended destination. Since the intention of the thrower was not realized, he is exempt. However, here, where Rabba said that the thrower is liable, he intended to throw the object into the dog’s mouth. He is liable because his intention was realized.,Rav Beivai bar Abaye said: We also learned support for that distinction in a mishna: There is a person who performs a single act of eating an olive-bulk of food, and he is liable to bring four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering. How so? This halakha applies to one who is ritually impure who ate forbidden fat that was notar from a consecrated offering, i.e., it remained after the time when it may have been eaten expired, and this happened on Yom Kippur. The person who did this is liable to bring one sin-offering for eating consecrated food while impure, one for eating forbidden fat, one for eating notar, and one for eating on Yom Kippur. He is also liable to bring a guilt-offering for misuse of consecrated items.,Rabbi Meir says: There is one more sin-offering for which he may be liable. In addition, if it was Shabbat and he carried this olive-bulk of food from one domain to another in his mouth, he is liable for carrying out on Shabbat. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Meir: Liability for the sin-offering that you added is not incurred from violation of the same type of prohibition. He is liable for carrying out the food, not for eating it. However, fundamentally, the Rabbis agree that one would be liable for carrying out in that case. The Gemara asks: And why would one be liable? That carrying, which was done in one’s mouth, is not the typical manner of carrying out. Rather, it must be that since he intended to carry out the object in that manner, his thought renders his mouth a suitable place for placement of an object. Here, too, since he intends to throw the object into the dog’s mouth, his thought renders the dog’s mouth a suitable place for placement of an object, and he is liable for throwing it there.